Breakthrough **Britain**

A Force to be Reckoned With

A Policy Report by the
Policing Reform Working Group

Chaired by Ray Mallon

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THE CENTRE FOR
SOCIAL
JUSTICE

About the Centre for Social Justice

The Centre for Social Justice aims to put social justice at the heart of British politics.

Our policy development is rooted in the wisdom of those working to tackle Britain's deepest social problems and the experience of those whose lives have been affected by poverty. Our working groups are non-partisan, comprising prominent academics, practitioners and policy makers who have expertise in the relevant fields. We consult nationally and internationally, especially with charities and social enterprises, who are the the champions of the welfare society.

In addition to policy development, the CSJ has built an alliance of poverty fighting organisations that reverse social breakdown and transform communities.

We believe that the surest way the Government can reverse social breakdown and poverty is to enable such individuals, communities and voluntary groups to help themselves.

The CSJ was founded by Iain Duncan Smith in 2004, as the fulfilment of a promise made to Janice Dobbie, whose son had recently died from a drug overdose just after he was released from prison.

Chairman: Rt Hon Iain Duncan Smith MP
Executive Director: Philippa Stroud

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Iain Duncan Smith

The former mayor of New York City, Rudy Giuliani, once told me that the success of the New York Police Department wasn't simply about more police but about more effective police. To achieve this, they had to become more visible and make the community their office and the street their zone of operation.

They had a clear purpose, which was to make the streets safe, so that law-abiding people could go about their daily lives without fear. An officer would come to work in the morning, get a briefing, and then get out on to the street. The police pledged to be at the scene of a crime within five minutes, and prided themselves on being there in two. Criminals knew that if the alarm was raised, they'd have only a tiny window of opportunity to commit the crime and get away.

When in their cars, they would patrol very slowly, even at a walking pace. Being in a car, however, allowed them to respond very quickly, if needed, to a larger beat area.

Meanwhile, every week the Commissioner would get together all the precinct captains at the CompStat briefing, and he'd call out each captain to explain the previous week's crime. The captains would personally be on the spot to explain their performance. They knew that the Commissioner had the power to hire and fire which kept them on their toes. At these meetings, they were expected to know crime figures down to the level of particular streets, and have a plan to deal with crime increases at this level. The result of this action was that crime levels fell and the public regained confidence in the police.

Yet the public in New York do not have different aspirations from the British people. In every opinion poll that I have seen, when asked what they think is important, the British public respond that they want the police to keep their streets free from crime and antisocial behaviour. Yet the same polls show that the public do not believe that this is a priority for the police and often complain that they do not see enough police on the street. As a result their confidence in the police is much lower than their counterparts in New York.

This is the challenge that I asked Ray Mallon to deal with: how to reform policing so that the police are able to become more effective and visible. Policing by consent, the historic formula for effective policing, is undermined if the public do not feel that their communities are as safe as they should be.

This report shows that the police themselves are unhappy with the way they have become increasingly bogged down by form-filling and target-chasing. They are frustratedW that they cannot do the job they joined to do. One figure sticks in my mind from the report's powerful analysis: that to put one officer on the street the police must hire five more. This illustrates just how bureaucratic the job has become. Such a figure shows why the public isn't moved by the Government's claim that there are more officers: as their experience suggests and as the figure shows, that doesn't mean more officers on the beat.

The report also shows how the priorities of the CPS run counter to those of the police, trapping the police in a huge paper chase and too often resulting in a refusal to prosecute as the police would wish.

The role of the Home Office also comes under scrutiny: the way successive Home Secretaries have politicised the police and tied them up in targets which promote the skewed priorities of politicians and not the effective operation of the police. Successive governments have centralised ordinary policing – most recently under the umbrella of the very real terrorist threat. This report makes it clear that it is time to decentralise and rediscover proper policing.

Ray Mallon and his team have set out a series of recommendations which will, I believe, make the police more effective and properly accountable through elected commissioners, while leaving the police their proper operational independence.

We need police who treat the streets as their office, dealing with antisocial behaviour in a way that deters as well as punishes. Police officers need to know that they can take the necessary risks and use their discretion, and that they'll be supported by politicians and the public when they do.

In short this report sets out the plan to make the police a force to be reckoned with and a force for good.

Rt Hon Iain Duncan Smith, MP
Chairman, Centre for Social Justice

Chairman's Foreword

I was delighted to lead this piece of work because I know what a massive impact policing has on every person, in every street, in every village, town and city in this country. Good policing is a basic expectation for every citizen and this report aims to make sure that it happens.

Over the last ten years, policing has become far too complicated and needs to be made simpler. At its heart, policing is about the relationship between police officers and the public that they serve. But more and more, I see officers who have been conditioned by the need to police by government prescription, set down in action plans, performance indicators and targets. During the course of this work, I met officers who craved the return of their discretion but I also met officers who had never known, in their short service, the important place of that discretion in providing a service to the public.

In my day to day role as an elected Mayor, I see the value of police officers intervening in the street to challenge unacceptable behaviour. Discretion is a vital part of those interventions as it allows officers to judge when to make an arrest and when to use an informal approach. In the public's eyes, they will judge the officer's intervention not by its achievement of some government target but by whether it makes their street a better place to live.

Police officers are an expensive but vital resource. As a senior police officer, I knew that one officer represented just under 2,000 available resource hours per year and I saw my job, as their leader, as making the best possible use of every one of those hours to provide the best possible service to the public.

If policing is to improve, it is vital that it operates as a true profession, responsible for its own development and strongly led by Chief Officers who are freed from political interference and have genuine operational independence. It is also vital that Chief Officers are overseen by truly effective local governance which holds the Chief Constable to account but also has the power to hold to account all of the agencies who combine together to make our streets safer.

I want the criminal justice system to become a real system and I want the police to become, once again, a Force to be reckoned with.

Ray Mallon
Chairman, Policing Reform Working Group

Members of the Policing Reform Working Group

Ray Mallon (Chairman)

Ray is currently serving his second term as the elected mayor of Middlesbrough. Before 2002, Ray spent 28 years as a police officer, rising through the ranks to become Detective Superintendent in charge of Criminal Investigation in Hartlepool and Middlesbrough in 1996. 'Robocop', as he came to be known in the press, cut crime in Middlesbrough by 20 per cent in 18 months through proactive policing and a focus on education and rehabilitation. Ray is a board member of the regeneration agency One NorthEast as well as a columnist for *The Northern Echo*. He used to play water polo for Great Britain.

Norman Dennis

Norman Dennis was Reader in Sociology at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. He is now Director of Community Studies at CIVITAS. His main publications on the topic of crime, the police and the disappearance of the institution of life-long monogamy, have been *Families Without Fatherhood*; *Rising Crime and the Dismembered Family*; *Racist Murder and Pressure Group Politics*; *The Failure of Britain's Police*; *Zero Tolerance: Policing a Free Society* (ed.); and *Cultures and Crimes*.

David Green

Dr David Green is the Director of CIVITAS: The Institute for the Study of Civil Society. He has written a number of books on public policy issues: *Power and Party in an English City; Mutual Aid or Welfare State*; *The New Right*; *Reinventing Civil Society*; *Community Without Politic*; and *Individualists Who Co-operate*. Two books deal with crime. In 2005, he wrote *Crime and Civil Society: Can we become a more law-abiding people?* and, in 2006, *We're (Nearly) All Victims Now: How Political Correctness is Undermining Our Liberal Culture*. He was a member of the Home Secretary's Crime Statistics Review Group, which in 2006 recommended improvements in the collection of the crime figures.

Steve Green QPM

Steve Green retired as Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire after eight years in May 2008. He was previously an Assistant Chief Constable with Staffordshire Police following his promotion in December 1996. He started his policing career with North Yorkshire Police in 1978, having served for four years in the Army as an officer with the Royal Corps of Signals. He was appointed as Chief Inspector with North Yorkshire in 1989 and became Divisional Commander at Malton in 1991 and then York in 1993. Mr. Green has a Master of Arts degree in Management Systems from the University of Hull and was awarded the Queen's Police Medal in the New Year's Honours' in 2002.

Ken Pease OBE

A forensic psychologist by training, Ken is currently Visiting Professor at University College London, the University of Loughborough and Chester University. Before retirement, he held chairs at the Universities of Manchester and Saskatchewan where he worked in the maximum security Regional Psychiatric Centre (Prairies). He has acted as Head of the Police Research Group at the Home Office, and has been a member of the Parole Board for England and Wales. He is a member of the Home Office Design and Technology Alliance and sat on the Steering Group of the DBERR review of Home Office science.

Sir Charles Pollard QPM

Charles Pollard was Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police, the UK's largest non-Metropolitan force, for eleven years up to February 2002 following service in London and Sussex. During that time Thames Valley Police became the first police organisation to develop the use of Restorative Justice in community policing and for tackling young offending. He then chaired the Justice Research Consortium, a partnership of criminal justice agencies undertaking trials on Restorative Justice for the Home Office under its Crime Reduction Programme, in conjunction with Professor Lawrence. A board member of the Youth Justice Board for England & Wales from its inception in 1999 to August 2006, Charles led on Youth Restorative Justice and was Acting Chairman in 2003–2004. He is now Chairman of Restorative Solutions Community Interest Company, a not-for-profit organization providing the police, criminal justice agencies and community based organisations with support on implementing Restorative Justice.

Jonathan Shepherd CBE

Jonathan Shepherd is Professor of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery (Head of Department 1991–2004), Vice Dean at Cardiff University and Director of the Cardiff University Violence Research Group. His many contributions to public policy, legislation and practice in the areas of preventing violent crime, caring for victims and tackling alcohol misuse stem from his continuing clinical practice and research funded by the NHS R&D Scheme, research charities and the Research Councils. His discoveries include the great extent to which violence resulting in NHS treatment is not reported to the police, the substantial mental health impact of violence on victims and the effectiveness of partnership interventions. He led the development of the pioneering Universities' Police Science Institute – opened by the Prince of Wales in 2007. Awards include the Sellin Glueck Award (2003) of the American Society of Criminology for outstanding international contributions to criminology, and the 2008 Stockholm Criminology Prize. He was appointed CBE in the 2008 New Year's Honours.

Adam Schoenborn (Author)

Adam Schoenborn joined the Centre for Social Justice as a Researcher after completing his M.Sc. in Political Theory at the London School of Economics, where he received the Oakeshott/Cranston Prize for best overall performance. Adam has also received the Saul and Freda Frankel Award, awarded by McGill University in Montreal for an outstanding research paper on the history of ideas. Adam's background includes work for Legal Aid Ontario, the Disability Rights Commission and the Overseas Development Institute.

Advisors

Jan Berry QPM

Mrs. Jan Berry is the former Chairman of the Police Federation of England & Wales, having been elected its first female chairman in 2002. She gained a reputation for being professional, balanced and a free thinker and is widely recognised as an effective public speaker and media commentator. In 2008 Jan retired from Kent Police after 37 years service, having gained experience in a variety of duties from beat officer to CID. Jan rose quickly through the ranks to patrol inspector, being promoted Chief Inspector in 1997. She introduced Juvenile Liaison Bureaus and Rape Victim Suites in Kent and was a key member of the team that introduced the Crime Prevention initiative "Secured by Design". Jan's contribution was recognised in 2006 when she received the Queen's Police

Medal. Jan has recently taken up an appointment as an Independent Government Advisor to champion the reduction of unnecessary bureaucracy in the Police Service.

Lawrence Sherman
Lawrence W. Sherman is the Wolfson Professor of Criminology and Director of the Police Executive Programme at Cambridge University, where he is a Fellow of Darwin College. After beginning his career as a research analyst in the New York City Police Department, he developed the field of "evidence-based" policing by designing or directing over 30 randomized controlled experiments in police field operations in the US, the UK and Australia. His books include *Policing Domestic Violence, Evidence-based Crime Prevention*, and the forthcoming *Experimental Criminology*. A past President of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, the International and American Societies of Criminology, and the Academy of Experimental Criminology, he has received awards for distinguished service from numerous police agencies.

This report represents the views of the Working Group as a whole and does not reflect at every point the individual opinion of each and every Working Group member.

Glossary of Acronyms

A&E	Accident and Emergency
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
APACS	Assessments of Policing and Community Safety
ASB	Antisocial Behaviour
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic Command Unit
CAM	Community Accountability Meeting
CJS	Criminal Justice System
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
LAA	Local Area Agreement
LCJB	Local Criminal Justice Board
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
NCRS	National Crime Recording Standard
OBTJ	Offence Brought to Justice
ONS	Office for National Statistics
PCSO	Police Community Support Officers
PND	Penalty Notice for Disorder
PPAF	Policing Performance Assessment Framework
PSA	Police Superintendents' Association
PURE	Police Use of Resources
SPI	Statutory Performance Indicator
TIC	Taken Into Consideration

Executive Summary

At its heart, policing is about the relationship between police officers and the public that they serve. Increasingly, however, the focus of policing in England and Wales has become the centrally set targets, indicators and priorities that have jeopardised the Police Service's unique history of localism and "policing by consent".

The Policing Reform Working Group was convened to address this challenge and point a direction forward for policing in England and Wales. The Working Group brought together independent experts from the world of policing, politics, research, criminology and the wider criminal justice system to do so.

The recommendations in this report have been designed to give officers the time, the skills and the discretion they need to get on with the job. The proposed "Interventionist Neighbourhood Policing" model insists on keeping police on the streets, with a commitment always to intervene against crime and antisocial behaviour. To allow this to happen, and to put local priorities back at the heart of local policing, a Crime and Justice Commissioner will be elected in every Force area.

1. The Police

The Police Service of England and Wales, made up of 43 "independent" local Forces, is one of the largest, most important and impactful public services in the country and is esteemed among police services internationally for its reputation, based on its history of local policing and policing by consent.

In 1990, the Association of Chief Police Officers defined the Police Service's mission as:

- To uphold the law fairly and firmly;
- To prevent crime;
- To pursue and bring to justice those who break the law;
- To keep the Queen's Peace;
- To protect, help and reassure the community; and
- To be seen to do all this with integrity, common sense and sound judgement.[1]

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1   Association of Chief Police Officers, *Setting the standards for policing: Meeting community standards* (London: Association of Chief Police Officers 1990).

However, changes in society and in criminality have meant that the scope of this mission has expanded rapidly in order to keep pace. "Upholding the law" has come to incorporate such diverse functions as: e-crime, offender management, asset confiscation and the increasingly globalised challenges of terrorism and serious organised crime.

The question: "What do we want the police to do?" was raised repeatedly to the Working Group. Before any further reform of the Police Service is attempted, the police mission should be clearly defined and the breadth of services that it is required to provide should be clearly understood.

Towards the delivery of its mission, the Service now employs 140,000 full-time officers. This represents an increase of more than 16 per cent in the number of fully sworn police officers since 2000.[2]

With an annual budget of over £17.5 billion, the Police Service makes up more than half of the entire public order and safety budget (which includes the fire services, law courts and prisons).[3] Policing costs £283 per person annually in the United Kingdom. This amounts to over 3 per cent of the UK's total annual public sector expenditure.[4] Policing has not always commanded such a large proportion of national expenditure – over the past decade alone, spending on the police has increased by 40 per cent in real terms (or 75 per cent in cash terms).[5] Taken as a percentage of its GDP, the UK now spends more on law and order than any other OECD country.[6]

The Working Group observed a Police Service that is better resourced though often unnecessarily constrained in its ability to deploy its resources effectively, and has set about reform guided by the principle that the Police Service must recognise that its most precious commodity is the "resource hours" provided by its staff.

2. The Police Perspective

During the course of researching this report, the Working Group visited forces in London, Surrey, Cleveland, Nottinghamshire and South Yorkshire in an attempt to capture the voice of policing today, from the viewpoint of both police leaders and frontline officers. In addition, they took evidence from the leaders of the main staff associations and from members of other Forces and institutions. Their input played an important part in shaping the Working Group's recommendations.

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2   Garside, R., and Groombridge, N., *Criminal justice resources staffing and workloads: an initial assessment* (London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2008), 6, http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/opus978/Criminal_justice_resources_staffing_and_workloads.pdf.
3   HM Treasury, *Public Expenditure Statistcal Analyses 2008: National Statistics* (London: HM Treasury, 2008), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/9/A/pesa08-09_pu548_210408.pdf, Table 5.2.
4   Ibid.
5   Ibid.
6   Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, *Strategic Priorities for the UK: the Policy Review* (London: Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, 2006), 22.

Across the entire Police Service, officers universally emphasised the opportunity to "serve the public" and "make a difference" as the best parts of police work today. They frequently praised the Neighbourhood Policing model and an increasing focus on local priorities, as well as the camaraderie of police work and the diversity of the challenge faced.

> "The soul of policing is still good. People join the police with the right motives. People who join want to help protect the public."
>
> *Temporary Chief Constable Rowley, Surrey*

> "I think you actually make a massive difference just by putting your uniform on."
>
> *Response Team Officer, Cleveland*

The Working Group was also impressed by the honest and open critique given by officers, best summarised by one officer's concern that: "I don't think we provide the service that the public wants." The chief problems identified by senior and frontline police officers as holding them back from providing "the service that the public wants" were: political interference (both local and national); performance targets and inspection frameworks; and the numerous issues affecting the time police have for patrol and public interaction. The Working Group put these issues at the heart of its recommendations for policing reform.

The commitment to public service demonstrated by police officers is a significant asset and the Service should be led, managed and governed in a manner which fosters and encourages this commitment.

3. The Public Perspective

Generally, public confidence is used as a proxy for an array of persistently troubling indicators of public attitudes towards the police, including: trust and confidence in the police (and, more generally, the criminal justice system); as well as fear and perceptions of crime. In an attempt to understand and capture public sentiment on policing today, the Centre for Social Justice commissioned a poll of over 2,000 adults, aged 18+, across Britain.

Nationally, the public has low (and, in some cases, declining) confidence in the Police Service. Satisfaction levels are markedly worse among those who have had contact with the police, not least as witnesses.[7] At present, only four

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7   Bradford, B., Jackson, J., and Stanko, E., *Contact and Confidence: On the Distribution and Significance of Public Encounters with the Police* (London: London School of Economics).
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/methodologyInstitute/pdf/JonJackson/Contact_and_Confidence.pdf

out of ten believe the police can be relied upon to deal with minor crime.[8] Polling suggests that public trust in the police is significantly lower than comparable professions and declining (only 59 per cent of people report trusting the police, down from 64 per cent in 2003).[9]

This suggests that while driving police activity through quantitative assessment may have delivered substantial improvements in reducing crime (as discussed in Section 4), it is failing to convince the public that the Police Service is on its side.

Crime reduction is only one factor significantly influencing public confidence in the police. Other factors identified by the British Crime Survey (BCS) – such as perceived fairness, satisfaction after contact and relevance of police activity to community concerns[10] – are much less tangible, and sometimes have no obvious metric by which to assess performance.

Similarly, researchers and politicians are often troubled by a so-called "perception gap" between the (increasing) public fear of crime and the (declining) official crime rates. However, research underpinning the influential Signal Crimes Perspective supports the conclusion that reducing fear of crime is unlikely to be achieved simply by the pursuit of national targets and priorities, since:

> *Levels of concern about safety are profoundly shaped by the presence of incivilities and disorder in an area. Indeed, the research suggests that in some areas, levels of disorder are more influential than crime in shaping perceived risk ... Perceptions of risk vary considerably by area, and different signal crimes and signal disorders function as causes of insecurity in different locations.*[11]

Ultimately, even if police activity is successfully reducing crime, if it does so without simultaneously reassuring the public, then the legitimacy of the Police Service will, ultimately, be undermined.

4. The State of Crime and Disorder

In response to the question: "What is the most important issue facing Britain today?" a staggering 47 per cent of people polled by Ipsos MORI last year answered: "Crime."[12] The predominance of crime as the national

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8   Home Affairs Select Committee, *Policing in the 21st Century* (London: Home Affairs Select Committee, 2008), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/364/36402.htm, 3.

9   Ipsos MORI " Trust in Professions 2007" (London: Ipsos MORI, 2007). http://www.ipsos-mori.com/content/polls-07/trust-in-professions-2007.ashx.

10   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf, 119.

11   Ibid.

12   Ipsos MORI, *Political Trends: The most important issues facing Britain today* (London: Ipsos MORI, 2008), http://www.ipsos-mori.com/content/the-most-important-issues-facing-britain-today.ashx. Subsequent polling by Ipsos MORI has shown concern for "crime" at 35 per cent, with this decline having being offset by concern for "the economy".

concern in England and Wales is out of step with international trends, as crime is "a bigger cause for concern for Britons than the citizens of any equivalent western European nation, and even the United States."[13]

Crime statistics in Britain are collected in two very different ways, which paint rather different pictures of the state of crime. The police keep records of the crimes which are reported to them by the public or detected in the course of duty; whereas the British Crime Survey aims to give "a better reflection of the true extent of crime", and polls a large cross-section of the population to ask about experiences as victims of crime.[14]

As Figure 1 shows, police recorded crime statistics showed just under five million offences in total for the financial year 2007/08. This represents a nine per cent drop from the previous year, and an 18 per cent drop from the recorded peak in 2003/04, returning crime levels to just under the levels recorded for 1998/99.

In contrast, the BCS estimated that there were 10.1 million crimes committed in the financial year 2007/08. This represents a 48 per cent drop in overall crime since the peak BCS year of 1995.[15] At this peak, the BCS measured 19.3 million crimes. This has meant a drop to overall crime levels below those of the baseline year of 1981.

Figure 1: Recorded and BCS Crime Levels 1981–2007/08[16]

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13   Morris, N., "The Big Question: Does fear of crime reflect the reality of life on Britain's streets?", *The Independent*, 22 January, 2008. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/the-big-question-does-fear-of-crime-reflect-the-reality-of-life-on-britains-streets-771727.html; Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., Crime in England and Wales 2007/08 (London: Home Office, 2008), 129. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf.

14   Jansson, K., *British Crime Survey: Measuring Crime for 25 Years* (London: Home Office, 2007), 3. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/bcs25.pdf.

15   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), 2. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf.

16   Home Office, *A Summary of Recorded Crime Data 1898 to 2001/2* (London: Home Office, 2008) http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/recordedcrime1.html; Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., Crime in England and Wales 2007/08 (London: Home Office, 2008), 2. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf.

"The amount of resources available for the number of incidents has not kept pace. The huge amount of resources that has been put into policing has largely gone into counter-terrorism and Neighbourhood policing."

Chief Constable Hughes, South Yorkshire

But is this the whole picture? Despite the fact that 16 per cent of people experience high levels of worry over antisocial behaviour (ASB),[17] a large proportion of antisocial acts, such as begging, noise and rowdy behaviour, are not recordable crimes and as such escapes analysis of crime rates. Crime statistics should take a wide view of crime and disorder, in order to capture elements of social disorder which affect the public sense of safety and risk.

Analysis of current crime rates also often fails to take into account anything before the BCS baseline year of 1981. Thus, when officials interpret recent decreases in crime to mean that "the risk of becoming a victim of crime is still historically low",[18] they do so with reference to a history of less than thirty years.

Figure 2: All Recorded Offences in England and Wales 1898–2008[19]

As Figure 2 illustrates, between 1940 and 1960 recorded crime rates doubled. In the following two decades, leading up to the BCS baseline year, recorded

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17   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), 11. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf.18   Simmons, J., and Dodd, T., *Crime in England and Wales 2002/03* (London: Home Office, 2003), . http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/statistics/statistics28.htm.

19   Home Office, *A Summary of Recorded Crime Data 1898 to 2001/2* (London: Home Office, 2008) http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/recordedcrime1.html.

20   Ibid.

crime increased again nearly threefold.[20] While the claim that Britain is a high crime society is often dismissed as nostalgia for a golden age that never existed, it is difficult to downplay the fact that the average citizen (who, in Britain, is aged 39) has lived through a fourfold increase in overall crime during the course of his or her lifetime. This added demand for police services only serves to further underline the importance of using police time effectively.

5. How Police Time is Spent

Do you think that there are enough police on the streets?	
Yes there are	9%
No there are not	**85%**
Don't know	6%
CSJ YouGov polling results, Jan 2009	

The vast majority (85 per cent) of the public thinks that there are not enough police on the street. Government estimates in 2008 put the average amount of officer time spent on street patrol as low as 14 per cent.[21] Much of that time is spent patrolling in pairs which halves the extent and visibility of patrol. Officers are spending less than a fifth of their time on patrol, which translates to every full-time officer patrolling for less than seven hours a week. At that rate, in order for a Force to add one full-time officer to street patrol, five new officers need to be employed.

The Working Group also noted the irony of PCSOs (Police Community Support Officers), who have less training and fewer formal powers than fully sworn officers, having 75 per cent of their time available for patrol functions.[22] While recognising that PCSOs bring benefits to communities, the Working Group's recommendations have sought not only to bridge the gap in patrol time between fully-sworn officers and PCSOs, but to give Chief Constables the discretion to get the right balance between the two on the streets.

Street patrol, and public contact, is one of the most important police functions and allocated police "resource hours" must take account of the importance which the public place upon it.

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21   Home Affairs Select Committee, *Policing in the 21st Century* (London: Home Affairs Select
      Committee, 2008), 3.
      http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/364/36402.htm.
22   Ibid, 3.

The main issues affecting police time for patrol and public interaction identified by the Working Group were: bureaucracy (especially around form-filling and the Crown Prosecution Service); insufficient or ineffective information technology; abstraction from frontline duties to specialist squads; inspections and assessments; and, of particular interest to the Working Group, the increasingly prescribed and inefficient way officers are forced to deal with incidents.

Police discretion over how to respond to an incident is discussed in detail in Section 6, but its impact on police time cannot be overstated. As Figure 3 details, the type of disposal available to an officer greatly impacts their available time. For example, an arrest leading to trial takes approximately fifteen times more police resource hours than issuing a Penalty Notice for Disorder.

Figure 3: Police Resources Required for Disposals

	Penalty Notice for Disorder	Standard Caution	Conditional Caution	Guilty Plea (Court)	Trial (Court)	Restorative Justice
Police Time (hours)[23]	0.53	1.73	2.09	7.59	7.81	0.3
Cost to Police (£)[24]	13.49	43.45	52.35	189.96	195.23	7.50

Discretion is at the heart of and fundamental to effective policing and must be exercised at all times when dealing with the public. When determining an appropriate intervention against crime or antisocial behaviour, the consequences for resource hours committed to visible patrol should legitimately be considered. These principles are strongly supported by a public that feels more reassured by a Police Service whose visibility consists of police intervening on the street rather than just arrests on paper.

Which of the following would make you feel safer?

Seeing more police on the street	62%
Finding out that more criminals were being arrested	26%
Neither	9%
Don't know	3%

CSJ YouGov polling results, Jan 2009

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23   Home Office, "Efficiency Planning Toolkit – Ready Reckoner" (London: Home Office 2006). http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/human-resources/efficiency-planning/EPl_Readyreckoner.xls?view=Standard&pubID=528315.

24   Costings for police time provided to the Working Group by Norfolk Constabulary, based on the Office for Criminal Justice Reform's "Waterfall" model.

6. A Force to be Measured?

The Police Service has been the subject of a number of reform initiatives during the past fifteen years. Taken individually, these have had some merit; however, when taken together, they have had a devastating effect on policing and its ability to serve the public. Specifically, the combination of the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS), the targets regime, and the drive to "Narrowing the Justice Gap" has destroyed the discretion which had hitherto been central to the office of constable.

> "Counting Offences Brought to Justice pressurises staff to focus on total numbers. It values arresting a twelve year old shoplifter the same as a murderer or drug dealer."
>
> *Senior Officer, Surrey*

The NCRS was introduced in 2002 in an attempt to enforce common practices and standards nationally and reduce the scope for manipulation of the data by which police are measured. It requires that all reported incidents that technically amount to a crime be recorded by police as reported, unless there is evidence to the contrary – effectively removing all discretion over whether to formally treat a given incident as a crime.

In 2002, the Government also introduced an initiative designed to bridge the so-called "Justice Gap" – the then increasing gap between the number of crimes recorded and the number which resulted in an offender being brought to justice. At the heart of this initiative was a hard-edged commitment to increase the number of "Offences Brought to Justice" (OBTJs), those incidents disposed of by formal sanctions such as arrest or caution.

Finally, the introduction of heavily pressurised targets (currently embodied in the national APACS framework), whereby goals for policing have been linked to financial and career incentives and sanctions, have created a system which perversely incentivised certain quantitative outcomes for police (including maximising OBTJs) regardless of the qualitative outcomes for victims and the community.

Taken together, these three initiatives have produced a highly toxic mixture which has had the effect of corroding the very fabric of British policing. Officers are faced with a rigid National Crime Recording Standard, a suite of nationally determined targets to which they must contribute (regardless of the needs of a victim or any other member of the public) and the further requirement to increase the volume of Offences Brought to Justice. In this context, it is easy to see how a Police Service has been created in which discretion, which had hitherto been seen as central to the role of a constable, has been all but destroyed. In its place has been the thoughtless criminalisation of (usually young) people for the most petty of offences, in the name of achieving government targets.

Police have been held accountable, both individually and collectively as teams and a Force, for maximising the quantity and proportion of formal disposals – regardless of how that impacts the service received by the public in any given situation. The following situation, which was described to the Working Group, is a perfect example of how this has affected policing.

A mum comes in and says: 'My daughter's thirteen and she's stolen 35p from my purse.' Guess what? The 13 year old gets locked up, a social worker comes in, the girl gets interviewed, admits to taking the 35p, she gets fingerprinted, has her DNA taken and she gets reprimanded. The girl has behavioural difficulties, she's not being supported the way she should. She needed the 35p to get to school.

Only 31 per cent of people polled thought that the standard response to such an incident should be for the police to treat it as a crime, while 48 per cent thought that they should not. The withdrawal of constabulary discretion has led to thoughtless, ineffective and inefficient police responses to social problems, and undermined the relationship between the public and the police.

Do you think it is ever acceptable for an on-duty police officer not to intervene when they have observed a crime or a threat to public safety?

Yes it is sometimes acceptable	24%
No it is never acceptable	**72%**
Don't know	4%

CSJ YouGov polling results, Jan 2009

7. A Force to be Reckoned With

The Working Group acknowledges Neighbourhood Policing as a starting point towards increasing street patrol, visibility, community interaction, partnership work and flexible disposals, but would describe the style which is now required as: "Interventionist Neighbourhood Policing". Building on the strengths of Neighbourhood Policing, this style of policing would incorporate a "commitment to intervene": a philosophy that every single observed or evidenced behaviour which is criminal or antisocial should be subject to an appropriate intervention. The Working Group believes that this is a challenging but achievable aspiration, which will require the following key ingredients:

- A commitment by the police to intervene in any observed act of crime or antisocial behaviour;
- The rebuilding of discretion for police officers;
- Closer affinity between Neighbourhood and Response officers;
- Better management of resources to ensure that the maximum quantity and range of interventions can be delivered; and
- An increased skilling of officers to ensure that they have the capability to deliver the widest possible range of interventions.

Do you think the police are intervening enough, too much or too little against antisocial behaviour?

Too much	3%
Too little	**76%**
About enough	15%
Don't know	7%

CSJ YouGov polling results, Jan 2009

The Service should begin by adopting Surrey's "Harm's Way" policy, which obliges officers to place themselves "between any vulnerable individual or group and a dangerous person intent on causing harm or injury". The Working Group also recommends that, in order to facilitate appropriate and resource-efficient interventions, all officers should be trained to employ discretion to choose amongst a range of possible disposals.

Restorative Justice approaches offer a range of commonsense and effective disposals, which can be applied by officers before engaging the criminal justice system. Interventions based on Restorative Justice principles proceed by establishing a joint agreement between everyone involved on how the offender should "pay back" and repair the harm that they have caused. This is a powerful process which motivates everyone involved – the victim has questions answered and can move on, while the offender is internally motivated to change their behaviour in the future. Rigorous research shows that this process, which requires the consent of all involved, provides high satisfaction for victims and often reduces re-offending significantly. It also strengthens community bonds.

The Police Service should develop a policing style which energetically tackles harm or the threat of harm in communities but does so in a way which builds confidence among the public that the police are on their side.

8. The Independence and Accountability of the Police

The Tripartite governance structure for policing, as originally conceived under the Police Act of 1964, was designed to give sufficient power to each party – the Home Secretary, Police Authorities and Chief Constables – to ensure that no one party could dominate the other two in setting the agenda for policing in any given locality. Based on the evidence it received, the Working Group took the view that its aspiration to see Interventionist Neighbourhood Policing delivered in every neighbourhood could not be achieved within the current governance arrangements. The Tripartite structure in its current form is not fit for purpose and needs to be rebalanced.

In making its recommendations on how to rebalance the Tripartite structure, the Working Group has strived to secure a robust sphere of operational independence for Chief Constables to pursue democratically established policing priorities. These priorities should be set – by directly elected representatives – at a local level for local policing (informed by "Citizens Juries" appointed in every BCU) and at a national level for the so-called Protective Services.

Thus, the Working Group has sought to balance this independence with a level of local, democratic priority-setting and accountability, through the election of a Crime and Justice Commissioner for each of the 43 local Force areas. This is important not only to provide local police oversight, but to balance against the encroaching priority-setting power of the Home Secretary, who is currently alone in the Tripartite structure in having a direct electoral mandate. The only possibility of wresting control of local policing back into local hands is through the route of a directly elected office.

The effective aim of a local democratic mandate is to strengthen the Police Authority in the Tripartite system, while also giving it the leadership and direct democratic feedback needed to be effective in its role. To protect against abuse and ensure a qualified individual is selected for this position, candidates should be required to have at least five years experience in a senior role related to one of the criminal justice professions, and to stand as independents – without party support and with no previous history of having stood for election representing any political party.

Putting control of local policing back in local hands means scrapping the current target regime, to be replaced by a maximum of five national targets around the delivery of Protective Services. At a local level, performance should be measured by a flexible and weighted "Harm Index".

9. Embedding Evidence-Based Policing

Grounding police work in practical research about "what works" will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of police action. Not only will this improve the service that the public receives, but it will provide police with a defence against what officers described as "kneejerk political directives". By increasing police professionalism and acting as a bulwark against political interference, embedding a culture of evidence-based policing will help to restore and defend constabulary discretion.

Evidence-based policing uses the best evidence to shape the best practice about what works in reducing crime. It promotes the use of experimentation to test practical theories about crime reduction, in the long-run building up a body of practical knowledge, grounded in rigorous research.

In just the same way that medical research is developed by medical research schools, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, and the Royal Colleges, embedding evidence-based policing requires the foundation of police research institutes in our universities, a research council and professional bodies.

10. The Crown Prosecution Service

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is responsible for charging suspects and prosecuting criminal cases investigated by the police. The former purpose impacts greatly on how the police operate. Frontline officers told the Working Group about the speed of CPS responses and their availability outside 9–5 working hours. It is also felt that, in its role of gatekeeper to the courts, the CPS stops many good cases from making it to trial. CPS targets are based on the proportion of successful convictions, giving CPS lawers an interest in only pursuing the most clear-cut convictions. One officer told us:

> We had a PPO [prolific and other priority offender] smash up a booking shop. The CPS wouldn't charge because there was no CCTV. There were witness statements. He was seen by us. That afternoon he was released and raped a 16 year old girl behind the same shop. That's the kind of thing that gets to you.

The decisions taken by the CPS affect both the morale of the police and public confidence in policing and the criminal justice system, in some cases directly lowering public confidence in the police:

Does it lower your confidence in the police when a criminal is released without charge?	
Yes it does	**69%**
No it doesn't	23%
Don't know	8%
CSJ YouGov polling results, Jan 2009	

While the Working Group recognises the benefit in an independent decision on the likely strength of a charge, and robust advice to police about evidence requirements, for many types of "volume crime" this procedure is unnecessary and counter-productive.

Summary of Recommendations

As a result of the problems and policy failures identified in the preceding sections, the Working Group makes the following proposals to reinvigorate traditions of localism and policing by consent.

CRIME STATISTICS:

1. Alternative sources of data should be utilised to enrich the picture given by crime statistics and inform crime reduction initiatives.
2. The responsibility for the collection and public presentation of crime or crime related data should rest with an independent body, which is free from control by the Police Service and local or national government.

THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF FULLY-SWORN POLICE OFFICERS AND PCSOS:

3. The effectiveness of PCSOs should be enhanced by their being trained to make full use of their citizen's powers of arrest.
4. The Chief Constable should determine the mix of PCs and PCSOs locally.

A COMMITMENT TO INTERVENE:

5. The Working Group recommends "Interventionist Neighbourhood Policing" as the natural progression from the current Neighbourhood Policing model.
6. The Working Group recommends the Surrey "Harm's Way" Policy for adoption by the whole Service.
7. All officers must be trained to deliver the widest possible range of interventions in response to crime or antisocial behaviour.
8. Specifically, officers should be trained to deliver Restorative Justice disposals in situations where they deem a conventional criminal justice disposal to be inappropriate.
9. Officers need to be properly trained and supported in the use of constabulary discretion to determine what type of disposal is appropriate in any given circumstance.

A REBALANCED TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE:

10. The role of the Home Secretary in the Tripartite structure should focus on setting standards and objectives for Protective Services and cede greater control of local policing to local governance arrangements.

11. The Home Secretary should:
    - Retain an involvement in the appointment and dismissal of Chief Constables; but only sufficient to act as a safeguard against the inappropriate use of these powers by Police Authorities.
    - Retain an overview of the delivery of local policing and a means of exercising accountability in cases of significant and persistent under-performance.
    - Control and hold to account Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.

12. A Crime and Justice Commissioner should be elected for every Police Force area in the country.

13. The Commissioner should:
    - Act as a figurehead for community safety.
    - Chair the Police Authority and hold to account the Local Criminal Justice Board and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships.
    - Set local priorities for all of these agencies and influence the spending of budgets across partnerships.
    - Be accountable to the Home Secretary where there is evidence of significant and persistent under-performance.
    - Have a duty to consult the public and coordinate consultation by all of the partner agencies, including by convening Citizens Juries in every BCU.

14. Police Authorities should:
    - Consist of ten ordinary members with the Crime and Justice Commissioner making the eleventh.
    - Be appointed in the manner of the current independent members, being selected for the relevant skills they hold to assist in the discharging of the functions of the Authority.
    - Have the duty to maintain an efficient and effective Police Force.
    - Have the power to appoint, appraise and dismiss the Chief Constable.
    - Hold the Chief Constable to account for his/her performance against the Crime and Justice Commissioner's priorities.
    - Set the police budget and set the precept for any contribution from local taxation.

15. Chief Constables should:
    - No longer be subject to Fixed Term Appointments.
    - No longer receive Performance-Related Bonuses.
    - Have the power to appoint their own top team.
    - Have the power to appoint top team members, from the lower ranks, on a fixed term basis.

STREAMLINED INSPECTION AND LOCAL ASSESSMENT:

16. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary should:
    - Be the single gateway for all inspection/assessment activity within every Police Force.
    - Agree an allocation of hours with the Police Service for each force and then determine the priorities for utilising those hours for inspection activity.
    - Reduce the burden placed on Forces by this type of activity.

17. Scrap APACS as the national performance assessment system.

18. Replace APACS with a small number of national indicators (not more than 5).

19. Introduce the Harm Index to manage performance at local level.

POLICE INTERVENTIONS BASED ON WELL-GROUNDED RESEARCH:

20. Evidence-based policing should be the foundation doctrine for all police interventions.

21. Establish university police schools in Russell Group universities.

22. Establish a new research council to support police research.

23. Establish an Excellence Institute for the Criminal Justice System.

24. Re-establish an independent Bramshill Police Staff College.

THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE:

25. Restore police discretion over charging of volume crime.

26. Commission a full review of the CPS to be conducted by the Centre for Social Justice.

Breakdown Britain:
The Criminal Legacy

An Introduction by the Centre for Social Justice

In compiling the original *Breakthrough Britain* reports, the Centre for Social Justice's Working Groups travelled the length and breadth of Britain, spending over 3,000 hours in public hearings and consulting over 2,000 organisations and individuals who live, experience, and study social breakdown on a daily basis. This major inquiry identified a clear pattern of social breakdown in five interconnected areas:

1. Family breakdown;
2. Educational failure;
3. Worklessness and economic dependence;
4. Addiction; and
5. Personal indebtedness.

These five areas were deemed "pathways to poverty", strongly correlated to social deprivation and exclusion. More than just linked to poverty, these pathways were often found to correlate with crime and criminality, often shockingly. The many connections found between social failure and criminality, summarised in this introduction, provided the impetus for extending research into the criminal justice system, and the police specifically – who are left to pick up the pieces of social breakdown.

Intervening early to support families helps tackle problems before they begin

In several focused follow-up reports, such as our study of early intervention for at-risk children (*The Next Generation*) and our in-depth review of the care system (*Couldn't Care Less*), CSJ research has shown that social breakdown in these areas is particularly implicated in the transmission of poverty between generations. These reports also offered strong indictments of the statutory safety nets in place to protect children and support families as failing to intervene successfully on behalf of those young people who bear the brunt of failing social institutions.

The impact of social breakdown on children is particularly visible in terms of crime and criminality, as our upcoming Youth Crime report will show. Tragically, it argues, risk factors cluster together in the lives of our most

disadvantaged children, greatly increasing their likelihood of offending. The vulnerability of children to social breakdown is, of course, intuitive – as children growing up in dysfunctional households (subject, for example, to neglect, abuse or substance-addicted carers) are less likely to develop fully the emotional, social and practical skills required to succeed at school or in society. It is all the more shocking, in light of this intuition, how little has been done to address the root causes of social breakdown – especially for those most vulnerable to its effects: young people.

One common strand running throughout the *Breakthrough Britain* series, and one of the major motivations behind extending our focus to the criminal justice system, is the correlation between each identified pathway to poverty and crime. Ultimately, the police and their local partners can only address the symptoms of these problems, as reducing crime levels in the long-term requires a comprehensive policy platform focused on alleviating the pressure from, and reversing the societal trends of, family breakdown, educational failure, debt, worklessness and addiction.

Family Breakdown

Family life is not only essential for general well-being, but its well catalogued corrosion in British society at large – and especially amongst the most deprived and vulnerable section of societies – has acted as a barrier to social justice. Family structure is undeniably linked to outcomes for the children involved. When it comes to criminality, *Breakthrough Britain* found time and time again that fractured and dysfunctional families correlate with negative criminal justice outcomes for the children they produce:

- Seventy per cent of young offenders come from lone parent families.[1]
- Children with separated parents are more frequently involved in antisocial behaviour.[2]
- Controlling for other factors, 17 year olds not living with two parents are 50 per cent more likely to take drugs.[3]

Sixty-nine per cent of people polled cited lack of parental discipline as a major cause of crime, while a further 35 per cent cited family breakdown.[4] Family breakdown contributing to childhood criminalisation is not only a driver of further crime for society generally, but a tragedy for the children involved – they are often academically and socially excluded, with increased barriers to

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1   Youth Justice Board, *Review 2001/2002: Building on Success* (London: Stationary Office, 2002).
2   Rodgers, B., and Prior, J., *Divorce and Separation: The Outcomes for Children* (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1998).
3   McVie, S., and Holmes, L., *Family Functioning and Substance Use at Ages 12 to 17* (Edinburgh: Centre for Law and Society, 2005), 19–23.
4   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf, 131.

employment and increased likelihood of drug and alcohol dependency. A policy failure to help reverse problems stemming from family breakdown has left the police and the wider criminal justice system with the responsibility to pick up the pieces.

Many dysfunctional and disintegrating families cultivate crime even within their own walls – with domestic violence affecting a stunning percentage of families:

- Domestic violence accounts for 18–25 per cent of violent crime in England and Wales.[5]
- Every minute of each day the police receive a domestic assistance call.[6]
- Up to one in ten women experience domestic violence each year – in 90 per cent of incidents children are in the same or next room.[7]
- The British Crime Survey 2001 estimated 12.9 million incidents of domestic violence against women and 2.5 million against men.[8]

Domestic violence is not only a serious crime in and of itself, but it has equally significant intergenerational effects on crime, as "evidence suggests that children who have been physically abused or neglected are more likely than others to commit violent crimes later in life."[9] In fact, criminality generally has acute intergenerational impacts, with researchers finding that one of the best predictors for future offending by a child is parental criminal history.[10]

A 2002 University of London Institute of Psychiatry report in SCIENCE, the world's leading scientific journal, reported that physical abuse or neglect can raise the chances of future violence by children with certain risk factors to over 75 per cent.[11] Even poor nutrition at age 3 leads to more aggressive behaviour at age 8, more externalising problems at age 11, greater conduct disorder at age 17 and aggressive antisocial behaviour in adults.[12]

Without the implementation of measures to reverse the effects of family breakdown, and help struggling families, society (with the police as its frontline) will inherit the legacy. One of many such measures recommended by our *Fractured Families* report was the establishment of family hubs, especially in disadvantaged areas, to provide a one-stop array of family services including

5   Home Office, *Domestic Violence: A National Report* (London: Home Office, 2005), 28.
6   Amnesty International, *It's in our hands-stop violence against women* (London: Amnesty International, 2004), 1.
7   HM Treasury, *Every Child Matters* CM 5860 (London: Stationary Office, 2003), 21.
8   Walby, S., and Allen, J., *Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault and Stalking: Findings from the British Crime Survey* (London: Home Office, 2004), 36–7.
9   US Department of Justice, *Juvenile Justice Bulletin*, 2000, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/179065.pdf.
10   Whyte, B., *Effective intervention for serious and violent young offenders* (Edinburgh: Criminal Justice Social Work Development Centre for Scotland, 2001), 1.
11   Caspi, A., et al, "Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children", *Science* 297 (2002).
12   Liu, J.H., Raine, A., Venables, P.H., and Mednick, S.A., "Malnutrition at age 3 years and externalizing behavior problems at ages 8, 11 and 17 years", *American Journal of Psychiatry* 161 (2004).

crucial counselling for victims of abuse, families-in-need and children-at-risk. It also recommended:

- The provision of non-stigmatising relationship and parenting education and support provided by effective third sector organisations.
- An enhanced role for Health Visitors in the delivery of both targeted and universal support for families.
- Greater access to bespoke mental health services for children and adolescents.

27 per cent of all prisoners have come from the Local Authority care system

Furthermore, as the Graham Allen MP and Iain Duncan Smith MP report *Early Intervention* forcefully argues, it is crucial that we begin interventions to support families as early as possible – "before problems begin." Targeted interventions during the crucial first three years of a child's life can prevent ill-preparedness for school; the adoption of the violent behaviour; the physical and mental problems which perpetuate the cycle of dysfunction; and the development of callousness that allows fatal beatings and stabbings on residential streets.

Children in Care

What is worse, as families continue to fracture, the care system – which aims to stand in as an emergency substitute for vulnerable children – is hardly more successful than the most dysfunctional families in terms of shielding its children from criminal justice outcomes:

- Twenty-seven per cent of all prisoners have come from the Local Authority care system.[13]
- There are 2,222 children aged 15–17 in prison in England and Wales.[14]
- Thirty per cent of these children have been in care.[15]
- Seventy-one per cent of these children were identified as "children in need" of receiving social services prior to entering custody.[16]

The care system should be providing a buffer between children and the world of criminality, in the absence of the relative stability of a functioning family.

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13   Social Exclusion Unit, *Reducing re-offending by ex-prisoners* (London: Social Exclusion Unit 2002), 18.
14   Ministry of Justice, *Population in Custody Monthly Tables 2009 England and Wales* (London: Ministry of Justice, 2009), Table 1.
15   Prison Reform Trust, *Criminal Damage* (London: Prison Reform Trust, 2008) http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/temp/CriminalspDamage.pdf, 1.
16   Youth Justice Board, *Accommodation needs and experiences* (London, Stationary Office: 2007).

Local Authorities have a responsibility to stop children in care from drifting into criminality. Instead, our *Couldn't Care Less* report found that policies underwriting the care system actually provide perverse incentives that encourage Local Authorities to abdicate these responsibilities and shift the burden from care to custody.

Substance Addiction

Substance addiction and dependency is one of the foremost problem areas for British society as a whole and the foremost problem area for British crime. Most prominently, the social harm associated with a widespread culture of alcohol misuse is now commonly acknowledged – and is increasingly impossible to avoid in Britain's city centres. Alcohol-related crime alone is estimated to cost the economy £7.3 billion per year, and 70 per cent of frontline officers believe that demands placed on them by alcohol-related crimes divert them away from dealing with other crime.[17]

> "A real problem is licensing and binge drinking related issues. Most people just don't realise the extent – but you need to see the number of people spilling out of the pubs in the city centre on the weekend to believe it."
>
> *Senior Officer, South Yorkshire*

More than half (52 per cent) of the general public polled by the British Crime Survey (BCS) think that alcohol is one of the major causes of crime.[18] This is corroborated by crime statistics that show that alcohol abuse greatly increases the risk of being involved in crime, both as a victim and as a perpetrator:

● Alcohol is a factor in 45 per cent of violent crime.[19]
● For violent crime against a stranger, this figure rises to 58 per cent.[20]
● More than 50 per cent of victims of assault have been drinking.[21]
● Drugs and alcohol contribute to the majority of homicides.[22]

While alcohol abuse may be a highly visible driver of social breakdown, illicit drug abuse plays an equally serious role. A 2007 report commissioned for the independent UK Drug Policy Commission found that the UK currently "has the worst drug problem in Europe" – referring to the UK having the highest rate of problem drug use and the second highest rate of drug-related deaths.[23]

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17   Home Affairs Select Committee, *Policing in the 21st Century* (London: Home Affairs Select Committee, 2008),
     http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/364/36402.htm, 34.
18   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf, 131.
19   Ibid, 76.
20   Ibid, 76.
21   Mayor of London, *Alcohol use and alcohol related harm in London* (London: GLADA, 2003), 9.
22   Shaw et al., "The role of alcohol and drugs in homicides in England and Wales", *Addiction* 101 (2006) 1117–1124.
23   Reuter, P., and Stevens, A., *An Analysis of UK Drug Policy*, (London: UK Drug Policy Commission, 2007).

BCS polling has found that the public views drug use as the number one cause of crime in Britain today, with 71 per cent of people polled selecting it as a major cause of crime, more than any other possible cause. **Nearly 1 in 3 people (30 per cent) believe drug use is the main cause of crime**.[24] The *Breakthrough Britain* report on addiction, *Towards Recovery*, highlighted the powerful link between addiction and crime rates:

- 56 per cent of total crime is committed by drug users.[25]
- Between 72 and 82 per cent of arrestees for trigger offences test positive for drug and alcohol use – most commonly cannabis, followed by alcohol and opiates.[26]
- According to the Home Office, 75 per cent of crack and heroin users claim to commit crime in order to feed their habit.[27]

While the costs of drug and alcohol misuse and abuse are often borne by the criminal justice system, solving the problem cannot be left to the criminal justice system alone. Without an integrated addiction treatment policy programme which prioritises families with children for treatment, this problem will continue to grow exponentially as it transmits between generations. Up to 1.3 million children currently live with parental alcohol misuse at home[28] – a prime factor in domestic violence, neglect and child protection cases. A further 350,000 children live with parental problem drug use.[29]

Many of the senior police officers who spoke with the Working Group emphasised the need for a national review of the relationship between the alcohol industry (producers, retailers and licensees) and the communities and services that their product strains:

"Nationally, we need to look at the binge drinking culture. The licensees will tell you that they need special promotions to get people into the pubs – they have to compete with low cost alcohol sales and people drinking at home. At the same time, I have the council issuing more and more late-night licenses rather than trying to control the size of the drinking problem."

Senior Officer, South Yorkshire

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24   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf, 131.

25   Strategy Unit, *Strategy Unit Drugs Report: Phase One – Understanding The Issues* (London: Cabinet Office, 2003), 22.

26   Holloway, K., and Bennett, T., *The results of the first two years of the NEW ADAM programme* (London: Home Office, 2004), 13.

27   Home Office, "Unique Scheme To Crack Drug Crime Expands" http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-releases/Unique_Scheme_To_Crack_Drug_Crim?version=1

28   Cabinet Office, *Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy for England* (London: Cabinet Office, 2004), 4.

29   Given in evidence to the Social Justice Policy Group, *Breakdown Britain: Addiction*, (London: Centre for Social Justice, 2006), 53.

Amongst the recommendations in *Breakthrough Britain: Towards Recovery* are several focused on regulating alcohol prices, with measures such as an Alcohol Treatment Tax on alcohol sales per unit and a ban on special promotions in licensed establishments and retailers.

Educational Failure and Worklessness

The education system, one of the most powerful tools for achieving social justice, is failing Britain's most vulnerable. The CSJ's *Educational Failure* report found that Britain is a world leader in educational inequality and, as a result, social mobility (especially amongst the most vulnerable) is declining steeply. With many children from deprived areas facing extremely limited chances of academic success, our failing education system is more closely linked to negative criminal justice outcomes than to positive social justice outcomes.

More than one in ten children leaves school with no qualifications.[30] 44,000 school leavers each year are illiterate.[31] Twelve per cent fail to achieve 5 GCSEs with basic accreditation in English and Maths.[32] These abysmal results are heavily concentrated in Britain's most deprived communities, and they have serious repercussions for local crime and disorder:

Alcohol is a factor in 45 per cent of violent crime

- Over two-thirds of the prison population have no educational qualifications.[33]
- For young offenders, this figure rises to nearly 75 per cent.[34]

It is commonly recognised that economic conditions are amongst the major predictors of national crime rates, especially regarding acquisitive crime.[35] For individuals, worklessness is closely correlated to criminality:

- Nearly two-thirds of young offenders did not have a job at the time of their arrest.[36]
- A Prince's Trust report estimated that a one per cent decline in youth unemployment could save over £2 million in youth crime.[37]

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30   Joseph Rowntree Foundation, *Monitoring poverty and social exclusion* (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2006) 6.
31   Hansard, Answer to Written Question from John Hayes, 22nd May 2006.
32   Department for Children, Schools and Families, First Release: GCSE and equivalent examination results in England 2006/07 (London: Department for Children Schools and Families, 2008), 1.
33   Social Exclusion Unit, Reducing Re-offending by ex-prisoners (London: Social Exclusion Unit, 2002), 44.
34   HM Inspectorate of Prisons, A Second Chance: A Review of Education and Supporting Arrangements within Units for Juveniles managed by HM Prison Service (London: HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2002), 10.
35   Kennedy, S., "Recession will bring big rise in crime and race hatred, says Home Office", *The Times*, September 1, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4649056.ece.
36   Social Exclusion Unit, Reducing Re-offending by ex-prisoners (London: Social Exclusion Unit, 2002), 173.
37   The Prince's Trust, The cost of exclusion: counting the cost of youth disadvantage in the UK (London: The Prince's Trust, 2007), 7.

One third of the prison population have no educational qualifications

This relationship is often cyclical, as both our Prison Reform report and our forthcoming Courts and Sentencing report address in significant detail, worklessness is especially linked to recidivism after release from prison. Re-offending rates currently exceed 60 per cent; 75 per cent for young offenders.[38] Ex-offenders (already likely to lack significant educational qualifications) often face further barriers to finding stable or sustainable employment as a result of their imprisonment. The resulting social and economic exclusion often presents an insurmountable obstacle to a legitimate lifestyle, even amongst ex-offenders committed to personal reform.

Given that so many people failed by the education system, or incapable of maintaining steady employment, come into contact with the criminal justice system, there is an opportunity and a responsibility for the criminal justice system to strive to improve their future outcomes – an area which is addressed at length in both our Prison Reform and Courts and Sentencing reports. However, in the long term, a holistic policy approach to reducing crime is needed, beginning with reform to the education system, especially in Britain's most deprived areas.

Who is Responsible for Crime?

The public, the media and politicians often express and encourage unrealistic expectations regarding the effect that the police and, more widely, the criminal justice system can have on crime rates – praising the Police Service for declining crime rates and disparaging them for crime rises. It is clear that variations in crime rates are at least partially linked to wider social trends, which are beyond the reasonable remit of the police. Some of these trends will be relatively static (such as changes in demographics, economic patterns and technological advances), although their effects on crime can be mitigated by the police as well as by partner agencies and by third sector charities and voluntary agencies.

This presents several problems when attempting to assess police performance based on outcomes in crime reduction. The amount of value added by police to crime reduction may be masked or exaggerated by socioeconomic trends, which need to be taken into account. The work of other agencies may be similarly impactful:

> *I can't sit here and say that a 27 year low in crime is all down to us, I see the impact that drug intervention teams are having.*

> *Senior Officer, South Yorkshire*

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38   Hansard, House of Commons written answers, 16 July 2007; Ministry of Justice, *Re-offending of Juveniles, results from the 2006 cohort* (London: Ministry of Justice, 2008).

One Chief Officer went so far as to say that partner agencies have more of a potential to affect crime rates than the police, "In terms of crime reduction, it matters more to us if they cut the early intervention teams."

The corollary of this recognition of the diffuse responsibility for crime reduction is the recognition that reducing crime requires criminal justice agencies and partner agencies planning together, pooling resources and working together. While this report focuses on the Police Service and its impact, boundaries between agencies can't be obstacles to co-operation and co-ordination. Partner agencies must be held to account in accordance with their role in crime reduction.

Guiding Principles

Principle 1: Addressing crime and disorder requires a holistic policy approach, not only criminal justice solutions.

Principle 2: Crime reduction requires police and partner agencies planning together, pooling resources and working together, which should be reflected in resourcing and accountability structures.

The Police

The Police Service of England and Wales is one of the largest, most important and impactful public services in the country and is esteemed amongst police services internationally for its reputation, based on its history of local policing and policing by consent. Whilst British policing derives undoubted benefits from supporting national and regional bodies, the bedrock of the Service remains the 43 "independent" local Forces.

"Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police"

Over the past two decades, however, the Police Service has lost its way. To these local foundations has been added increasing central government direction and control. There have been repeated police reform initiatives, some of which have been, almost as quickly, abandoned and have left doubt and confusion over some of the key questions for the Service. To whom are the police accountable? Are the police to be one national Service accountable to national politicians, or are they to be a set of locally organised and overseen services? What should we expect the police to achieve and to what standards? Can these standards be captured in concise quantitative measures? What should be the predominant policing style and how should the police develop the skills to deliver this? How should the police be governed?

The Policing Reform Working Group (hereafter, the Working Group) was convened to address these questions and point a direction forward for policing in England and Wales. The Working Group brought together independent experts from the world of policing, politics, research, criminology and the wider criminal justice system to do so.

Interviews with police professionals, other experts and the public, by the Working Group, have consistently suggested that two decades of modernising reforms of the management of the Police Service have effected a fundamental transformation of its ethos, structure, capabilities and means of evaluation – a transformation which has confused the police mission and jeopardises its traditions of localism and public consent.

The Working Group has observed a Police Service that is strained by the demand placed upon it by social breakdown; that is better resourced though often unnecessarily constrained in its ability to deploy its resources

effectively; that is concerned over political encroachment; and is concerned, from the lowest to the highest ranks, about how its success has been measured. Amongst the public, this has generated a healthy scepticism towards a Service which it has seen as delivering on paper but not visibly on the streets.

In response to this, the Working Group has put forward a set of recommendations which reflects a growing consensus about policing, a consensus confirmed by a frustrated Police Service and dissatisfied public, that radical change is necessary to deliver the police services that local communities need as well as want.

1.1 Mission and Principles

The Police Service's role in British society is as broad as it is crucial. The culture and self-image of the British Police remained virtually unchanged from the foundation of the Metropolitan Police, as a civilian police force in 1829, under Sir Robert Peel, until the 1960s.

Sir Robert Peel laid out a charter of principles to guide his civilian police (See Figure 1), underlined throughout by an affirmation that the legitimacy of the police is intrinsically linked to public consent – "the police are the public and the public are the police."

Figure 1: Peel's Nine Points of Policing

1. The basic mission for which the police exists is to prevent crime and disorder.
2. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions.
3. Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public.
4. The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force.
5. Police seek and preserve public favour not by catering to public opinion but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law.
6. Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient.
7. Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.
8. Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary.
9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it.

In 1990, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) introduced the *Police Service Statement of Common Purpose and Values*, which held that the police mission was:

- To uphold the law fairly and firmly;
- To prevent crime;
- To pursue and bring to justice those who break the law;
- To keep the Queen's Peace;
- To protect, help and reassure the community; and
- To be seen to do all this with integrity, common sense and sound judgement.[1]

However, changes in society and in criminality have meant that the scope of this mission has expanded rapidly in order to keep pace. "Upholding the law" has come to incorporate such diverse functions as: e-crime, offender management, asset confiscation and the increasingly globalised challenges of terrorism and serious organised crime. In addition, the standards of service provided in more traditional functions such as child protection and domestic violence have been dramatically, and justifiably, increased. Furthermore, the Blair Government alone is reported to have created over 3,000 new criminal offences, "one for almost every day spent in office".[2] As a result of these rapid but piecemeal and *ad hoc* additions to the mission of policing, experts and police leaders frequently call for a reassessment of the police mission. As one Assistant Chief Constable told the Working Group:

> *Since the 1960s, the Police Service has been getting broader and broader. But as the available resources have diminished, we've attempting to keep that breadth and shave off the depth. As opposed to saying: 'What are the things that the Police Service should stand for and should do?'*

The question **"What do we want the police to do?"** (or, to be more precise, **"What does who want the police to do?"**) has been raised repeatedly to the Working Group, and it is a question which the Working Group has put directly to police, the experts and the public. A clear answer to this question must underpin any attempt to reform policing.

1.2 Local Policing vs. Protective Services

A dramatic example of the Service being required to raise its game has been the debate over the last few years about how the so-called Protective Services should be delivered (see, for example, the Home Office *Closing the Gap* report).

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1   Association of Chief Police Officers, *Setting the standards for policing: Meeting community standards* (London: Association of Chief Police Officers 1990).

2   Morris, N., "Blair's 'frenzied law making,'" *The Independent*, August 16, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/blairs-frenzied-law-making--a-new-offence-for-every-day-spent-in-office-412072.html.

Indeed, this debate was of such significance that it nearly led to a massive programme of amalgamations of Police Forces, although this programme was subsequently abandoned by the Government.

Protective Services include:

- Counter-terrorism and extremism,
- Serious organised and cross-border crime,
- Civil contingencies and emergency planning,
- Critical incident management,
- Major crime,
- Public order,
- Strategic roads policing, and
- Protecting vulnerable people.

The scope of the police mission has expanded rapidly to keep pace with social change

Whilst it is readily accepted that these services are inextricably linked to local policing, they are not the aspects of policing which regularly touch the lives of ordinary citizens and, as such, a detailed examination of them has been omitted from this work. The Working Group has focussed on the more conventional aspects of local policing and the issues which directly affect its delivery.

Principle 3: The Working Group endorses Peel's Nine Points of Policing and their emphasis on: local priorities, reducing crime and disorder, policing by community consent and measuring performance by outcomes rather than activity.

Principle 4: Before any further reform of the Police Service is attempted, the police mission should be clearly defined and the breadth of services it is required to provide should be clearly understood.

1.3 Resources and Police Strength

With an annual budget of over £17.5 billion, the Police Service makes up more than half of the entire public order and safety budget (which includes the fire services, law courts and prisons).[3] Policing costs £283 per person annually in the United Kingdom. This amounts to over 3 per cent of the UK's total annual public sector expenditure and approximately 1.25 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product.[4] Policing has not always commanded such a large proportion of national expenditure – over the past decade alone, spending on the police has increased by 40 per cent in real terms (or 75 per cent in cash terms).[5] Taken as a

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3 HM Treasury, Public Expenditure Statistcal Analyses 2008: National Statistics (London: HM Treasury, 2008), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/9/A/pesa08-09_pu548_210408.pdf, Table 5.2.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.

percentage of its GDP, the **UK now spends more on law and order than any other OECD country.**[6]

Towards the delivery of their mission, the Service now employs 140,000 full-time officers. **This represents an increase of more than 16 per cent in the number of fully sworn police officers since 2000.** Broken down by rank, this represents approximately 108,000 constables, 22,000 sergeants, 8,000 inspectors, 1,840 chief inspectors and 1,650 senior officers (defined as those holding a rank of chief superintendent or above).[7]

Comparing England and Wales with other European Countries, there are 2.65 police officers per thousand population which is lower than Italy (4.7), France (3.87) and Belgium (3.5) but greater than countries such as Denmark (2.65), The Netherlands (2.27), Sweden (1.92) or Finland (1.81). Taking a different view, however, England and Wales has one officer for every 39 crimes recorded annually (up from a low of one officer for every 46 recorded crimes in 2002–3).[8] Compared with Italy (one officer for every 9 recorded crimes), France (one officer for every 17 recorded crimes), Belgium (one officer for every 28 recorded crimes) and the Netherlands (one officer for every 37.5 recorded crimes), this number is extremely low.[9] According to the most recent European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice, only Denmark, Finland and Sweden in Europe have more recorded crimes per officer.[10]

Supporting these officers are more than 15,000 Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), 14,000 volunteer Special Constables and 78,000 other police staff.[11]

But how efficiently utilised are these resources? To put the question of police efficiency in this country into an international context, a recent study concluded that in England and Wales, "officers make an average of nine arrests per year, compared with 21 in the United States."[12] While arrest rates are a poor shorthand measure of policing activity, and indeed inimical to Peel's ninth point, there is little to suggest that recent reforms have resolved the question of how to measure and drive efficiency in police activity. In reality, as Section 6 suggests, attempts to do so have created an unhealthy focus on quantitative measures which have adversely skewed the very behaviour which they sought to assess.

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6   Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, *Strategic Priorities for the UK: the Policy Review* (London: Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, 2006), 22.

7   Garside, R., and Groombridge, N., C*riminal justice resources staffing and workloads: an initial assessment* (London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2008), 6, http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/opus978/Criminal_justice_resources_staffing_and_workloads.pdf.

8   Ibid., 7.

9   Ministry of Justice, *European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Studies 2006*, 2006, http://www.europeansourcebook.org/esb3_Full.pdf. Author's own calculations. This publication does not include comparable data regarding officer strength for several countries, most significantly Germany and Spain.

10   Ibid.

11   Home Office, *Cutting Crime: A New Partnership 2008–11* (London: Home Office, 2008), 8. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/crime-strategy-07/crime-strategy-07?view=Binary.

12   Muir, G., and Lodge, G., *A new beat: options for more accountable policing* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2008), 10. http://www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=613.

This raises the serious question of whether the efficiency measures driving reform over this same decade have truly delivered the promised benefits. As Section 5 shows, police officers are now spending as much time in the office as on the street and many police officers have been diverted, away from street policing, into more specialist roles.

In Section 7, the Working Group endorses the position that there must be police officers on the street in such numbers, and embodying such a police culture, that the public has confidence in their capacity to make a reality of the Peelite principles. If the Police Service is to truly police by consent, it must be present, visible, active and effective in each local area.

The diminishing availability of officers for frontline policing serves to underline the significance of two important principles:

Principle 5: The resourcing of the Police Service should take adequate account of the requirements of its mission.

Principle 6: The Police Service should use its resources efficiently and effectively and recognise that its most precious commodity is the "resource hours" provided by its staff.

The Police Perspective

The Working Group asked police officers around the country "What's good about policing?"

During the course of researching this report, the Working Group visited forces in London, Surrey, Cleveland, Nottinghamshire and South Yorkshire to assess the state of policing, from the viewpoint of both police leaders and frontline officers. In addition, they took evidence from the leaders of the main staff associations and from members of other Forces or institutions, who, it was believed, could assist. To open each interview, officers were given the opportunity to offer their experiences of police work today and give their views about what they saw as good and bad about the state of modern policing. Their input played an important part in shaping the Working Group's recommendations.

2.1 "What's Good about Policing?"

The Working Group was particularly interested in the positives of policing today – which aspects of the Police Service were working and which aspects shouldn't be touched. As such, every interview began by asking officers "What's good about policing?"

2.1.1 SERVING THE PUBLIC

One of the most consistent responses from officers when asked about the positives of policing today was that it afforded them an opportunity to protect and serve the public:

> The soul of policing is still good. People join the police with the right motives. People who join want to help protect the public.
>
> Temporary Chief Constable Rowley, Surrey

> I think you actually make a massive difference just by putting your uniform on.
>
> Response Team Officer, Cleveland

2.1.2 NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING AND LOCAL PRIORITIES

Police officers interviewed were particularly enthusiastic about protecting and expanding the Neighbourhood Policing model (see Section 6.5 for further discussion). Many officers feel it has afforded a means of both determining what local priorities are, and implementing them on the ground.

> *What's particularly good is our relationship with the community and the local partners; the interactivity of policing. The greatest visible representation of that at this point in time is Neighbourhood Policing, I think that is particularly good. It's corny, but if we're going to say that policing by consent is alive and well, Neighbourhood Policing is important. It's about inclusivity and about the police's role in social cohesion – I think that's fairly unique for policing in the world.*
>
> Senior Officer, Cleveland

> *I am passionately supportive of Neighbourhood Policing because before Safer Neighbourhood teams were introduced, we were getting results but people were getting increasingly dissatisfied.*
>
> Senior Officer, MPS

> *Being on a Neighbourhood team, you tend to speak to your residents more.*
>
> Neighbourhood Team Officer, Cleveland

2.1.3 THE DIVERSITY OF THE ROLE

Despite many concerns over the increasing breadth of the police mission, constables around the country remain passionate about the diversity of the policing challenge:

"The diversity of the role"

> *What's good? The diversity of the challenge that we face.*
>
> Senior Officer, MPS

> *What's good? Variation – it's different all the time. And, with some cases, maybe you can make a difference.*
>
> Response Team Officer, Cleveland

> *I like the variety, knowing that today will be nothing like yesterday. It can be very challenging, but the challenge is good, it keeps you on your feet.*
>
> Response Team Officer, Limehouse

The range of skills required and problems faced are one of the most fundamental issues confronting the police. While individual officers often cited the diversity of the task as a major positive of police work, they remained

concerned as to whether the resourcing, training and assessment of the Force as a whole reflected the multifaceted challenges encountered.

2.1.4 CAMARADERIE AND SUPPORT

Finally, the other major factor cited as drawing police to the job is the sense of camaraderie and support that comes with being a police officer:

> *There are things that get you down. But they support you. They look after their personnel. You feel like you belong to the organisation.*
>
> <div align="right">Response Team Officer, Limehouse</div>

> *Just being part of the team. It's like a family. If you call, you know people will be there quick. You know they care.*
>
> <div align="right">Response Team Officer, Limehouse</div>

However, despite the sense of belonging and social purpose that the Police Service provides, many officers also expressed concern over the direction of policing in the context of recent reforms.

2.2 "What's Wrong with Policing?"

The Working Group were impressed by the honest and open critique given by officers of all ranks which was, for the most part, underlined by one common message:

> *I don't think we provide the service that the public wants.*
>
> <div align="right">Response Team Officer, Limehouse</div>

2.2.1 POLITICAL INTERFERENCE

Amongst senior leadership, this was often expressed as a concern over the constitutional issue of political interference (both by local politicians and from central government) in the agenda for regional policing. What is wrong with policing?

> *What's wrong? Political control of frontline resources.*
>
> <div align="right">Senior Officer, MPS</div>

> *I remain appalled by central intervention into policing, regardless of what gimmicks they use.*
>
> <div align="right">Senior Officer, South Yorkshire</div>

> *What's wrong? Knee-jerk political directives. They cause a lack of consistency, a lack of direction and interfere with our vision.*
>
> <div align="right">Senior Officer, Cleveland</div>

This concern was mirrored throughout in the comments of lower-ranking officers, who tended to focus on the practical implications of political interference from national politicians, with policing on the ground. As one Neighbourhood officer from Nottinghamshire put it: "We've been politicised. We don't police to what we think is important, we police to what someone up there wants."

2.2.2 ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS AND ISSUES AFFECTING POLICE TIME

The most commonly cited form of inappropriate political intervention was centralised performance targets and assessment frameworks. One Chief Officer described the worst part of policing as "the whole accountability framework."

"Neighbourhood Policing is important. It's about inclusivity and about the police's role in social cohesion"

Given extensive discussion with policing professionals, the central theme that emerges is the question: "To whom should the police be accountable?" There was a strong consensus that, however well-intentioned, the priorities set by central government were rarely in tune with the concerns of the local public in different areas around the country.

From the perspective of police on both the frontline and in the senior ranks, several other clear issues emerged. These were focused primarily around the lack of sufficient police time to provide a quality service. As one Neighbourhood officer described, the worst thing about policing today is: "The amount of time you spend in the office." This comment was echoed across the country, coupled with the concern that, as another officer put it: "Bureaucracy is a million times worse now."

The main issues that frontline officers identified as affecting their time and ability to provide a quality service to the public were:

- Excessive bureaucracy (Section 5);
- Stringent performance measurement (Section 6); and
- Political interference with the police (Section 8).

Principle 7: The commitment to public service demonstrated by police officers is a significant asset and the Service should be led, managed and governed in a manner which fosters and encourages this commitment.

SECTION THREE
The Public Perspective

"Public confidence" in the police is a nebulous concept which can be defined and measured in significantly different ways. As one Chief Constable told the Working Group, "I think the concept of public confidence is the right measure of the Police Service; we should be judged by what the public think of our service. But I have no idea how to measure it."

Generally, public confidence is used as a proxy for an array of persistently troubling indicators of public attitudes towards the police. These can broadly be categorised as:

1. Confidence in the criminal justice system (Section 3.1);
2. Trust and confidence in the police (Section 3.2); and
3. Fear of crime (Section 3.3).

Extensive polling in each of these different areas has consistently shown that – despite the declining national crime rates outlined in Section 4.2 – **nationally the public has low (and, in some cases, declining) confidence in the Police Service. Satisfaction levels are markedly worse amongst those who have had contact with the police, not least as witnesses.**[1] This suggests that while police activity driven by quantitative assessment may have delivered substantial improvements in reducing crime, it is failing to deliver the quality of service that the public expects.

On the other hand, there are legitimate concerns that too narrow a focus on public satisfaction outcomes might have perverse incentives similar to the current targets regime, by making public relations the overriding concern of the policing mission:

> *With the Green Paper proposal to only measure public satisfaction, it might swing the other way – we could have a Giuliani-style media team with every other indicator in the red.*

> Senior Officer, MPS

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[1]   Bradford, B., Jackson, J., and Stanko, E., Contact and Confidence: On the Distribution and Significance of Public Encounters with the Police (London: London School of Economics, 2007).

However, the police officers and PCSOs who were interviewed believed overwhelmingly that improvements in public confidence in the police are a legitimate and achievable goal:

It is important to tell the public that we really are reducing crime and that this is a safe place to live. Did I become a constable because I wanted to be a spin doctor? No. But it is a fundamental part of policing.

Senior Officer, MPS

We can have a tremendous impact on public satisfaction. We are trying to engender in officers the question: 'What can we do? … What more can we do?'

Senior Officer, South Yorkshire

This is heavily supported by British Crime Survey polling, which suggests that high levels of confidence in the police correspond with very reasonable factors:

- Believing that the local police are dealing with the things that matter to communities;
- Thinking that the local police treat everyone fairly and with respect;
- Thinking that the level of crime in the local area had stayed the same or decreased in the previous two years; and
- Being very or fairly satisfied with the way the police handled the matter after initiating some form of contact with them.[2]

It is important to note that crime reduction is only one factor significantly influencing public opinion. Other factors (such as perceived fairness, satisfaction after contact and relevance of police activity to community concerns) are much less tangible, and sometimes have no obvious metric by which to assess performance.

Ultimately, even if police activity is successfully reducing crime, if it does so without simultaneously reassuring the public, then the legitimacy of the Police Service will, ultimately, be undermined. The police will never solve every crime or remove every possible harm, but they can and should leave the law-abiding public with an unquestionable belief that, whatever its faults, the full force of policing is "on their side."

The analysis and recommendations to follow throughout this section and the report will be based on the considered view point of the Working Group that policing is a holistic profession, involving many complex factors that escape targeted measurement. A narrow and pressurised assessment regime distorts performance by prioritising one set of outcomes at the expense of

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2   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., Crime in England and Wales 2007/08 (London: Home Office, 2008), 119. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf,

others. In the same vein, a shift towards an equally narrow performance measurement regime, in this case one focused primarily or exclusively on changing public opinion, risks missing the wood for yet another tree.

This report will examine the serious question of how police are to balance their mission to "reassure the community" with their missions to "prevent crime" and "bring to justice those who break the law", especially when focusing on the latter two has not sufficed to accomplish the former. According to national polling, the public believe that **"creating a society where people feel safe" is the most essential function of the criminal justice system.**[3]

3.1 Confidence in the Criminal Justice System

As the most visible agency in the criminal justice system (CJS), it is important to set attitudes of the public towards the police against the overall background of public confidence in the criminal justice system as a whole.

Polling data from the British Crime Survey suggests low confidence in the CJS as a whole. A minority of people polled in 2007/08 agreed with the following statements about the criminal justice system on issues of fundamental importance:

Figure 2: Confidence in the Criminal Justice System[4]

Agree 44% / Disagree 56%
The CSJ brings people who commit crimes to justice

Agree 42% / Disagree 58%
The CSJ deals with cases promptly and effectively

Agree 38% / Disagree 62%
The CSJ brings people who commit crimes to justice

Agree 36% / Disagree 64%
The CSJ deals with cases promptly and effectively

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3   Home Office, *Public confidence in the criminal justice system, Findings* (London: Home Office, 2004), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/r221.pdf.

4   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf; Hough, M., and Roberts, J., *Confidence in justice: an international review, Findings* (London: Home Office, 2004), 243. http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/r243.pdf; Home Office, Public confidence in the criminal justice system.

When focused on dealing with young people accused of crime, only 25 per cent of respondents expressed confidence in the criminal justice system.[5] These levels of confidence are disturbingly low: nearly two-thirds of society rejects the assertion that the Criminal Justice System is effective at reducing crime or meeting the needs of victims.[6] Despite being so low, these figures universally represent slight improvements in confidence over the previous year's results.[7]

Respondents to the British Crime Survey were asked to rate a number of functions of the criminal justice system, and selected the following functions as "absolutely essential", listed in order from most to least selected:

1. Creating a society where people feel safe;
2. Dealing effectively with violent crime;
3. Reducing the level of crime;
4. Dealing with street robbery;
5. Preventing re-offending;
6. Bringing people to justice; and
7. Dealing with sex offences.[8]

Tellingly, every one of these areas "received low levels of public confidence".[9]

Perhaps the final word on the criminal justice system and its ability to add value to public feelings of safety rests with this quote from the British Crime Survey:

> *Thirty-six per cent of those who had been both a victim and a witness were confident that the CJS was effective in bringing people who commit crimes to justice, compared with 47 per cent of those who had not experienced crime in the previous 12 months.[10]*

3.2 Trust and Confidence in the Police

Levels of trust in the police and the expectations for their performance reported by the public are disconcerting.

When asked by Ipsos MORI to rank their trust in various professions, police received only 59 per cent of respondent's backing. Other comparable professions register much higher levels of public trust, such as doctors (who lead the professions with 90 per cent), teachers (86 per cent) or judges (78 per cent).[11] Moreover, since the survey began in 2003, levels of trust in the police have

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5   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), 121. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf.

6   Ibid, 121.

7   Ibid.

8   Home Office, *Public confidence in the criminal justice system, Findings* (London: Home Office, 2004), 221. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/r221.pdf.

9   Ibid.

10   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), 121. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf.

11   Ipsos MORI " Trust in Professions 2007" (London: Ipsos MORI, 2007). http://www.ipsos-mori.com/content/polls-07/trust-in-professions-2007.ashx.

declined while comparable professions have remained stable or have improved – trust in police having dropped from 64 per cent to 59 per cent over that period (compared with trust in scientists, which has remained stable at 65 per cent).[12]

But do the public trust the police to deliver? The British Crime Survey measures the public's trust in policing activity as follows (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Public Trust and Confidence in the Police[13]

Agree 48% / Disagree 52%

The police will be there when needed

Agree 51% / Disagree 49%

The police are dealing with issues that matter to the local community

Agree 41% / Disagree 59%

The police and the local council seek people's views about the antisocial behaviour and crime issues that matter in the local community

Agree 45% / Disagree 55%

The police and local council are dealing with the antisocial behaviour and crime issues that matter in the local community

At present, only four out of ten believe the police can be relied upon to deal with minor crime.[14]

As with the wider criminal justice system, these simple motions of confidence in the police were rejected by the majority of respondents (apart from the statement: "The police are dealing with issues that matter to the local community" which was affirmed by 51 per cent of respondents). This is a stark indictment of a policing tradition which has at its heart a principle of public consent.

That said, it is recognised that over the last five years, the public's belief that their local police are doing a good job has improved by six percentage points,

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12   Ibid.
13   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf
14   Home Affairs Select Committee, Policing in the 21st Century (London: Home Affairs Select Committee, 2008), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/364/36402.htm, 3.

from 47 to 53 per cent, but this still leaves a significant proportion of the population who do not have confidence in the police.[15]

3.3 Fear of Crime

Much has been made of the so-called "gap between the reality and perception" of crime.[16] This refers to the fact that, despite police recorded crime statistics and British Crime Survey data to the contrary, **nearly two-thirds (65 per cent) of people thought crime had increased either "a lot" or "a little" nationally in the previous two years.** More than half of those thought it had risen "a lot".[17]

> "Well, I wouldn't walk around at midnight and I'm fortunate that I don't have to do that."
>
> *The Rt Hon Jacqui Smith MP, Home Secretary[18]*

The significance of public fear and perceptions of crime needs to be put into context. Members of the general public often form opinions about personal and community safety based on poor, incomplete or sensationalised information. Studies consistently find, for example, that crime fears are heavily influenced by the type and extent of media coverage received. The findings of the British Crime Survey are consistent with this line of reasoning:

> *Readers of national 'tabloids' were nearly twice as likely as those who read national 'broadsheets' to think the crime rate nationally had increased 'a lot' (44 per cent and 24 per cent respectively).[19]*

Ipsos MORI polling supports this position, having asked why individuals perceived higher crime rates, 57 per cent selected "watching television" and 48 per cent selected "reading newspapers."

Whilst it is often tempting to treat public perceptions of the state of crime as factual claims about the actual state of crime which can be "right" or "wrong" – "mistaken" or "correct" – in reality, public perceptions are personal assessments of the social environment and reflections of people's experience of safety and security in their community. It is important to recognise that public perceptions of crime are important outcomes in their own right – and that it is central to the role of police to create a *justified* feeling of safety in the communities they protect.

> "Prisons are full, detections are up, crime is down. But go to any high street in the country and ask anyone: 'Do you feel safer?' The answer is a resounding 'no.'"
>
> *Chief Superintendent Walker, Nottinghamshire*

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15   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), 121. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf.

16   Morris, N., "The Big Question: Does fear of crime reflect the reality of life on Britain's streets?", *The Independent*, 22 January, 2008. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/the-big-question-does-fear-of-crime-reflect-the-reality-of-life-on-britains-streets-771727.html; Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), 129. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf.

17   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), 128–130. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf.

18   Oakeshott, I., "Interview transcript: Jacqui Smith speaks with Isabel Oakeshott of the *Sunday Times*", *The Sunday Times,* January 19, 2008.

19   Ibid, 129–130.

Furthermore, it is important not to dismiss fears of crime as unfounded without examining their context. For example, the elderly (and particularly elderly women) have high levels of fear, but are the group least likely to be victimised. This seeming paradox disappears when the consequences of victimisations are taken into account. If an elderly woman, perhaps with osteoporosis or living alone, falls victim to crime, then the consequences are much worse than for younger and less vulnerable people. Considering consequences alongside likelihood of victimisation gives context to the public's fears.

3.3.1 SIGNAL CRIMES

There is increasing evidence that the failure of fear levels to track reductions in crime reflects unrecognised public priorities for local security. The Signal Crimes Perspective has been developed to explain the growing discrepancy between the fear of crime and crime rates:

> *The key idea of the Signal Crimes Perspective is that some criminal and disorderly incidents function as warning signals to people about the distribution of risks to their security in everyday life. Some crimes and disorderly behaviours are thus held to matter more than others in shaping the public's collective risk perceptions.*
>
> - *A signal crime is any incident that causes a change in the public's behaviour and/or beliefs about their security.*
> - *A signal disorder is an act that breaches situated conventions of social order and signifies the presence of other risks. They can be social or physical in nature.*[20]

Examples of signal crimes and disorders will vary between local areas and between people, depending on what individuals perceive as warning signals about risks to their security.

Three central findings of the Signal Crimes Perspective offer considerable insight into the setting of police priorities. Firstly, it has found that the overall volume of crime in an area is not the sole or chief determinant of public fear. Different types of crime may have different levels of impact on the community:

> *The public's sense of being 'at risk' of crime is not determined solely by the 'volume' of offending in an area, but also the 'impact' that single incidents have upon their collective risk perceptions.*[21]

Secondly, research has found that an area's sense of insecurity is not driven by crime alone – it may be highly shaped by antisocial behaviour and conditions which are simply disorderly rather than illegal:

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20   Innes, M., *The Signal Crimes Perspective* (London: National Reassurance Policing Programme, 2004), http://www.upsi.org.uk/resources/signalcrimesin60secs.pdf.
21   Ibid.

Levels of concern about safety are profoundly shaped by the presence of incivilities and disorder in an area. Indeed, the research suggests that in some areas, levels of disorder are more influential than crime in shaping perceived risk.[22]

Finally, it suggests that there is significant local variation in the impact that different types of crime and disorder have on a given community:

Perceptions of risk vary considerably by area, and different signal crimes and signal disorders function as causes of insecurity in different locations.[23]

The Signal Crimes Perspective has already played a large role in shaping the mission of the Neighbourhood Policing initiative introduced nationally in 2003. Based on evidence from the public and police to the Working Group, Neighbourhood Policing has been a welcome first step towards redressing the gap in public confidence. The Working Group provisionally endorses the Neighbourhood Policing model (see Section 7 for further discussion) and has made recommendations to capture the gains and improve on the model to address local priorities more precisely.

Signs of disorder can be more influential than levels of crime in shaping perceived risk

Whilst reforms to make policing more effectively local (and more locally effective) are welcome in their own right, the potential to thereby improve public confidence in the police and lessen fear of crime, make a local focus even more beneficial. That said, a basic distinction should remain: fear reduction through the reduction of crime and disorder is desirable; fear reduction through spurious reassurance about risks may even put citizens in the way of danger.

The Working Group strongly endorses the following principles for reform:

Principle 8: Public trust and confidence in the police and feelings of safety by members of the public are important outcomes in their own right and are unlikely to be achieved simply by the pursuit of national targets and priorities.

Principle 9: Local policing should be attuned to local priorities and perceptions of risk and this should take priority over any conflicting national priorities.

Principle 10: Police should be legitimately expected to prioritise non-criminal behaviour, such as disorder and other neighbourhood problems as identified locally.

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22   Ibid.
23   Ibid.

3.4 "What's Good about Policing?"

In a Centre for Social Justice poll (conducted by YouGov) of over 2,000 adults, aged 18+, across Britain, the Working Group asked respondents what, in their opinion, the police were doing well. They were given a free-range to respond, and a sample of those responses is assembled here in order to give a feeling of the public's view of the police.

3.4.1 MIXED RESPONSES

While some respondents unreservedly offered positive opinions of the police in general, such as "I think the police have got their finger on the pulse and do a great job" and "I think that they do their job well, and they dedicate their lives to helping people" and "I think they have a very difficult job but they seem to be doing a good job in catching real violent criminals and trying hard to keep drugs off our streets"; such comments were in the minority.

"What are the police doing well? Sitting in their cars and watching out for motorists"

A greater number of respondents, in line with our expectations based on British Crime Survey polling, offered unreservedly negative comments, typified by answers such as: "Not a lot"; "Very little"; "Nothing"; "Don't know"; "Ignoring minor crime" and "I can't think of anything." Many of the respondents who gave negative responses did so by offering sarcastic praise of a Police Service perceived to have available manpower for policing road offences, but not criminal offences. This attitude was typified by comments like: "Catching motorists and issuing on the spot fines"; "Setting up speed traps"; "Road policing";"Hunting down driving offences and nicking drivers"; "Stopping speeding"; "Sitting in their cars watching out for motorists"; "Catching motorists" and "Raising funds via road users."

Some respondents displayed a more nuanced understanding of the context in which police work takes place: "A reasonable job in general with a lack of resources"; "Most things with the constraints and resources they have"; "I think on the whole they do a good job, but it can sometimes be a very difficult one" and "I think they are trying to clamp down on things but they seem to have their hands tied."

Specifically, bureaucratic requirements were seen by the public as holding back an effective Police Service. "Their paperwork" and "Filling in their forms" were amongst the top responses to the question "What are the police doing well?", and betray a growing public cynicism over the effect of police measurement on the service delivered to the public. Some members of the public sympathetically see bureaucracy and paperwork as compromising police performance:

They are doing their best in a difficult climate, with not enough police and with too much paper work to complete.

I think the police do a wonderful job – but they are hindered and deterred by the mountain of red tape and paperwork involved.

Some respondents went further, linking paperwork explicitly with a decline in public service:

I think their hands are tied with many things. Too much paperwork and not enough getting to know their area and the people in it.

Police time usage is a perennial challenge, and the subject of Section 5, which will outline recommendations to free police time for patrol and neighbourhood engagement.

Other respondents took this opportunity to comment on the fact that the police unfairly shoulder the burden of public dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system: "Overall I have no problem with the police, it is the justice system that needs sorting." The courts were the criminal justice agency most commonly identified as problematic: "Doing well in all aspects, but the courts let the police down in all aspects" and "I think generally the police do a good job, however I feel it is the courts that let all the hard work down."

3.4.2 ADDRESSING SERIOUS CRIME

Amongst positive responses, "Addressing serious crime" was the most commonly specified success of the police. Common answers included: "Investigating and solving major crimes like murder"; "Preventing terrorism" and "They are fighting organised crime well in Nottingham." The public seems to have a high level of confidence that the police are successfully addressing the most serious forms of criminal activity.

Despite being a major public priority, success in addressing minor crime drew considerably less praise for the police. Only the occasional initiative was recognised, such as: "In our area an antisocial hotline has been set up and they are looking into expanding for example a zero tolerance area for drinking in the street. Small things I know but..."; "They are targeting antisocial drinkers in my area" and "On the Isle of Wight there is a specially designated phone number to report ASB ... it seems a good idea."

3.4.3 IMPROVED PUBLIC INTERACTION

One area of the existing Police Service which the public readily value is "Communicating". Respondents commented that: "They seem to be helpful when you deal with them one-on-one"; and that the police are "Very friendly" and "Approachable." Several comments indicated that this was a recent improvement, praising "Training in social skills, how the police relate to the public has improved in recent years" and recent initiatives such as "Newsletter e-mails inform public of current actions. Interactive forums." As one respondent put it: "Our local support officers are helpful when contacted. There are just too few of them."

This recognition of improved community interaction may be related to recent "Local and neighbourhood initiatives" and "Community policing", which were also the subject of many positive responses with new community-based policing initiatives garnering a large proportion of public support:

> *In my neighbourhood they are quite involved with the people who live here. They are friendly and actually listen.*

> *They are there to support the community. There are too few of them but in their limited capacity they do as good a job as can be expected. They could do better if there were more of them!*

With the introduction of Neighbourhood Policing initiatives has come an increase in police visibility which the public also welcomes:

> *Where I live we do have a few PCSOs and policemen walking around which is a good thing as they are a visible presence.*

> *Know their communities, making their presence felt, taking part in community events.*

Despite this reported increase in visibility, many respondents still felt the police were absent from the streets. What are the police doing well? "Filling in forms and driving from one police station to another"; "Filling in forms while being invisible"; "Sitting at desks" and "I have very little interaction with them to comment on." The prevalence of this type of response only underlines the public desire for more visible police resources on the street and in communities:

"How the police relate to the public has improved in recent years"

> *I can't see what the police are doing in the area where I live because you never see any. We only hear their sirens when they come speeding down the road.*

Besides addressing serious crime, the most commonly specified positive response was that police visibility is improving: "Although there are not enough police on the streets, there are more than there used to be"; "Trying to be more of a presence on the streets"; "They are getting a few more officers to walk the streets instead of driving around in their cars"; "More officers on the beat over the past few years"; "Seeing more police on the streets" and "I think the police are more active in the streets now more than before" were all typical responses. These are changes that our recommendations will seek to capture, reinforce and improve.

3.5 "What's Wrong with Policing?"

The same Centre for Social Justice poll also asked respondents what, in their opinion, the police should be doing differently. An overview of responses clearly shows a narrow range of themes emerging in the public interest.

3.5.1 MORE POLICE OUT ON THE STREET

More than any other issue, "More visibility" was a priority for the public. Responses included: "Get on the streets"; "More presence"; "Be more visible in public"; "We used to know our local policemen - we don't see them any more"; "More community policing on the beat and not in cars"; "More visible police activity"; "Conversing with the public" and, perhaps the single most repeated comment, "Getting out of their vehicles and doing foot patrol."

More than any other concern, the public want to see police "get on the streets"

The related issue of police resourcing is also a clear focus of public attention, as respondents suggested: "Few more on the beat"; "Recruiting more officers"; "I think perhaps just more of them"; "More men on the beat" and "More officers on the street, better communication with the public". A few respondents took the opportunity to express scepticism that PCSOs were a sufficient substitute for fully-sworn officers on the frontlines, with comments including: "Get more real police on the streets, the PCSOs should not have the same powers" and "There must be more police officers, not PCSOs, on the beat everywhere." The underlying message remains that the police need more available, visible and effective resources on the frontline.

3.5.2 LESS BUREAUCRACY AND MORE INTERVENTIONS AGAINST STREET CRIME

The public also identified "Bureaucracy" as a misplaced police priority keeping officers out of sight and away from protecting the public at large, with comments supporting: "Less form filling"; "Less paperwork" and "More could be done by civilians"; "More foot police in both rural and urban areas"; "More proactive; "More old fashion policing."

What specifically should the police be doing differently on the frontline? The main change in policing priorities suggested by respondents involved more interventions against low-level crime and disorder: "Concentrating on crimes of violence, theft, antisocial behaviour"; "Be more visible and do something about petty crime as well as 'serious' crime"; "Not to ignore crimes they can see being committed even if they are not 'their responsibility'"; "I don't think it acceptable to ignore petty crime" and "More active involvement in tackling knife crime and binge drinking. They should go into schools and become a clear and visible part of the local communities."

One specific public priority is antisocial behaviour. "Tackling antisocial behaviour on high streets" was raised again and again by respondents. A range

of responses was suggested to antisocial behaviour, which is often not criminal in nature (see Section 4.2.2). Some thought there should be "More stringent controls on antisocial behaviour from youths or adults". For many, this means punitive measures – especially for younger people ("Be tougher on kids"). Others pointed to the necessity for more frequent and more diverse interventions:

> *Intervening more against antisocial behaviour and working with other groups to address doing more about antisocial behaviour.*

This was supported by respondents calling for a Police Service more closely integrated with other agencies, "More interaction with cooperative bodies."

Another public priority is drug-related crime, with the public wanting police capable of "Stopping drug trafficking and arresting known dealers"; "Doing more about the drug problem"; "Dealing with drug dealers and burglars" and "Dealing with drugs, violence and robbery." Respondents saw drug abuse as particularly connected with acquisitive, violent and antisocial crime, as well as with the level of public confidence in the police generally.

3.5.3 MORE TRAINING AND DISCRETION

Respondents saw the ability to successfully intervene against antisocial behaviour and street crime as requiring special training and skills, rather than just relying on the power of arrest. Comments suggest that "Adequately training police officers to interact with young people appropriately" and "More restorative justice approaches to issues" have wide public support.

The skills to intervene against antisocial behaviour and low-level crime without resorting to arrest can only be used effectively if police are authorised to, and supported in, using other types of disposal, "They should have the right of discretion where offences are minor to deal with it on the spot." The public strongly supports "More discretion about issues like whether to charge someone" for police, including: "More discretion when dealing with teenagers"; "Responding to society's desire to see more discretion being applied in operational situations" and "They should be able to use discretion and evaluate the action they need to take."

3.5.4 MORE COMMUNITY POLICING

A more general change that the public want to see on the frontline is "More community policing" and "Responding to public concerns." Increased focus on local priorities was underlined. "Too much focus on targets" was another common and connected complaint. The public is acutely aware of the problems associated with target-driven police work, which they see as drawing police time away from local priorities: "Police communities effectively, rather than police to hit targets." Indeed, the public see targets as taking police away from the frontline altogether: "Less focus on target achieving by the

government and less paperwork should give them more time on the street." In the eyes of the public, "Using common sense and ditching targets" means "Less obsession with minor/easy offences such as speeding."

Finally, our public polling suggests that keeping police independent from political interference is an important principle. "Seeking independence from government"; "Should be independent from the politics of the day" and "There is too much political influence on the police."

One respondent summarised the public's priorities for the police neatly: "We need more police on the beat – more visibility, less paperwork to tie them up and discretion to be able to nip petty crime in the bud rather than to criminalise." These public priorities for policing reform informed the Working Group's recommendations.

Principle 11: There is a clear link between public perceptions of the police and the visibility of police interventions to tackle minor crime and disorder.

The State of Crime and Disorder

One of the most important measures of the state of policing must be the state of crime and disorder. In response to the question: **"What is the most important issue facing Britain today?" a staggering 47 per cent of people polled by Ipsos MORI last year answered: "Crime."**[1] To put this into some historical perspective, only nine per cent gave that reply to the same question when asked in 1974. Figure 4 illustrates the ascent of crime as the national concern in Britain:

Figure 4: "What is the most important issue facing Britain today?"

The predominance of crime as the national concern is out of step with international trends, as crime is "a bigger cause for concern for Britons than the

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1   Ipsos MORI, *Political Trends: The most important issues facing Britain today* (London: Ipsos MORI, 2008), http://www.ipsos-mori.com/content/the-most-important-issues-facing-britain-today.ashx. Subsequent polling by Ipsos MORI has shown concern for "crime" at 35 per cent, with this decline having being offset by concern for "the economy".

citizens of any equivalent western European nation, and even the United States."[2]

As with public confidence and fear of crime, the public's increased focus on crime, which has escalated since the early nineties, comes counter-intuitively alongside reported widespread reductions in crime (see Section 4.2).

Section 4.2.1 will look at the historical context of British crime – and affirm that Britain is a high crime society. This is not to detract or draw attention away from recent improvements in crime levels, but to place concerns over crime levels into their wider context. This is essential for a realistic assessment of the extent of the burden which is placed on the police and the criminal justice system, and goes a long way towards explaining some of the discrepancies between official statistics and public opinion.

Toward this end, Section 4.1 will draw together an analysis of how crime is measured and made available to the public in England and Wales, as well as what problems current methods present for the public's ability to use crime data. Trustworthy and transparent crime statistics are not only important for holding police to account, but also for providing the public with vital information about the community in which they live – information which should be available to inform individuals' important decisions about personal and household safety.

Despite drops in official crime rates, crime remains "the most important issue facing Britain today" according to public polling

4.1 How is Crime Measured?

Crime statistics in Britain are collected in two very different ways, which paint rather different pictures of the state of crime.

The police keep records of the crimes which are reported to them by the public or detected in the course of duty. Police recorded statistics do not, therefore, capture the massive number of crimes which go unreported – currently estimated at around 60 per cent of offences.[4]

Behind these figures, however, lie a number of changes in the rules by which crimes were recorded and, until relatively recently, variable recording practices on the part of different Police Forces. For example, in 1998/99, a significant number of offences (most notably common assault) were added to the list of recordable crime, thereby giving the impression of

> "Public trust in the crime statistics produced by the Home Office has declined to such an extent that it is no longer possible to have a debate about alternative criminal justice policies on the basis of agreed facts about the trends in crime."
>
> *Office of the Home Secretary*[3]

2   Morris, N., "The Big Question: Does fear of crime reflect the reality of life on Britain's streets?", *The Independent*, 22 January, 2008. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/the-big-question-does-fear-of-crime-reflect-the-reality-of-life-on-britains-streets-771727.html; Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), 129. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf.

3   As quoted in: Smith, A., *Crime Statistics: An Independent Review* (London: Home Office, 2006), 1. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/crime-statistics-independent-review-06.pdf.

4   Ibid, 8.

a substantial uplift. In addition, in 2002, the National Crime Recording Standard (see Section 6.1) was introduced to standardise crime recording practises across Forces and is estimated to have increased recorded crime levels by ten per cent.

The Home Office's British Crime Survey (BCS) aims to give "a better reflection of the true extent of crime"[5], and polls a large cross-section of the population aged over 16 (consisting of approximately 40,000 people) to ask about experiences as victims of crime. This data is used to estimate general crime levels and trends. Figures from the BCS show that **crime levels are more than twice what police statistics suggest**.[6] Furthermore, it is difficult to correlate the trends displayed in the BCS data with the recorded crime data as each give very different pictures of the rate and periods of time over which crime has been rising or falling.[7]

In addition, studies estimate that even the BCS under-reports crime levels – by more than 3 million incidents nationally every year – and skews trends because of methodological problems.[8] For example, the BCS excludes crime against people in irregular housing and, until recently, youths under 16. It also fails to capture "victimless" crimes or crimes where victims are unable or unlikely to report crime to a survey (for example, murders and sexual assaults). Importantly, it fails to capture chronically repeated victimisation of the same people. The under-counting of chronic victims, particularly chronic victims of violence has a major impact in shaping crime trends, and in understating the huge extent to which crime is concentrated on its chronic victims.[9]

Neither should it be forgotten that the British Crime Survey's response rate, while good for a survey of this type, still fails to extract information from some 30 per cent of the people it seeks to question. The Working Group fears that the people who are least likely to respond may also be particularly prone to crime victimisation.

This leaves the public with conflicting pictures of the state of crime: a more positive recent picture presented by police statistics, a less positive picture reported by victims of crime (and filtered through Home Office statistical conventions) and another, much bleaker picture of crime nationally, a large portion of which experts say is not being recorded or addressed by police.

4.2 Overall Crime Trends

So how do these different pictures of crime look? Police recorded crime statistics recorded just under 5 million offences in total for 2007/08. This represents a 9 per cent drop from the previous year, and an 18 per cent drop from the recorded peak in 2003/04, returning crime levels to just under the levels recorded for 1998/99 (see Figure 5).

5   Jansson, K., *British Crime Survey: Measuring Crime for 25 Years* (London: Home Office, 2007), 3. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/bcs25.pdf.

6   Ibid, 7.

7   Ibid, 8.

8   Farrell, G., and Pease, K., "Crime in England and Wales: More Violence and More Chronic Victims," *Civitas Review* 4 (2007), http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/CivitasReviewJun07.pdf.

9   Ibid.

Figure 5: All Recorded Crime 1981–2007/08[10]

In contrast, the BCS estimated that there were 10.1 million crimes committed over the 12 months leading up to its publication in August 2008. This represents a 48 per cent drop in overall crime since the peak BCS year of 1995.[11] At this peak, the BCS measured 19.3 million crimes. This has meant a drop to overall crime levels below those of the baseline year of 1981.

Figure 6: All BCS Crime 1981–2008[12]

10   Home Office, *A Summary of Recorded Crime Data 1898 to 2001/2* (London: Home Office, 2008) http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/recordedcrime1.html.
11   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08 (*London: Home Office, 2008), 2. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf.
12   Ibid, 2.

4.2.1 THE TRULY HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Analysis of current crime rates often fails to take into account anything before the BCS baseline year of 1981. Thus, when officials interpret recent decreases in crime to mean that "the risk of becoming a victim of crime is still historically low"[13], they do so with reference to a history of less than thirty years.

In fact, the twentieth century run-up to the baseline year of 1981 saw a dramatic and sustained surge in crime:

Figure 7: All Recorded Offences in England and Wales 1898–2008[14]

As Figure 7 illustrates, between 1940 and 1960 crime rates doubled. In the following two decades, leading up to the BCS baseline year, recorded crime increased again nearly threefold.[15] While some of this increase is surely attributable to increases in police detection, crime opportunities and public reporting over that same period, this sixfold increase remains a historically unprecedented rise in crime from which British society has never recovered.

While the claim that Britain is a high crime society is often dismissed as nostalgia for a golden age that never existed, it is difficult to downplay the fact that **the average citizen (who, in Britain, is aged 39) has lived through a fourfold increase in overall crime during the course of their lifetime.**

Significantly, this rise in recorded crime has been accompanied by an increase in demand for the police which has vastly outstripped increases in police resources over the same timespan.

> "The amount of resources available for the number of incidences has not kept pace. The huge amount of resources that has been put into Policing has largely gone into counter-terrorism and Neighbourhood policing."
>
> *Chief Constable Hughes, South Yorkshire*

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13   Simmons, J., and Dodd, T., *Crime in England and Wales 2002/03* (London: Home Office, 2003), . http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/statistics/statistics28.htm.

14   Home Office, *A Summary of Recorded Crime Data 1898 to 2001/2* (London: Home Office, 2008) http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/recordedcrime1.html.

15   Ibid.

4.2.2 ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

Antisocial Behaviour (ASB) is a collective term which represents acts of social disorder which intimidate members of the public, and remains one of the key drivers of public concern over personal security. Research around the Signal Crime Perspective (introduced in Section 3.3.1) found that "in some areas, levels of disorder are more influential than crime in shaping perceived risk".[16] Currently, national polling data reports that 16 per cent of people experience high levels of worry over antisocial behaviour.[17]

While antisocial behaviour is an often used and seldom defined term in public discourse, the Government established the following broad definition in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998:

Acting in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as (the defendant).[18]

The Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate has developed the following typology of behaviour categories which are "widely accepted to be antisocial by both practitioners and the public":

- Drug/substance misuse and dealing;
- Street drinking;
- Begging;
- Prostitution;
- Curb crawling;
- Sexual acts;
- Abandoned cars;
- Vehicle-related nuisance and inappropriate vehicle use;
- Noise;
- Rowdy behaviour;
- Nuisance behaviour;
- Hoax calls;
- Animal-related problems;
- Intimidation/harassment;
- Criminal damage/vandalism; and
- Litter/rubbish.[19]

A large proportion of these antisocial behaviour categories is generally composed of acts, such as begging, noise and rowdy behaviour, which are not recordable crimes and as such escape analysis of crime rates. Furthermore, the

16   Innes, M., *The Signal Crimes Perspective* (London: National Reassurance Policing Programme, 2004), http://www.upsi.org.uk/resources/signalcrimesin60secs.pdf.

17   Kershaw, C., Nicholas, S., and Walker, A., *Crime in England and Wales 2007/08* (London: Home Office, 2008), 11. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb0708.pdf.

18   *Crime and Disorder Act 1998* (London: Office of Public Sector Information, 1998), http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980037_en_1.

19   Home Office, *Defining and measuring anti-social behaviour* (London, Home Office: 2004), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/dpr26.pdf.

Antisocial behaviour often escapes analysis of crime rates, despite its impact on public perceptions of risk

subjective nature of many of these instances of antisocial behaviour makes it more difficult than strictly criminal activity to quantify and catalogue. However, one Home Office count carried out in 2003 found that various agencies combined received over 66,000 reports of antisocial behaviour in a single day.[20] Assuming that figure is typical, this would suggest that **there are over 24 million reported incidences of antisocial behaviour annually**. Another recent estimate put the number of criminal acts of antisocial behaviour at 35 million in 2008.[21]

This disparity between recorded (or surveyed) crime levels and the public's perception of antisocial behaviour may well go some way towards explaining the gulf between the apparently positive trends in crime and the low levels of public confidence or feelings of safety.

4.3 Alternative Sources of Data

The public, police and partner agencies require clear and accurate information about crime levels, in order to assess local police performance. Accurate information can be used by police and the public to support defensible police resource decisions. These same tools can be used by individuals and communities to inform decisions affecting personal safety. This should help to reduce crime by helping communities make safer choices.

The public are also entitled to see police data correlated with data from other sources to provide a richer picture of what is taking place. For example, information about violence from outside the criminal justice system has brought clarity to violence trends for a public confused by official data. Such information is also key to prevention since a great deal of violence is not reported to the police. Accident and Emergency (A&E) Departments treat large numbers of victims of unreported violent offences. Emergency Departments can therefore work with Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) to provide anonymous data about: location, weapon use, repeat victimisation, assailants and time of violence. This approach has been found to increase violence prevention above the levels achievable using police intelligence alone. This A&E data has been found to be a new, objective measure of the harm generated by violence in England and Wales and has been used to demonstrate, amongst other things, significant links between violence, deprivation and regional alcohol prices.[22]

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20   Ibid.
21   Milland, G., "35 million yob crimes a year," *Sunday Express*, February 4, 2009, http://www.dailyexpress.co.uk/posts/view/83209.
22   Matthews, K., Shepherd, J., and Sivarajasingham, V., "Violence-related injury and the price of beer in England and Wales", *Applied Economics* 38 (2006).

In trials where this data has been employed for targeted policing, there have been significant and sustained reductions in violent crime rates (especially street violence and licensed premises), and in violence-related Emergency Department intake.[23]

The Working Group recommends that data derived from alternative sources, such as A&E Departments, is used to support crime reduction efforts in local neighbourhoods.

4.4 How Crime Statistics are Presented

Currently, crime statistics are gathered, interpreted and presented directly by the Home Office and individual police forces – whose performance is assessed against those same statistics. The Working Group is aware of the work of the recently established UK Statistics Authority, which is intended to promote and safeguard the quality of official statistics that serve the public good, safeguard the comprehensiveness of official statistics, and ensure good practice in relation to official statistics by providing:

- Oversight of the Office for National Statistics (ONS);
- Monitoring and reporting on all UK official statistics, wherever produced; and
- Independent assessment of official statistics.

> "Few question the crime figures in New York. Residents largely accept that their city is safer than it was. And that is because New York has not fiddled about with how they collect crime statistics in the way that the UK has."
>
> *Former Commissioner Sir Ian Blair, MPS*[24]

Despite this welcome oversight, high profile and seemingly opportunistic errors in the gathering and publication of official crime statistics continue to undermine public confidence in their accuracy. Most recently, the Chairman of the UK Statistics Authority, Sir Michael Scholar, exposed the use of "premature, irregular and selective" data on knife crime published by the Home Office with the apparent sanction of the Prime Minister's Office.[25] The decision to publish the statistics was taken despite warnings from the NHS Chief Statistician Andy Sutherland that doing so would "look to observers as if the government has cherry picked the good news and forced out publication for political ends." [26]

Expert testimony suggests that stable and sensible crime measures, presented by an independent body, would greatly improve public confidence in the positive picture of crime trends told by official statistics. Similarly, public

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23   Warburton, A., and Shepherd, J., "Tackling alcohol-related violence in city centres: effect of emergency medicine and police intervention", *Emergency Medicine* 23 (2006).
24   Blair, I. Colin Cramphorn memorial lecture, delivered 17 June 2008.
25   Travis, A., "No 10 ordered release of flawed knife crime figures," *The Guardian*, March 6, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/mar/06/knife-crime-statistics.
 26   Ibid.

polling undertaken by the CSJ confirms that 64 per cent of respondents would trust an independent body over the Government (2 per cent) and police (18 per cent) to provide accurate crime statistics.

Which of these would you most trust to provide accurate crime rates?

The Government	2%
The police	18%
An independent body	**64%**
None of them	14%
Don't know	3%

CSJ YouGov polling results, Jan 2009

Considered together, this evidence suggested to the Working Group that further measures to strengthen the independence of this data should be taken. The Working Group, therefore, recommends that an independent body collects, manages and publishes crime statistics.

Principle 12: Crime statistics should take a wide view of crime and disorder, in order to capture elements of social disorder which affect the public sense of safety and risk.

Principle 13: Crime statistics should enjoy the trust and confidence of the public and be clear, stable and comparable over time.

Recommendations
- Alternative sources of data should be utilised to enrich the picture given by crime statistics and inform crime reduction initiatives.
- The responsibility for the collection and public presentation of crime or crime related data should rest with an independent body which is free from control by the Police Service and local or national government.

How Police Time is Spent

5.1 On the Streets

CSJ-commissioned public polling found that **the vast majority (85 per cent) of the public thinks that there are not enough police on the street**, and would like to see more police on patrol. In the same poll, when asked what single thing the police could do to improve, a great number of responses centred around improving visibility – especially by foot patrol: "Less paperwork more patrolling the streets"; "More police patrolling streets on foot"; "More frequent high visibility patrols and on-street presence"; "More visible patrolling, targeting more low level crime"; etc.

As can also be seen from the quotation above, police officers also understand the value of "flooding the streets."

> "We need to flood the streets. We had an operation on Bonfire Night with hundreds of officers patrolling the streets. Crime dropped to almost zero."
>
> *Response Team Officer, Limehouse*

Do you think that there are enough police on the streets?

Yes there are	9%
No there are not	**85%**
Don't know	6%

CSJ YouGov polling results, Jan 2009

The extent to which officers are incapable of performing patrol functions given their resourcing, Response duties and other bureaucratic functions was first made public by the 2001 Home Office study entitled *Diary of A Police Officer*, which concluded that **"only around 17 per cent of police officer time is spent on reassurance patrol" and that the police are "spending almost as much time in the police station (43.1 per cent of their time) as they are on the streets".**[1] More recent Government estimates in 2008 put the average amount of officer time spent on street patrol as low as 14 per cent.[2]

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1   PA Consulting Group, *Diary of a Police Officer* (London: Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, 2001), v. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/prs149.pdf.
2   Home Affairs Select Committee, *Policing in the 21st Century* (London: Home Affairs Select Committee, 2008), 3. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/364/36402.htm.

This is a shocking finding, which translates to **the average full-time police officer patrolling for less than seven hours a week.** At that rate, having a police presence outside of Oval tube station 24 hours a day would require the devoted patrol time of 24 police officers, who do no other patrolling.

This means that in order for the police to add one full-time officer to street patrol, five new officers need to be hired.

The same report found that police visibility is further reduced by the common practise of **"double crewing",** whereby officers patrol in pairs – effectively halving the extent and visibility of police patrol.[3] Thus, if the police presence at Oval tube station were to be double-crewed, it would require 48 devoted officers.

"Double crewing" effectively halves the already minimal extent and visibility of police patrol

Still more, the majority of this minimal patrol function is conducted by police in patrol cars – increasing the extent of patrol, but minimising its impact, effectiveness and marginalising community interaction.[4] In the final accounting, just over 1 per cent of an officer's time is spent on foot patrol.[5]

As for the 83 per cent of police time that is not spent on the streets, the main unnecessary time commitments identified by the 2001 study were:

- Time taken to **process prisoners** and prepare prosecutions, and the other paper work which the police must produce;
- **Antiquated IT** system applications which meant that forms available electronically did not actually save officer time;
- Officers having to provide the same information on **multiple separate records**; and
- **Queues encountered in custody** suites and other factors delaying the process after an arrest.[6]

A subsequent study published in 2006 found that there was "evidence from the focus groups that the situation, with respect to paperwork in particular, has worsened" and moreover that:

Ironically, the compounding of the problem by shift shortages is itself a consequence of the reform agenda in many instances. Officers are abstracted from 24/7 reliefs to provide the staff for new initiatives set up in response to Home Office reform strategies.[7]

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3   PA Consulting Group, *Diary of a Police Officer* (London: Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, 2001), v. http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/prs149.pdf.
4   Ibid, v.
5   Ibid, 27.
6   As quoted in Chatterton M., and Bingham E., *24/7 Response Policing in the Modern Police Organisation: A View from the Beat* (2006), 20.
7   Ibid.

5.2 Police Bureaucracy

Although the Home Office has not revisited the findings of the *Diary of a Police Officer* study since its publication in 2001, and it may now be seen as dated, the evidence that the Working Group received from its Force visits remained consistent with its findings.

5.2.1 "HOW DO YOU USE YOUR TIME WHEN YOU'RE NOT ON THE STREET?"

If there is a single issue which, our evidence suggests, demoralises police officers equally across the country, one single thing that every officer would change, it is the proportion of their time spent away from activity that directly serves the public. What do they think is drawing them away? What do officers spend their time on when they're not on the street? One constable from a Cleveland Response team gave the Working Group a concise summary of what police see as the commitments that keep officers at their desks: "Paperwork, dealing with people, dealing with the CPS."

Frontline supervision has been particularly hard hit by bureaucratic time requirements, with supervisors drawn away from oversight and support of frontline officers. Members of one Neighbourhood team reported seeing a supervisor "once a week, maybe an afternoon." As a result, "It falls down to PCs to be the beat managers". Supervisors reported that they "seldom" or "never" get onto the streets, and performing most supervision remotely from their offices.

> "I never get out on the streets."
>
> *Response Team Sergeant, Cleveland*

Officers are estimated to spend between 20 and 30 percent of their time completing paperwork.[8] More than anything else, the police see the massive burden of paperwork as a barrier to more effective interaction with the public:

> *The paperwork. When I leave home, my wife says: 'Be safe when you go out there'. I have to say to her 'I'm more likely to get an RSI (Repetitive Strain Injury) than I am to get stabbed'. Eight hours of my day, I'm just typing away.*
>
> Response Team Sergeant, Cleveland

Excessive paperwork has a double-edged impact on the resource hours available for street patrol and public interaction, as not only does form-filling keep officers off the street, but its volume increases with virtually every public intervention. In the most extreme case, the stop-and-account or stop-check form – typically a two-sided form, one foot in length (see overleaf) – must be completed on-the-spot whenever an officer intervenes to question any citizen. As one Neighbourhood officer explained to the Working Group:

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8   Home Affairs Select Committee, *Policing in the 21st Century* (London: Home Affairs Select Committee, 2008), 3.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/364/36402.htm.

All these lads on the estate, we know who they are, they're not necessarily doing anything, but because we've stopped to talk with them, we've got to fill in this great big stop-check form.

Officers universally supported the Government's Green Paper pledge to eliminate stop-and-account forms, "I would like to see it that we have to fill out a form only when we search someone." Similarly, some forms may be appropriate but require more data to be captured on-the-spot than is strictly necessary, "Domestic violence incidents are a priority, but there's an 11-page form to fill out every time an officer attends an incident."

What's more, paperwork still remains predominantly in the hands of sworn officers – in the words of one Response officer, "There are a lot of officers doing work that a civilian could do for half the cost." The ratio of public interaction to paperwork draws enormous ire and frustration from officers on the frontline. As another Response officer from Limehouse described it, "You go to a victim for 20 minutes and fill out forms for an hour and a half. It should be the other way around."

Many officers see the rise in paper-based accounting as a costly price of the wider performance-based accountability framework (see Section 6), which requires extensive quantification of police work for managerial and statistical accountability. More generally, it is perceived as symptomatic of a risk-averse culture where being protected against blame is prioritised over an emphasis on getting the best results possible or using resources efficiently, "It's a question of risk-aversion: stop-and-search forms, stop-and-account forms."

5.2.2 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FAILINGS

The related issue of appropriate (and appropriately resourced) information technology was also a top priority for frontline officers. In 2008, simple access to basic technology remained a pressing issue for several of the teams that met with the Working Group:

I have 12 people working for me, and three computers.

Neighbourhood Team Sergeant, Cleveland

Insufficiently available information technology (IT) creates delays and bottlenecks at periods of high usage, especially when processing offenders – with wasted police resource hours accumulating at great expense to the tax-payer and to public safety. Information technology is not only limited in availability, but also in its mobility – requiring police to "double key" or "triple key" the ever-increasing amount of data recorded from the street after returning to the station:

We need more investment in technology. Five years ago we carried pads. Now there are computers, and you have to input all the details at the nick. We don't have mobile data.

Senior Officer, South Yorkshire

The HMIC report thought we could reduce bureaucracy by 20 per cent, but I think we can go further. I think we could get it down by 60 per cent. Information Technology has a lot to answer for – we're still triple keying a large percentage of the data we enter. And we should scrap encounter-related forms, such as stop-and-accounts.

Senior Officer, MPS

The Working Group were encouraged by the initiative being developed in the East Midlands to fit laptop computers into police vehicles and issue palmtop computers to officers to improve their access to information while keeping them out on the street – and improving their ability to input information without returning to the office. Surely, this should be a basic entitlement for the whole Police Service, circa 2009.

Despite improvements in this field, the Working Group heard evidence that police IT in England and Wales is roughly ten years behind many parts of the United States: New York, for example, introduced the Mobile Data Terminal system ten years ago in all patrol cars, which allows police to cross-check suspect details on a wide database and immediately identify any outstanding warrants for arrest.

5.3 Specialist Squads

Testimony from senior officers to the Working Group repeatedly raised the issue of abstraction from frontline services (Response and Neighbourhood patrol) to specialist squads, emphasising that **overall manpower increases have been more than offset by the transfer of officers to teams devoted to such specific areas as armed response, anti-terrorism and domestic violence.** As one officer put it: "If you've got a problem we've got a team for it." This would appear to be a direct consequence of the "widening police mission" referred to in Section 1.1.

We used to have loads of people on shifts, absolutely loads, we could throw loads of people at problems – put them on nights, plainclothes, whatever. Now, there's so few on shifts because they're all on teams – if you've got a problem we've got a team for it. There are so few people actually in uniform doing the jobs.

Neighbourhood Team Officer, Nottinghamshire

Officers are required to complete stop-check forms for virtually every public encounter

In the days when I joined, there were a lot more officers available to respond. Because policing is more complex, we now have a squad culture: Public Protection units, Major Incidents, Intelligence, Firearms, Surveillance… They keep coming from the frontline. We never replenish them. The pool of officers keeps diminishing, to be replaced by PCSOs.

Senior Officer, South Yorkshire

When I started in 1990 we had 36 cops on this beat, and now the maximum is 21. The most I've seen is 17.

Response Team Sergeant, Cleveland

Overall police manpower increases have been more than offset by the need for officers to staff teams devoted to specific functions

While specialised police squads are a necessary reality of policing a diverse modern society, this growing percentage of police officers is unavailable for general patrol. Given the premium placed on visible patrol by the public, it seems reasonable to predict that this increasing specialisation will be having an adverse effect on public confidence. While CSJ polling suggests that the public are confident that the police are capable of addressing serious crime (Section 3.4), the same polling suggests that the absence of police on the street to address disorder and low-level crime has undermined the public's overall confidence and sense of security (Section 3.5).

Linking this evidence to the impact of signal crimes and signs of offending on public perceptions of crime described in Section 3.3.1, the Policing Reform Working Group affirms that:

Principle 14: Street patrol, and public contact, is one of the most important police functions and allocated police "resource hours" must take account of the importance which the public places upon it.

Principle 15: Greater use can be made of technology to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and, more importantly, to keep officers out on the street for longer.

5.4 Formal Interventions and Police Time

Paperwork, technology, and the widening police mission, however, are not the only obstacles keeping police off the street. As Jan Berry, former Head of the Police Federation and current Independent Government Advisor to champion the reduction of unnecessary bureaucracy in the Police Service, advised the Working Group: "Cutting bureaucracy is not just about reducing forms, it's about changing the structures, systems and processes that we have in place."

One major procedural change introduced to policing has been the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS), which requires police to record every reported incident as a crime, unless they have evidence contradicting the report. Section 6 details the two fundamental (and bureaucracy-impacting) effects of the NCRS on police time, namely:

1. The NCRS requires the recording and investigation of reports that would otherwise be judged not credible, or unworthy of pursuit.
2. In combination with targets for Offences Brought to Justice (OBTJs), rigid NCRS recording requires that more incidents are disposed of through formal sanctions, regardless of whether they are appropriate.

Both of these outcomes entail an increased burden on the police for every reported incident to produce proof that no crime has been committed, or to formally "bring the offender to justice" – which is defined by a narrow set of acceptable criminal sanctions.

The procedures surrounding arrest and charge are, in themselves, laborious. According to the *Diary of a Police Officer* study, "Arresting someone – no matter whether they are a petty criminal or a serious offender – keeps officers off the beat for an average of 3.5 hours – often for far longer." Response officers gave evidence that even processing a straightforward arrest for shoplifting takes:

> *A minimum of one hour. You need to take a statement from the shopkeeper. You've got to type it all up, email it off to the CPS. Then you have to wait for them to make a decision. It could be a couple hours.*

But three-and-a-half hours isn't the whole story. The Home Office estimates that the evidence-gathering process requires an average of 208 minutes of police time, including but not limited to processing notes (30 minutes), searches (60 minutes), statement taking (24 minutes), forensic evidence (10 minutes) and processing any CCTV evidence (12 minutes).[9] Following this, a further 184 minutes is required to prepare the evidence file for the CPS.[10] **In total, evidence-gathering and preparation for an average arrest requires 6.5 hours of police time.** This is the case regardless of whether or not an investigation has taken place, as the decision to charge is taken after the case file is submitted. An arrest resulting in trial takes an average of 7.81 hours of police time.

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9 Home Office, "Efficiency Planning Toolkit – Ready Reckoner" (London: Home Office 2006). http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/human-resources/efficiency-planning/EPl_Readyreckoner.xls?view=Standard&pubID=528315.
10 Ibid.

According to Home Office time estimates and costings submitted to the Working Group by the Norfolk Constabulary, the average time and corresponding cost of the standard available police disposals are:

Figure 8: Police Resources Required for Disposals

	Penalty Notice for Disorder	Standard Caution	Conditional Caution	Guilty Plea (Court)	Trial (Court)	Restorative Justice
Police Time (hours)[11]	0.53	1.73	2.09	7.59	7.81	0.3
Cost to Police (£)[12]	13.49	43.45	52.35	189.96	195.23	7.50

As it stands, when an officer intervenes on the street or responds to an incident report, the amount of time that the officer will be drawn away from street patrol depends heavily on the officer's decision to issue a penalty notice, caution, arrest or find another type of disposal (such as employing a Community Accountability Meeting or engaging an appropriate partner agency, as discussed in Sections 7.4 and 7.5).

As Figure 8 illustrates, on average, an arrest leading to trial requires approximately fifteen times more "resource hours" than issuing a penalty notice (a time savings of 93 per cent), and twenty-five times more police hours than a standard restorative disposal (a time savings of 96 per cent).

This should clearly not be read to imply that less formal interventions should be used by officers regardless of the context, simply because they are more cost-effective. However, it is important to recognise how severely police time is affected by the types of disposals used. More than 13 penalty notices can be issued in the time that an officer will expend in bringing just one offender to trial, or seven extra hours can be spent on visible patrol and performing informal interventions on the street.

This is particularly significant as CSJ polling indicates that the majority of people (62 per cent) are more reassured by seeing police on patrol than by learning that more criminals were being arrested.

Which of the following would make you feel safer?

Seeing more police on the street	62%
Finding out that more criminals were being arrested	26%
Neither	9%
Don't know	3%

CSJ YouGov polling results, Jan 2009

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11   Ibid.
12   Costings for police time provided to the Working Group by Norfolk Constabulary, based on the Office for Criminal Justice Reform's "Waterfall" model.

Principle 16: Discretion is at the heart of and fundamental to effective policing and must be exercised at all times when dealing with the public.

Principle 17: When determining an appropriate intervention against crime or antisocial behaviour, the consequences for resource hours committed to visible patrol should legitimately be considered.

5.5 Police Community Support Officers

This section could not be complete without an examination of the role played, in street policing, by PCSOs (Police Community Support Officers), which were introduced in the Police Reform Act 2002 specifically to address the withdrawal of frontline officers from the street and to increase police visibility and community interaction.

5.5.1 THE LUMINOUS JACKET ON THE STREET

I do feel PCSOs are a good investment. They are high visibility and focused on problem solving. They're a really useful resource. Having meetings, determining local problems, coming up with solutions, working with partners.

Senior Officer, South Yorkshire

According to ACPO Guidance (2005), the primary function of PCSOs is to "contribute to the policing of neighbourhoods, primarily through highly visible patrol with the purpose of reassuring the public, increasing orderliness in public places and being accessible to communities and partner agencies working at local level." According to estimates presented by the Home Affairs Select Committee, PCSOs spend 75 per cent of their time on patrol.[13]

Senior police officers were generally grateful that PCSOs were unencumbered by paperwork, making them readily available to be deployed primarily for visible patrol and

"I wrote the job description for PCSOs. I needed PCSOs because I couldn't get a police officer to just stand outside the Oval tube station and stay there. It's about visibility and taking back public space."

Acting Deputy Commissioner Godwin, MPS

community interaction. However, some fully-sworn officers on Neighbourhood teams were concerned that the work done by PCSOs created an administrative burden, further increasing the workload of other officers:

They don't take away any of my workload, they add to it. We have two police officers and four PCSOs. They go out there and they gather intelligence, which is great. But I can't say 'I've got this to do, can you take it off my hands?'

Neighbourhood Team Officer, Cleveland

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13   Home Affairs Select Committee, *Policing in the 21st Century* (London: Home Affairs Select Committee, 2008), 3.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/364/36402.htm.

When it comes to having the operational scope for community interaction, problem-solving and extensive visible patrol, the difference between fully-sworn police officers and PCSOs is not merely one of scale – PCSOs specialise in those narrow community-based functions for which additional powers are largely unnecessary and may even detract from their role:

> *I see PCSOs and PCs as two totally different jobs. Without them, we wouldn't be successful in Neighbourhood Policing. We have so many teams now, there'd be nobody left on the frontline. Without PCSOs, you would never ever see bobbies on the street, you'd never see that luminous jacket anywhere.*
>
> Neighbourhood Team Officer, Cleveland

Given their limited formal responsibilities, PCSOs gave a very different picture of their bureaucratic requirements from fully-sworn officers: "We just go out, we don't do paperwork"; "Our job is being in the street" and "We do have some – stop and accounts, emails, intelligence" were common responses. One PCSO gave a more conservative estimate: "I'm inside for the first half hour of the day, and again after lunch. The rest of the time is spent in the streets."

Many members of the police and public reported that it is ironic, that the most limited members of the police family are alone in having time available to patrol the streets and engage the local public. However, as one Neighbourhood team officer put it to the Working Group: "At least those limitations keep them on the street." It was, however, difficult for the Working Group not to form the impression that the role of foot patrol has been largely abandoned by most police officers and left in the hands of their PCSO colleagues.

5.5.2 THE POWER TO INTERVENE

Compared with fully-sworn police officers, PCSOs have a more limited range of powers and responsibilities, consisting primarily of the ability to issue fixed penalty notices; power to confiscate alcohol and tobacco; and the power to demand the name and address of a person acting in an antisocial manner. For some officers and members of the public, PCSOs are judged to be simply an inferior police officer. As one Neighbourhood officer put it, "It's a horrible thing, but people call them plastic policemen."

The Working Group is conscious of the adverse publicity which the PCSO role has attracted. High profile examples have included two PCSOs reported to have observed the drowning of a young boy[14] and two PCSO passively observing a gang of female muggers beating a middle-age man (before his eventual rescue by an elderly woman).[15] In neither case as reported was there

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14   "Police defend drowning death case," *BBC News*, September 21, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/manchester/7006412.stm.
15   Leapman, B., "'Blunkett's bobbies' to be given more powers," *The Telegraph*, April 19, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1571230/'Blunkett's-bobbies'-to-be-given-more-powers.html.

an intervention by the involved PCSOs to safeguard the public. In both of these cases, the major criticism was perceived to be that the PSCOs appeared to have reacted less effectively than might have been expected of an ordinary member of the public.

Many PCSOs expressed a wish to see the role extended to take on more typical policing functions, as one PCSO told the Working Group: "I'd like to do more, but I don't have the powers. Unless you're assertive, people will take liberties with you." However, the majority of police that spoke with the Working Group were opposed to giving PCSOs the more serious powers usually reserved for fully-sworn officers, especially the power to arrest: "There's even discussion of giving them handcuffs – if you're going to do that, why not make them full officers?" As one Chief Constable put it, "PCSOs are a positive but I don't want them to have the power of arrest. Don't do it. Give them the power to ticket, to take names and numbers."

In the opinion of the Working Group, the debate about whether or not PCSOs should have more powers is of limited value. The Working Group would place more importance on developing PCSOs to make more use of their powers and responsibilities as ordinary citizens (including citizens' powers of arrest) and that any further training and development should enhance that capability. The damage done to the reputation of the Service when PCSOs are perceived as acting less effectively than ordinary citizens cannot be overestimated.

5.5.3 GETTING THE RIGHT BALANCE

Given their value for money and availability for visible patrol, PCSOs are a rapidly growing proportion of policing manpower – especially on the street. Many officers around the country expressed concern over the balance between PCSOs and officers on Neighbourhood teams: "You get more for your money for them, I suppose. But they can't solve the problems. We've got 140 PCSOs and 100 officers"; "In my Neighbourhood teams, there are far too many: I've got two PCSOs for every one officer. We need to find the right balance"; "You need to top up the ratio of PCs to PCSOs. On our team it's 50–50. When you're the only PC on your beat a lot of that pressure is placed on you."

PCSOs have been predominantly funded by specific, initiative-based grants which severely constrain the ability of the Chief Constable to determine an appropriate mix of PCs and PCSOs. Going forward, it is important to get the balance between sworn officers and PCSOs right. The Working Group, accordingly, believes that Chief Constables should have the freedom to determine that mix.

Principle 18: PCSOs bring benefits to communities but action needs to be taken to remove any perception that they are less effective than an ordinary member of the public.

Recommendations

- The effectiveness of PCSOs should be enhanced by their being trained to make full use of their citizen's powers.

- The Chief Constable should determine the mix of PCs and PCSOs locally.

5.6 The "Inspection Industry"

While the direct impact of inspections and scrutiny on the availability of police officers may be less obviously apparent, senior officers nationwide universally spoke about the strain on public service delivery levied by the excessive time demands of inspecting bodies. In addition to the time and resources that Police Forces give over to making their Force accountable to the Police Authority, who conduct regular audits of performance, Forces are also required to submit to a myriad of inspections by a plethora of inspecting bodies.

> "We are endlessly inspected, endlessly audited – HMIC audits, Police Authority audits, Audit Commission audits…"
>
> *Senior Officer, South Yorkshire*

Foremost of these bodies is Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) whose remit over the past few years appears to have been in a constant state of upheaval. Less than 10 years ago, HMIC were primarily concerned with certifying the efficiency and effectiveness of every Force and, in addition, they conducted a range of Service-wide thematic inspections. This approach was modified in 2001 when additional inspections were made of individual Basic Command Units (BCUs) within Forces and, at least in theory, every BCU in the country has had at least one such inspection. At the same time, the Inspectorate took on so-called "Best Value Inspections" which examined the effectiveness of reviews conducted by local Police Authorities. At Force level, the approach was further changed in 2003 to a suite of Baseline Assessments in which individual grades were assigned to each Force across a range of topics, all of which fed into an overall assessment of each Force. In the following years, this approach became more targeted and, arguably created less of a burden for Forces. However, just as this welcome change was being made, another inspecting body increased its profile.

The Audit Commission has traditionally been involved in basic compliance issues for Forces – including financial probity, value for money and data quality. In 2005, this changed with the introduction of their Police Use of Resources (PURE) assessments, that provide a more holistic view of the linkages between the use of resources and the results achieved. However, this entailed considerable overlap with the traditional duties of HMIC, giving the impression to senior officers of a "turf war" between the two inspecting bodies – where the expansion or preservation of their interests is of more importance than the interests of the public.

In one week alone, I was visited by Her Majesty's Inspectorate, the Audit Commission twice and the National Policing Improvement Agency … The amount of effort and energy that go into it. The Police Service has been the victim of a turf war between different inspecting bodies.

Senior Officer, Cleveland

In dealing with these bodies, Forces are required to compile significant documentation, facilitate one-to-one meetings with key members of staff and convene focus groups (usually with frontline staff but sometimes with the public), all of which allows scrutineers to collect evidence upon which to base their assessment. Forces gave evidence of learning, sometimes painfully, the cost of failing to resource these inspections, which feed into performance assessments and can directly affect the reputation of the Force and its senior officers.

One Force was able to evidence to the Working Group some 53 separate pieces of inspection activity over a period of 40 months. The Chief Constable of another Force tried to put a cost on the burden of inspections in his Force:

[This Force has] been inspected by seven different agencies in nine weeks; The Audit Commission, HMIC, SIFR… I've got a team of people who just deal with inspections. That, combined with Freedom of Information requests, costs a couple million a year, no question.

Senior Officer, South Yorkshire

On top of this, Police Forces can be subject to joint inspections by a range of inspecting bodies with remits peripheral to the delivery of policing, such as the Surveillance Commissioners or the Interception of Communications Commissioner, or with completely general remits, such as Health and Safety.

The Working Group noted the strength of feeling amongst senior officers that the cost of Inspection activity had increased dramatically over the past few years. In respect of HMIC alone, its budget has risen from £5.49m in 2000 to

One Police Force gave evidence of 53 separate inspections in 40 months

£12.34m in 2007 (although this latter figure did not include officers seconded to HMIC "free of charge" from Forces, to a total value of a further £1.4m).[16]

In addition, there was a general feeling across the Police Service that the activities of all of these various bodies appeared fragmented and uncoordinated. It was routinely suggested that the cost of inspections in terms of police time and resources were not justified in terms of the public benefit

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16   Audit Commission, *Report of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary 1999/2000* (London: Audit Commission, 2000), Figure 1; Audit Commission, Report of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary 2005/2007 (London: Audit Commission, 2007), 112.

derived from them. Most worryingly, the Working Group reached the conclusion that, whatever value it had added to the standards of policing delivered, the extent of inspection activity was creating a generation of senior officers for whom the desire to satisfy the requirements of their scrutineers was now greater than the desire to satisfy the public.

Principle 19: The amount of police resources required to service the inspection process must be justified in terms of the overall public interest.

A Force to be Measured?

The Police Service has been the subject of a number of reform initiatives during the past fifteen years. It would be churlish to suggest that these have been of no benefit but, equally, it would be wrong to believe that the Service, circa 2009, represents the "finished article". As this report is written, further changes, driven by the latest Green Paper on Policing Reform are in progress.

No attempt is made here to describe the entirety of these reforms (although a number have already been referred to in this report). Focus will be placed on three particular reforms, all of which had, taken individually some merit but which, taken together, have had a devastating effect on policing and its ability to serve the public. Those reforms are:

1. The National Crime Recording Standard (Section 6.1);
2. The targets regime (Section 6.2); and
3. "Narrowing the Justice Gap" (Section 6.3).

The consequence of these changes, acting together, has been to destroy the discretion which (as affirmed in Principle 16) had, hitherto, been central to the office of constable.

Case Study 1: A Parent Turns to the Police for Help

Assistant Chief Constable Ackerley of Nottingham Police told the Working Group of an incident which typified the need for police discretion to choose appropriate disposals:

A mum comes in and says: 'My daughter's thirteen and she's stolen 35p from my purse.' Guess what? The 13 year-old gets locked up, a social worker comes in, the girl gets interviewed, admits to taking the 35p, she gets fingerprinted, has her DNA taken and she gets reprimanded. The girl has behavioural difficulties, she's not being supported the way she should. She needed the 35p to get to school.

6.1 The National Crime Recording Standard

Police crime recording has historically been notoriously irregular and subject to variations across Forces and over time. With any reported or detected incident, deciding whether a crime has been committed (and, if so, what crime) often

involves a significant degree of interpretation of the available evidence. Even when the facts are firmly established, a given incident could be categorised as any of several crimes. Variations and inconsistencies in recording practises between individual officers and between Forces nationally made data difficult to use and compare.

Furthermore, this subjective quality of crime recording (or "criming") left crime records open to subtle manipulation or "massaging", often done to improve performance figures. As one Chief Constable put it when discussing this subject with the Working Group: "I have reminded colleagues that we got here because we fiddled the figures: 'Your purse wasn't stolen ma'am, you lost it'". Another Chief Constable described the more extreme case of: "People recording rapes as indecent assaults until they get the narrative from the victim." Except in exceptional cases, the practise of statistical "gaming" in order to present performance in a positive light was seen as "part of the job" and fairly benign.

The rigidity of the NCRS has placed policing priorities at odds with needs of individuals and communities

The National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) was introduced in April 2002 in an attempt to enforce common practises and standards nationally and reduce the scope for manipulation of the data by which police are measured. It requires that all reported crimes be recorded by police as reported, unless there is evidence to the contrary. This approach is described as "victim oriented" in that it presumes the accuracy of the account reported by the victim (or witness or third party), until that description is contradicted by evidence.

Furthermore, any report that does not receive a police response within 72 hours is automatically recorded as a crime without investigation:

> *If it takes over three days to get to, it's a crime. If it gets to a crime, even if there's nothing happening, you have to do work to get it uncrimed and dealt with. You're creating a job when there's nothing there.*
>
> Response Team Officer, Cleveland

The Standard has been accompanied by a robust regime of external audit and scrutiny of crime reports, in order to ensure that all reports which amount to a crime have been recorded, with annual assessments grading the level of compliance of each of the Forces. Many forces resisted full implementation of the NCRS, which they perceived as an unacceptable restriction of constabulary discretion:

> *We'd be called to a fight outside a bar. We'd respond and no one would be there. Is it useful to record that? It takes too many officers off the street. So we didn't go along. Then, at the end of the year, we were reported as being only 84 per cent compliant with the NCRS. So, even though our crime rates had fallen, we couldn't claim that. As a result, we had to fully adopt the NCRS.*
>
> Senior Officer, MPS

Furthermore, the NCRS entails an unbendingly uniform implementation of the law, which often does not capture the reality of a given incident, as in the situation described by one senior officer, where:

> A wife comes home with a new navel piercing and shows her husband. The husband gets angry and tears the ring out. That gets crimed as a robbery. Which, of course, you would never charge.

Many senior officers felt that the NCRS was artificially inflating crime rates for certain types of crime, and that returning discretion over crime recording would, in the estimate of one senior officer, "immediately get a 20 per cent reduction in serious violent crime".

While the NCRS may meet the Government's needs and may be mitigating against previous police recording practises, the Working Group doubts that it is truly meeting the needs of the public. As one senior officer described:

> The typical one is a petty neighbourhood dispute, where neighbours who have gotten along for years suddenly have a row and the police are called in. Now that has to be recorded as a crime.

What's more, when combined with a stringent system of performance targets and a mandate to "narrow the justice gap", the rigidity of the NCRS has placed policing priorities at odds with the needs of individuals and communities.

6.2 The Targets Regime

Statutory Performance Indicators (SPIs) are tools for gathering and managing information used by many different types of organisation to measure progress towards goals. In order to quantify progress, it is typical for an indicator to be linked to a particular target; a desired outcome towards which the indicator provides a quantitative metric. The indicators themselves quantify processes (generally the output of personnel), converting them into reportable data for use by decision-makers.

> "You can't measure accountability through a tight statistical framework, because it doesn't capture what really matters."
>
> *Matthew Baggott QPM, Chief Constable, Leicestershire* [1]

The introduction of SPIs by Central Government has ushered in a complete sea change in police management. Alongside these metrics, heavily pressurised targets have been implemented – linking progress towards goals (predominantly set at a national level) to financial and career incentives and sanctions. Evidence collected by the Working Group suggests that while this has increased efficiency in some regards, it has also had severely negative effects on the role of police in society and their relationship with local communities.

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1 Baggot, M. Speech at Evidence Based Policing Conference, Cambridge University, 30 June, 2008.

> " I have many officers who, thankfully, haven't arrested anyone in 15 years. They're the officers whose job it is to make sure we don't need to arrest anyone. But the cost of achieving nothing isn't something the Government is interested in measuring. It should be. "
>
> *Hugh Orde, Chief Constable,*
> *Police Service of Northern Ireland*[2]

In 2003, performance targets were introduced to the Police Service in a standardised national regime, the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF), akin to those used in other public services and built around 19 discrete organisational goals to be measured which were grouped into themes and banded performance into quartiles with the intention that every Force should seek to move into the upper quartile of every theme:

Efficiency (to go up by 2 per cent a year), road traffic deaths (to go down 40 per cent in 10 years), community participation (up 5 per cent by 2006), sick days (down to 11.5 for each officer by 2006), value for money (up), overtime (down), police visibility (up), ill-health retirements (down), recruitment of women (up), child road deaths (down) and so on.[3]

However, the foundation of any successful performance management regime is a set of clear and actionable outcomes. And, unlike profit for a business, policing does not have a single bottom-line or ultimate metric; its goals are manifold – which presents problems for quantitative measurement.

Since its introduction, the limited performance regime of the Policing Performance Assessment Framework has expanded to accommodate more and more of the diverse goals of police work. The most recent incarnation, Assessments of Policing and Community Safety (APACS), includes 92 targeted indicators, clustered within five main themes:

- Promoting Safety – e.g. antisocial behaviour, road safety;
- Tackling Crime – e.g. burglary, robbery and violent crime;
- Serious Crime and Protection – e.g. organised crime, major civil emergencies;
- Confidence and Satisfaction – e.g. public confidence, satisfaction with services; and
- Organisational Management – e.g. value for money, financial management.[4]

6.2.1 NATIONAL TARGETS AND LOCAL PRIORITIES

Uniform nationally-set priorities cannot be expected to reflect the priorities of a local area. For example, a much lower proportion of people are victims of burglary and violent crime in rural areas than non-rural areas, whereas

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2   Orde, H. Speech at Evidence Based Policing Conference, Cambridge University, 30 June, 2008.
3   Davies, N., "National policing plan: what Blunkett wants" *The Guardian*, 11 July, 2003,
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2003/jul/11/ukcrime.immigrationpolicy.
4   Home Office, "APACS: Frequently Asked Questions," (London: Home Office, 2008).
    http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/performance-and-measurement/assess-policing-community-
    safety/apacs-faqs-intro/.

vehicle-related crime is a relatively bigger problem.[5] And while extremism may be a police priority in London, should it be in Barnsley? What if that means diverting resources away from addressing organised crime or burglary or a locally-identified problem? These are local strategic decisions, which should vary based on local priorities and intelligence. In the words of one Chief Superintendent, "We seem to take a one size fits all approach, rather than identify problem areas and work with those areas."

The more that the distribution of resource hours between these tools is prescribed from the centre, the less flexibility a given Force has to customise services for their local area. As one Chief Officer described the situation of target-driven priorities, "If I say 'You have to focus on catching offenders', then we're putting all our eggs in one basket – saying that disruption and prevention aren't as important." The issue of the operational independence of the office of Chief Constable will be returned to in Section 8.1, but it is important to note that nationally-set targets (especially those measuring police activity) limit the range of crime-reducing strategies available at a local level.

In addition to this, at Force level, Chief Constables have had to take account of any additional targets set by the Police Authority and give regard to targets set

Diverse local priorities, such as addressing low level crime and signs of disorder, cannot be captured by uniform national targets

through their Local Criminal Justice Board (as will be discussed in Section 8.1) and at more local levels BCU (Basic Command Unit) Commanders have had to incorporate targets set by Local Area Agreements. This has created a vast array of performance targets which may be overlapping or even conflicting and which have had to be interpreted at street levels by the officers and staff working on the ground.

6.2.2 QUANTIFYING POLICE WORK

Two conflicting but intractable problems with measurement thus come to the fore. On the one hand, a superabundance of indicators deflates their individual importance and utility, and a system designed to streamline priority information and goals becomes cumbersome and ultimately redundant. One senior officer summarised the problem concisely:

> *Intuitively, I like performance indicators. I ask for performance reports all the time. That's my natural model: I'm a doer not a thinker. Measures that tell me people are doing things are a good way to start discussions: 'We did this, why?'; 'We did this, now let's do this.' The problem is: we have millions of them. When you have millions of them, they stop mattering.*

> Chief Constable Hughes, South Yorkshire

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5   Hardy, J., *Understanding Crime in Urban and Rural Areas* (Leicester: Leicestershire County Council, 2006) http://www.leics.gov.uk/rural_crime_report.pdf.

Another was blunt about what a plethora of indicators meant for policing priorities:

> *I have almost completely lost track of the number of targets I am accountable for. This chart is my Bible, if I hit these targets I get my funding for the year. If I hit these targets, I am a top performing borough.*
>
> Senior Officer, MPS

On the other hand, the breadth of the policing mission is such that even with 92 discrete measures, SPIs can summarise only a narrow fraction of police work. This is an inherent problem: some important outcomes escape direct measurement, such as building trust in a community or using an appropriate intervention rather than a convenient one. While a selective measurement tool is not problematic in itself, it becomes problematic when combined with a system of incentivised targets designed to determine the police priorities for activity, as areas which escape measurement then also escape prioritisation.

When quantitative targets become the primary means of assessing police activity, assessment fails to capture (and thus marginalises) many significant outcomes:

> *The only positive feedback column is for letters of appreciation. That doesn't quantify what you can do in a community, does it? We work in a poor socio-economic area, they're not going to put pen to paper. Sometimes, the most you're going to get is a smile and an acknowledgement that you're there.*
>
> Neighbourhood Team Officer, Cleveland

The corollary of this position is the risk – and, in policing, the reality – that by marginalising significant outcomes you will narrow the organisational definition of success, and that the focus of policing will follow the narrow band of prioritised outcomes:

> *Despite the fact that these indicators are all green, my Force has one of the lowest public confidence rates. Explain that. We have 29 per cent approval and Camden has 81 per cent.*
>
> Senior Officer, MPS

The misalignment of the police mission and their targeted goals has resulted in a shifting of policing priorities to match targets (rather than the opposite) and inappropriate and inefficient disposals for the sake of generating statistics.

This translates down to individual officers being given relatively simple numerical targets which they will be expected to achieve or account for why they haven't.

Targets are a minimum standard: if you can't get five detections per month in a borough like this, you're doing something wrong. What a team will do if it's short of detections is put some dogs at the tube station and get some quick detections for cannabis.

Senior Officer, MPS

They've got to be able to justify paying me what they're paying me at the end of the day – they want an end product. They're not interested in me being out in my area for seven hours a day, high profile, seeing everybody. Because if I do that eight days a week, at the end of the month what am I going to have to show for it? And how does my Detective Superintendent judge what I'm doing? Especially when my Force is being judged on detections.

Neighbourhood Team Officer, Cleveland

In the opinion of the Working Group, the targets regime has reduced policing to a service where "the numbers" have become more important than "the people". The Police Service is no longer serving the public, it is servicing the performance indicators.

6.3 Narrowing the Justice Gap

In 2002, the Government introduced an initiative designed to bridge the so-called "Justice Gap" – the then increasing gap between the number of crimes recorded and the number which resulted in an offender being brought to justice. While the initiative contained a range of measures designed to make the criminal justice process more efficient and more robust in tackling persistent offenders and improve the care of victims and witnesses, at its heart was a hard-edged commitment to increase the number of "Offences Brought to Justice" (OBTJs) from just over 1 million in 2000 to over 1.2 million by 2006 – one of six key Public Service Agreement targets on which the Home Office leads nationally. As a category, OBTJs encompasses incidents disposed of by:

● A conviction;
● TIC (a case "Taken Into Consideration" by the court);
● A PND (Penalty Notice for Disorder);
● A caution; or
● A cannabis warning.[6]

Thus, by increasing the number of OBTJs and reducing the level of crime, the Justice Gap would be narrowed.

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6   Metropolitan Police Authority, *MPS Make-up of OBTJ's* (London: Metrolpolitan Police Authority, 2006) http://87.102.31.206/downloads/committees/ppr/061109-04-appendix01.pdf.

Taken on its own, this was a perfectly laudable response to a growing concern about the derisory number of offences which are detected compared to overall crime. The initiative was supported by a complementary drive by the Home Office to increase the level of Sanction Detections (those crimes which are detected and a sanction of some description is imposed) amongst Forces. Previously, a distinction was made between a primary detection (an OBTJ resolved using one of the means listed above) and a secondary detection (an offence resolved without resort to legal action), both of which were recognised in assessing outcomes. This legitimised discretion regarding individual offences, as to whether or not a punitive sanction was the most appropriate response. There were, however, a number of flaws in this change.

The most glaring drawback was the lack of discernment between the relative seriousness of the different offences which might be brought to justice. A Force could, therefore, inflate its performance figures by concentrating on large volumes of relatively minor offences. Similarly, OBTJs were limited to those offences which could be reconciled against recorded crime levels and, thus, whilst theft of a bar of chocolate from a supermarket is counted, disqualified driving or drink driving is not.

The focus on volume of OBTJs has led to the practise of "picking low-hanging fruit" such as cannabis possession

> *Counting Offences Brought to Justice pressurises staff to focus on total numbers. It values arresting a 12 year old shoplifter the same as a murderer or drug dealer.*
>
> Senior Officer, Surrey

In practise, this perverse incentive to maximise detection rates has shaped the style of policing delivered across England and Wales. Firstly, it has encouraged the practise of "picking low-hanging fruit" which refers to the formal sanctions for marginal crimes, or crimes which can be disposed of with minimal time and effort.

The most pervasive form of "low-hanging fruit" has been cannabis possession, with cannabis warnings – on-the-spot tickets for possession which are counted on a par with a successfully prosecuted rape or murder – now accounting for over seven per cent of all criminal disposals nationally (with over 200,000 warnings having been issued in 2008).[7] While drug enforcement is an important police function, senior police confirm that this recent low-profile crackdown on cannabis usage has not been driven by strategic prioritisation or public interest:

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7   Home Affairs Select Committee, *Policing in the 21st Century* (London: Home Affairs Select Committee, 2008), 12.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/364/36402.htm.

[The discretion to use a non-sanctioned disposal] went when we stopped counting non-sanctioned detections. When we used to count sanctioned and non-sanctioned, or primary and secondary as they were, we'd just say 'let's write that off as a secondary detection'. But that was recorded as a detection for the Force, so they were happy with that. Now they only count primaries.

<div align="right">Response Team Officer, Cleveland</div>

The focus on volume has led to several significantly less low-profile perverse outcomes, culminating in the Police Federation releasing the details of **a Police Force which, in 2007, devoted two weeks of officer time to reclassifying a single child's theft of £700 into 542 separate crimes – purely for accounting purposes.**[8]

6.4 A Toxic Mixture

Taken together, these three initiatives have produced a highly toxic mixture which has had the effect of corroding the fabric of British Policing. This section began with a case study described by ACC Ian Ackerley which seemed too shocking to believe. However, officers are faced with a rigid National Crime Recording Standard, a suite of nationally determined targets to which they must contribute (regardless of the needs of a victim or any other member of the public) and the further requirement to increase the volume of Offences Brought to Justice. In this context, it is easy to see how a Police Service has been created in which discretion, which had hitherto been seen as central to the role of a Constable, has been all but destroyed. In its place has been the thoughtless criminalisation of (usually young) people for the most petty of offences, in the name of achieving Government targets.

Within the policing profession, there is a growing concern over the effect that this withdrawal of discretion has had on the newest generation of police recruits, those recruited in the past decade, for whom the quantitative performance target regime has been the main method of evaluating success, and the main determinant of policing priorities.

Having only experienced a policing environment where the use of discretion is formally discouraged, this latest generation of constables has had a very different experience of public interaction from their predecessors. Specifically, many senior officers report concerns over a generation that lacks decision-making experience in balancing public interest against a strict application of the law,

You can give all these people discretion, but they probably can't walk into a job and deal with it like I can – because they don't have the experience using discretion. You can't just teach it, it comes from experience.

<div align="right">Neighbour Policing Sergeant, Nottinghamshire</div>

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8   Tendler, S., "Why police officers turned a single theft into 542 cases", *The Times*, 16 May, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article1795988.ece.

In practise, the predisposition towards a "by the book" approach has an effect both on how policing is delivered on a case-by-case basis, and on the overarching priorities of the Service. Individual officers who spoke with the Working Group were highly conscious of the trade-off between public service and statistical accountability, and saw their role as delivering the latter when the two conflict.

"There is evidence of an "arrest or ignore" culture – where officers do not feel able, encouraged, or resourced to intervene except to achieve a formal detection.**"**

Not only are many officers inexperienced in a robust professional application of discretion when faced with a conflict between the letter of the law and the public interest, but many officers and managers take comfort in a tight statistical framework that provides shelter from qualitative accountability and limits blame to easily managed statistical outcomes.

Overwhelmingly, police officers who spoke with the Working Group listed "to serve the public" amongst their chief motivations for joining the Service. As one Chief Constable summarised the situation to the Working Group, a culture of police assessment which alienates constables from this fundamental aspect of the job "dulls what officers are excited about and risks creating automatons."

The problem is not merely that criminal sanctions may be inappropriate, excessively harsh and an inefficient use of resources – but also that a formal intervention may contribute nothing to resolving the presenting issue, helping the victim or serving the interests of the community. As one officer told the group, "Whenever I arrest someone, I think 'What is this going to accomplish?'"

Working Group: "Are you stopping drivers for minor traffic offences?"

Response Officer: "No, I don't get any credit for that. We do what they record in the figures."

The effect of a police culture that places a consuming emphasis on criminalisation, arrest and charge has been the discounting, de-prioritising and de-legitimising of less formal interventions. This has engendered what one senior officer referred to as **an "arrest or ignore" culture** – where officers do not feel able, encouraged or resourced to intervene except to achieve a formal detection,

Bureaucracy-wise I don't want to have to arrest to death. I want to be able to use all sorts of disposals, depending on what's appropriate. It might be appropriate to say this young man committed a crime and we're going to re-skill him so he can contribute something to society.

Senior Officer, South Yorkshire

The constricted choice, perceived by many officers, between responding with an arrest or not responding at all, is especially problematic when dealing with social problems where a formal criminal sanction is not likely to be appropriate, most notably antisocial behaviour – which comprises behaviour which is perceived as disruptive or intimidating, though often completely legal or

minor.[9] Despite the fact that minor but visible disorder and antisocial behaviour is persistently identified as a public priority (including in CSJ polling, which found that 76 per cent of people felt police were intervening too little against antisocial behaviour), and is linked to high levels of fear of crime, many officers expressed concern that the scope to intervene less formally had been severely reduced.

An appropriate intervention could entail something trivial, such as a brief conversation; a request for someone to desist from an unacceptable behaviour; offering advice; or referring someone to a suitable agency for assistance. On the more formal end of the scale, an intervention may require issuing a caution or a full arrest.

There is strong public support for a police intervention against every observed antisocial act and disorder

Do you think the police are intervening enough, too much or too little against antisocial behaviour?

Too much	3%
Too little	**76%**
About enough	15%
Don't know	7%

CSJ YouGov polling results, Jan 2009

In the eyes of the public, routine intervention against crime and disorder is one of the most significant functions of the police. Polling conducted by the Centre for Social Justice found that 72 per cent of respondents thought that it was never acceptable for an officer not to intervene when they have observed a crime or threat to public safety. The public is very supportive of a "zero tolerance" policing style – in the sense that there is strong public support for an appropriate police intervention against every antisocial act and disorder.

Do you think it is ever acceptable for an on-duty police officer not to intervene when they have observed a crime or a threat to public safety?

Yes it is sometimes acceptable	24%
No it is never acceptable	**72%**
Don't know	4%

CSJ YouGov polling results, Jan 2009

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9   Home Office, *Defining and measuring anti-social behaviour* (London, Home Office: 2004), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/dpr26.pdf.

Some senior officers interviewed by the Working Group were confident that their officers were intervening sufficiently on the street: "My staff adopt a fairly robust style on the streets. We don't have a blanket style of policing, but people are pretty interventionist." However, while Response team officers from the same Force were enthusiastic about the prospect of proactive intervention, they expressed reservations about the degree to which they were free and able to do so.

This would suggest that too many incidents are being resolved by the inefficient default reaction of arrest, charge and criminalisation – regardless of whether an arrest is appropriate. The courts have become the first port of call rather than the last. In evidence to the Working Group, officers recognised the extent of the impact from recent police reforms: "I know that I'm arresting a lot more people for crimes that I wouldn't have five years ago."

According to Home Office statistics, the ratio of incidents to crimes increased dramatically after the implementation of the NCRS, moving from two-thirds to three-quarters of all reported incidents being treated as crimes.[10] The brunt of this increase in criminalisation has been absorbed by young people; the number of offenders aged under 18 had risen by more than a quarter since 2002 – which is two-and-a-half times faster than adults.[11] Many officers lamented resorting by default to criminalisation, especially with young people:

> *Kids do stupid things that aren't necessarily malicious – like lighting a fire in a park. Instead of criminalising right away, the London Fire Brigade have an arson squad, and they now have a programme to teach kids about fire safety and give them fireman training. We can divert them to that.*
>
> Neighbourhood Team PCSO, Bow Road

The increasing resort to custody has also particularly disproportionately affected teenage girls aged 10–17, a group which saw a 22 per cent rise in arrests between 2004 and 2008, according to Youth Justice Board statistics. Since the implementation of the NCRS, arrests of teenage girls for personal violent attacks have risen by 48 per cent; for public order offences have risen by 37 per cent; and for racially aggravated crime have risen by 113 per cent.[12] This focus on young people, especially young girls, for custodial sentences is driven by a Police Service measured on activity and stripped of the discretion to decide when custody is appropriate.

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10   Simmons, J., Legg, C., and Hosking, R., *National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS): an analysis of the impact on recorded crime* (London: Home Office, 2003), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr3203intro.pdf.

11   Muir, G., and Lodge, G., *A new beat: options for more accountable policing* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2008), 10. http://www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=613; "Police focus on minor crimes", *Reuters*, 23 June, 2008, http://in.reuters.com/article/lifestyleMolt/idINL2316904420080623.

12   Travis, A., "Arrests of teenage girls and women reach record levels," *The Guardian*, 29 January, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jan/29/girls-arrests-crime.

6.5 "A mother reports that her daughter has stolen money from her purse. How do you respond?"

The Working Group used this scenario to test the reactions of a number of groups of people. We began with the public where, according to CSJ polling, only 31 per cent of people thought that the standard response to such an incident should be for the police to treat it as a crime, while 48 per cent thought that they should not. The same polling found that 78 per cent of people thought that the police should have the discretion over whether or not to charge, in non-serious cases where the victim did not want the offender charged (see Section 7.2).

If a parent contacts the police to intervene because their child has stolen money from their purse do you think that charging the child with theft should or should not be the standard response?

Should	31%
Should not	**48%**
Don't know	21%

CSJ YouGov polling results, Jan 2009

The Working Group then raised this case in interviews with both Response police and Neighbourhood teams around the country to see how the police in general would respond, and how the teams' responses would differ. The testimony given by officers not only underlined the withdrawal of discretion from frontline officers but also raised concern of two distinct tiers of service available to the public.

6.5.1 RESPONSE TEAMS

Officers from the Response teams around the country that spoke with the Working Group painted a bleak picture of the limited scope that they feel they have to deal with offenders and, therefore, with the local community and victims of crime. Responding to the question of how they would address the situation of a child having stolen money from their mother's purse, officers were keenly aware that arresting the child may not be in the interest of the public or the victim:

> *Whenever I arrest someone, I think 'What is this going to accomplish?'*
>
> Response Team Officer, Limehouse

> "If I'm honest, she'll be getting arrested. Whereas five years ago, we'd be having a word in her ear, now she'll be getting arrested."
>
> "That's not entirely fair – you can choose not to arrest her. But you need to make your arrests."
>
> *Response Team Officers, Limehouse*

There'll be times when the victim says 'I don't want them arrested', but they'll be arrested. I think we're too focused on the little details, rather than the big picture.

<div align="right">Response Team Officer, Limehouse</div>

However, Response officers reported having insufficient scope regarding how a crime (regardless of severity or context of the offence) is dealt with once it is reported and recorded:

This is where your NCRS comes in, because you'd get the mother saying that she just wants you to give her a telling off, but already they've created a crime incident. And then you have to try to make a detection.

<div align="right">Response Team Officer, Cleveland</div>

If it were recorded as a theft at this address and you just had a word with the daughter and let it go, a couple of days later they'd suddenly be asking 'Where's the crime report?'

<div align="right">Response Team Officer, Cleveland</div>

A combination of withdrawing constabulary discretion over what counts as a crime and simultaneously withdrawing constabulary discretion over what counts as an appropriate disposal of a crime has fundamentally redefined the relationship between the constabulary, communities and the law:

I would suggest that in Sheffield, on balance, a Response officer would make the arrest. What I would prefer is that she is not arrested, but referred to an appropriate agency. Here's the rub, do we record the crime? To my mind, it doesn't matter if the crime is recorded, what matters is getting the correct intervention.

<div align="right">Senior Officer, South Yorkshire</div>

This problem is particularly acute for Response officers. The Working Group put the same question to Neighbourhood Police around the country and found a completely different tier of service available to the public.

6.5.2 NEIGHBOURHOOD TEAMS

Faced with the same question that was posed to the Response teams over how they would respond to a child stealing from their parent, Neighbourhood officers and PCSOs from forces around the country reported a very different approach to public intervention – and to dealing with victims and the community:

Talk to the mother and see what she actually wants, because if there's no victim, there's no crime. Maybe the mother just wanted the daughter spoken to, doesn't want her put through the system.

<div align="right">Neighbourhood Team Officer, Cleveland</div>

" Where a Response team might arrest and criminalise, we're about problem-solving. We do a lot more 'step back' work. Talking to parents, schools, agencies, partners, whoever can help in a given case. "

Neighbourhood Team PCSO, Bow Road

Unlike Response officers, Neighbourhood officers reported a managerial ethos which granted them the freedom, training, access to partner organisations and time to identify and address underlying problems before criminalising:

First, we'd check if she's a missing person. See if the mother's having problems. Check if anyone's available who can help. On Safer Neighbourhood teams, we have the chance to work with other agencies.

Neighbourhood Team Officer, Bow Road

Find out if the daughter's got a problem, if that's why she took the money in the first place.

Neighbourhood Team Officer, Cleveland

Once a problem had been identified, Neighbourhood Police across the board reported close engagement with partner organisations (including schools, local authorities, social services, etc.) in finding appropriate assistance,

Six months ago, the daughter would be getting locked up and it'd be a detected crime. I'd like to think now that's not the end of it, we'd have a word with the daughter – give some advice to the daughter, some advice to the parents, see if anybody else needs to come in, maybe social services.

Neighbourhood Team Officer, Cleveland

Any cooperation with other agencies was, in and of itself, a tremendous absence from the testimony of Response police.

Some officers put this down to differences in resourcing. The Neighbourhood Policing model was designed to encourage the visible patrol and community engagement that a target-driven Response service had abandoned. As such, Neighbourhood teams are expected to spend time in the streets and engaging with the community and their management reflects that expectation. As one Neighbourhood officer put it, Response officers "have less discretion because they have less time."

The most manifest difference between Neighbourhood and Response teams was the connected issue of feeling pressure to police to targets generally, with Neighbourhood teams reporting: "We don't feel pressure to get the sanction detection" and "We have the discretion to do the softly softly approach and get the result in the end, rather than just use the big scare tactic." Although, some

> "The striking differences between Neighbourhood and Response police responses to this common, archetypal situation suggest that there are two distinct tiers of service available to the British public."

officers were sceptical that the Neighbourhood ethos would survive if crime trends reversed:

When the figures come out next year and we're not matching what we've already achieved or we've slipped down a bit – in that case, six months hence, that girl might be getting arrested.

Neighbourhood Team Officer, Cleveland

While this example is a convincing study into the demise of discretion in policing, it has also surfaced a second issue. The striking differences between Neighbourhood and Response police responses to this common, archetypal situation suggest that there are two distinct tiers of service available to the British public with no rational determining factor other than when, where, or how a citizen reports an incident as to which type of service is received.

Principle 20: Local policing will never succeed in a landscape dominated by national targets and performance frameworks.

Principle 21: Discretion will not be returned to officers simply by removing barriers, it will require training and leadership from every level of the Police Service.

Principle 22: The disparity in skills and service between Neighbourhood and Response officers is unacceptable and needs to be closed.

A Force to be Reckoned With

In response to the diverse challenges faced by the Police Service, there needs to develop a Policing style which energetically tackles harm or the threat of harm in communities and does so in a way which builds confidence among the public that the police are on their side – that, in the words of Peel, "the police are the public and the public are the police."

The Working Group acknowledges Neighbourhood Policing as a starting point in this endeavour but would describe the style which is now required as: "Interventionist Neighbourhood Policing". Building on the strengths of Neighbourhood Policing, this style of policing would incorporate a "commitment to intervene": a philosophy that every single observed or evidenced behaviour which is criminal or antisocial should be subject to an appropriate intervention. The Working Group believe that this is a challenging but achievable aspiration, which will require the following key ingredients:

> "We need a police culture that treats the streets as their office. Police need to know that they can take the necessary risks and use their discretion, and that they'll be supported by politicians and the public if things go wrong."
>
> *Rt. Hon. Iain Duncan Smith*

- A commitment by the police to intervene in any observed act of crime or antisocial behaviour;
- The rebuilding of discretion for police officers;
- Closer affinity between Neighbourhood and Response officers;
- Better management of resources to ensure that the maximum quantity and range of interventions can be delivered; and
- An increased skilling of officers to ensure that they have the capability to deliver the widest possible range of interventions.

7.1 A Commitment to Intervene

In order to successfully police a community, and encourage a community ethos that is largely self-policing, the role of the police is vitally important. Police must establish the norms and standards of that community, by continuously and appropriately reinforcing clear boundaries of what behaviour is acceptable and what behaviour is not acceptable. Whenever a

Visible signs of disorder which are ignored give the impression that breaches of the social order are acceptable

police officer, or PCSO, walks past a breach of public order without an intervention the opposite message is sent.

Just as visible signal crimes and disorders give the public the impression of wider social disorder and risk (see Section 3.3.1), so too does the signal event of a police officer ignoring a breach of social order give the impression that criminal or antisocial behaviour is acceptable. Recent evidence from the Netherlands has further demonstrated that visible signs of disorder or visible breaches of established social norms have a direct, adverse effect on future public behaviour.[1] The research included a series of social experiments which successfully linked signs of disorder and antisocial behaviour to further antisocial behaviour and criminality, illustrated by Case Study 2 below.

Case Study 2: "The Spreading of Disorder" Experiment[2]

A stamped and addressed window envelope was left partially sticking out of a mailbox, noticeable to everyone approaching. It was also clearly visible that the envelope contained a €5 note. The researchers then recorded what percentage of passers-by stole the envelope, varying the conditions around the mailbox as follows:

Conditions	Percentage of Passers-by Who Stole the Money
1. The mailbox was clean: no graffiti, no litter	13%
2. Graffiti on the mailbox	26%
3. Litter around the mailbox	25%

Ultimately, the simple presence of graffiti or litter in the area doubled the rate of theft.

This evidence suggests that if visible signs of disorder are not tackled immediately, then they can lead to further offending, possibly more serious than the original transgression. This is a further development of the Broken Windows thesis, which suggests that:

> *Signs of disorderly and petty criminal behaviour trigger more disorderly and petty criminal behavior, thus causing the behaviour to spread. This may cause neighbourhoods to decay and the quality of life of its inhabitants to deteriorate.[3]*

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1   Keizer, K., Lindenberg, S. and Steg, L., "The Spreading of Disorder", *Science* 322 (2008).
2   Ibid.
3   Ibid. See also: Kelling, G., and Coles, C., *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities* (New York: Free Press, 1998).

Not only does this provide a powerful argument in favour of ensuring that the police are committed to intervening against low level crime and disorder, but it underlines the futility of uniform central targets in the face of the complex local factors affecting crime.

Principle 23: The Police Service should develop a policing style which energetically tackles harm or the threat of harm in communities but does so in a way which builds confidence among the public that the police are on their side.

Principle 24: The Neighbourhood Policing model represents the right direction of travel for policing in terms of discretion, problem-solving disposals and resourcing. Gains in these areas should be consolidated and built upon.

Principle 25: Every observed act of antisocial behaviour or crime, no matter how minor, should be subject to an intervention by police or other enforcement agency.

Recommendation

● The Working Group recommends "Interventionist Neighbourhood Policing" as the natural progression from the current Neighbourhood Policing model.

7.1.1 IN HARM'S WAY

One key means for police to signal their commitment always to intervene against crime and antisocial behaviour on behalf of the public is the removal of perceived obstacles to intervention.

Whilst visiting Surrey Constabulary the Working Group became aware of what was referred to as their "Harm's Way" policy (see Figure 9). This made it clear to officers where the responsibility lies for protecting the public and appeared to be an ideal antidote to any perception that the police are somehow constrained from doing so by spurious considerations of Health and Safety. The Working Group commends this approach to all Forces as an example of an excellent doctrine.

Figure 9: Harm's Way Policy

Between any vulnerable individual or group and a dangerous person intent on causing harm or injury will be a police officer motivated to protect the former and to bring the latter to justice. This is a personal obligation upon each officer according to his or her oath, and upon those who lead such officers. The balance between protecting a member of the public from harm and protecting a police officer will sometimes be a fine one, but the presumption must always be towards protecting the public.

The policy contains clear advice on how to apply the policy and who is responsible for monitoring it and gives specific reassurance about using mistakes as learning opportunities rather than a pretext for management retribution.

Without such a commitment to intervene, the Working Group does not believe that the police will be able to achieve the necessary goal of convincing a sometimes sceptical public that they are on their side.

Recommendation

● The Working Group recommends the Surrey "Harm's Way" Policy for adoption by the whole Service.

7.2 Discretion

The Working Group felt that constabulary discretion is a key ingredient of a truly Interventionist Neighbourhood Policing style. While it is recognised that progress is being made towards restoring constabulary discretion, this must be driven much further, faster and deeper.

The Working Group became aware of a number of Forces who are attempting the difficult process of reinstating police discretion, and visited Surrey Constabulary to examine their work:

Case Study 3: Surrey Public First

What is Surrey Public First?
A pilot programme to give constables the discretion to choose appropriate interventions - but within guidelines and with accountability.

Principles
● Discretion is about officers asking themselves: "Is this best for the public?"
● It's about commonsense: "What would a member of the public want?"
● It asks of an intervention: "Does this resolve the issue?" and "Has as much as possible been done to prevent this from happening again?"

New Practises
● To restore officers' discretion, detection targets are removed, with the exception of those for serious crimes. This gives officers the freedom to decide what resolution will be the most effective in a given situation. This is a challenge as many supervisors have relied on detection targets for measuring their teams.
● Decisions need to be taken at the right level, and often the person best able to decide how to proceed with a given incident is the officer present rather than a remote supervisor. Frontline officers are authorised and encouraged to make these decisions in the public interest.
● This is not a targeted activity. An Effective Resolution Target would create the same perverse incentives as detection targets.
● When possible, schools, parents and agencies are engaged before criminalising.

Cont.

The "Traffic Light System" for Discretion

Officers receive training on situations where the use of discretion is (and is not) appropriate, based on a "traffic light" system which divides incidents into: red (no discretion), yellow (use discretion with caution) and green (use discretion).

Red: Serious offences

Sample offence: Serious assault, murder or rape.

Yellow: Certain serious offences

Sample Offence: A Serbian man was regularly racially harassed and threatened by neighbourhood teens, to the point that he was scared for his family's safety. He came to the police seeking advice and help – but didn't want the children arrested. A meeting was arranged with the man, the youths and their families, in which he was able to explain how their behaviour was affecting him. This meeting had a strong impact on the teenagers involved, who have not only apologised – but have completely stopped the harassing behaviour and even offered to assist him.

Green: Minor disputes

Sample Offence: A dispute between neighbours or a playground fight.

Results

"We're finding it is reducing bureaucracy."

The rate of arrests not resulting in charges being pressed was reduced by 3 per cent – because frontline officers are filtering out these cases on the street.

There has been a visible increase in public confidence. The public is more confident in the police responding appropriately when incidents are reported. Initial follow-up has found that **98 per cent of victims surveyed reported satisfaction.**

Challenges

Changing police culture

The introduction of constabulary discretion has largely been welcomed. Some supervisors want the comfort of targets, which provide an easy quantitative way to measure their team. However, many officers attending incidents find themselves begged by victims not to arrest and welcome the discretion to make the decision.

For some it is a difficult adjustment. Officers are often sceptical about using discretion – there is a perception that if a difficult decision goes badly, they will be reprimanded. Direct contact and approval from the upper ranks, including the Chief, has been important for reversing this.

You can't bring this in overnight. I think it will take at least another 12 months for the culture to change.

The National Crime Recording Standard

Officers are told to use their discretion when responding. All incidents which would be recorded as a crime under the National Crime Recording Standard are recorded as crimes for accounting purposes, after the fact.

Cont.

> **Temporary Chief Constable Rowley on Surrey Public First:**
>
> Basically we said to officers: "When you respond to an incident, use your discretion." The risk is that giving officers discretion will be interpreted as soft on crime. Which it isn't.
>
> Now, we've started getting calls where we wouldn't have before – for example, schools dealing with minor incidences – because before the public thought that we would overreact.
>
> Policing isn't complicated. In the end, it comes down to a few simple things:
>
> - Are we protecting the public?
> - What is our relationship with the public?

7.2.1 TRAINING FOR DISCRETION AND EFFECTIVE DISPOSALS

If this challenging agenda is to be delivered, the Working Group questions whether the skill levels among Neighbourhood and Response officers and PCSOs are sufficiently high.

In the Surrey Public First case study outlined above, initial findings have been that, despite generally welcoming the opportunity to use discretion when dealing with the public, many officers lack the experience needed to do so successfully. Significantly, they also lack the confidence that they will be supported in their decisions. The Force estimated that it will take 18 months of specialised training, practical experience and support reinforced across the entire Force (up to the Chief Constable) to overcome the prevailing culture.

The Working Group recommends that, in order to facilitate appropriate and resource-efficient interventions, all officers be trained to employ discretion to choose amongst a range of possible disposals. The aim is to empower police responding to a minor incident or act of antisocial behaviour, as well as certain serious offences, to use professional discretion to determine which disposals are appropriate for a given incident.

Ray Mallon describing the importance of policing style

7.2.2 BETTER ALIGNMENT OF RESPONSE OFFICERS WITH NEIGHBOURHOOD OFFICERS

Evidence taken by the Working Group, and presented in Section 6.5, gives a strong indication that the Neighbourhood Policing model has successfully re-introduced a measure of constabulary discretion over appropriate disposals – discretion which remains largely constrained for Response officers.

While some senior officers denied that it was the case, Response officers across the country still report a pressure to "police by the numbers" and described their performance in terms of quantitative measures and activity-based targets. Despite the qualitative and community-oriented model of

Neighbourhood Policing being widely embraced across policing, this seems to have had little impact on the ethos of Response Policing – which remains under-resourced and driven to compensate by sacrificing community priorities in favour of value for money. In fact, several Response teams reported that the introduction of Neighbourhood teams had made quantitative pressure worse, since targets remained in place and Neighbourhood teams had drawn even more resources away from the Response function.

The Police Service must build on the strengths of Neighbourhood Policing

For Neighbourhood teams, under-resourcing remained an issue but, because of their focus on local priorities and problem-solving, this hasn't translated into quantitative efficiency becoming the consummate issue:

> *The way the Force has set out Neighbourhood policing now as a model is ideal. In practise, we haven't got enough people for it, but we're getting towards it. We have got time: time to investigate, we can go and see our victims, we get potential witnesses to come forward – whereas on Response someone shows up in a panda, takes the briefest of details and goes on to the next job and a totally different person follows it up. On the whole, Neighbourhood policing is working.*
>
> Neighbour Team Officer, Cleveland

While the re-introduction of discretion for Neighbourhood officers is clearly a major step forward, the public is not concerned with an internal police distinction between Neighbourhood Police and other frontline officers. As CSJ polling suggests, **the public want whoever responds to an incident to be capable of using professional discretion when resolving it** – 78 per cent of respondents supported constabulary discretion when, for example, the victim of a non-serious crime does not wish to see the offender charged. The decision to criminalise (as in Case Study 1 presented above) should be based on the circumstances of the incident, rather than which type of officer is responding.

If the victim of a non-serious crime does not want the offender charged, should the police have the discretion to deal with the situation without arresting?

Yes they should	78%
No they shouldn't	14%
Don't know	8%

CSJ YouGov polling results, Jan 2009

As evidenced in Section 6.5, the Working Group was alarmed at the difference between the philosophies displayed by Response officers and their Neighbourhood colleagues. It was felt that this disparity needed to be urgently addressed if the public were not to receive a two tier Service, where the quality of service and outcome of police involvement is determined by which type of officer happens to be available at the time of your call. As a minimum, it was felt that Response officers should be aligned to the same Neighbourhood or collection of Neighbourhoods in their area and that the same level of investment should be made in their training as with their Neighbourhood colleagues.

7.3 Better Management of Resources to Achieve Maximum Interventions

It seemed intuitive to the Working Group that, in a Service where resources are finite, the most efficient interventions should be employed to obtain the maximum effect.

The amount of officer time required for an on-the-spot disposal is on average between 93 per cent and 96 per cent less than for an arrest (see Figure 8). As such, the cost in police time of the target-driven shift in policing towards more arrests-per-incident has been enormous. The cost becomes even more pronounced when the criminal justice system as a whole is considered:

Figure 10: Disposal Costs for the Criminal Justice System[1]

	Penalty Notice for Disorder	Standard Caution	Conditional Caution	Guilty Plea (Court)	Trial (Court)	Restorative Justice
Police Cost (£)	13.49	43.45	52.35	189.96	195.23	7.50
CPS Cost (£)	0	18.88	11.89	99.77	455.11	0
HMCS Cost (£)	0	0	0	33.16	202.23	0
NOMS Cost (£)	0	0	0	143.80	184.24	0
TOTAL (£)	13.49	62.33	64.24	466.68	1036.81	7.50

According to these Home Office estimates, from the point of view of the criminal justice system taken as a whole, **an on-the-spot disposal (where appropriate) would save between 86 per cent and 99.2 per cent of the cost of taking the same offender to trial.**

The Working Group became aware of work in Norfolk Constabulary along these lines and took evidence from Temporary Assistant Chief Constable Sarah Francis.

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1   Home Office, "Efficiency Planning Toolkit – Ready Reckoner" (London: Home Office 2006). http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/human-resources/efficiency-planning/EPl_Readyreckoner.xls?view=Standard&pubID=528315.

Case Study 4: Appropriate Outcomes: The Norfolk Approach

The starting point was asking: 'What influences public opinion of the police?'

Temporary Assistant Chief Constable Sarah Francis

Faced with an estimated 34,234 annual officer hours spent on the completion of unnecessary files, the Norfolk Constabulary decided to change which disposals were incentivised through targets, in an attempt to dampen the "pressure to arrest" and create room for other disposals where appropriate.

They simultaneously gave police officers the discretion and training to dispose of certain low-risk incidents on the spot using Restorative Justice techniques – in an attempt to positively impact: a) public confidence and b) police time and resources.

Changes Introduced

Type of Disposal	Targeted Proportion	Change
Charge/Summons	52%	Down from 63%
Caution/Reprimand	18%	Down from 26.2%
Conditional Cautions/Final Warnings	4%	Up from 1.7%
PND/Cannabis Cautions	15%	Up from 9.1%
TICs	6%	Up from negligible
Restorative Justice	5%	Up from zero

The Impacts of the Changes on Confidence in the Norfolk Criminal Justice System

The results of these simple changes were impressive:

- Public satisfaction and confidence rose to 48 per cent (up from 40 per cent).
- Confidence in bringing offenders to justice and reducing crime rose to 47.6 per cent (up from 33.2 per cent), and Norfolk ranked 6th nationally (up from 37th).
- Public perception of promptness and efficiency rose 49.6 per cent (up from 37.5 per cent) and ranked 1st nationally (up from 30th).
- Regarding public confidence in meeting the needs of victims, Norfolk ranked 6th nationally (up from 27th)
- Regarding perceived effectiveness in dealing with young people accused of crime, Norfolk ranked 8th nationally (up from 42nd).
- Regarding perceived effectiveness in meeting the needs of witnesses, Norfolk ranked 7th (up from 20th).

Initial Follow-up Survey Results Around Restorative Justice Use

Regarding the 5 per cent of incidences where Restorative Justice techniques were used for disposals, follow-up surveys were conducted with the victims, which showed very positive levels of approval:

- Ease of Contact   55% approval
- Actions Taken   71% approval
- Follow Up   65% approval

- Treatment   91% approval
- Whole Experience   89% approval

Temporary Assistant Chief Constable Sarah Francis on the Norfolk Approach:

It's about getting the right outcomes. There are loads more incidents we can deal with outside of the system, this is just the beginning. When you start to put costs on that, it's significant. Getting the right disposals means pounds, shillings and pence. It also means more officers out on the street; victims and witnesses not having to wait such a long time.

The main ingredient is the use of discretion. The ability to allow an officer to make a decision. I had an officer say to me: "For the first time in my career, I feel like a grown-up."

7.4 Restorative Justice Disposals

Officers should be trained in a range of skills, and with a toolkit of possible disposals to suit various problems. Restorative Justice approaches offer a range of commonsense and effective disposals, which can be applied by officers before engaging the criminal justice system. It is a matter of some regret to the Working Group that, **whilst Restorative Justice has been understood and practised in some areas of the country for some fifteen years, it has yet truly to enter into the mainstream of policing practice.**

Conventional disposals (including prosecution and court, fixed penalty notices and cautions) are based on the principle of punishment for an offence "against the state" – on the presumption that people understand that they are doing wrong and must be punished so as to deter them and others from doing it again. While this is important, in many circumstances it fails to deter repeat offenders – and is extremely expensive when used disproportionately for minor offences and antisocial behaviour. Restorative Justice is based on the fact that, as well as being technically an offence against the state, a crime also causes personal harm to other citizens.

"Community Accountability Meetings" (CAMs) – practical interventions based on the principles of Restorative Justice for street policing – make the offender face up to the harm caused, directly and personally in a face-to-face meeting with the victim (often with others such as close family who have also been affected). When handled by a trained professional, this regularly leads to genuine feelings of intense shame and remorse and the wish to make amends for the harm caused.

Interventions based on Restorative Justice principles proceed by establishing an "outcome agreement": at the meeting, a joint agreement between everyone involved on how the offender should "pay back" and repair the harm. This is a powerful process which motivates everyone involved – the victim has questions answered and can move on, while the offender is internally motivated to change their behaviour in the future. Rigorous research shows that this process, which requires the consent of all involved, provides high satisfaction for victims and often reduces re-offending significantly. It also strengthens community bonds.

If the aim of punishment in the conventional justice system is to enhance fear of punishment and therefore deter repetition, the aim of restorative justice – through persuasion and with a strong element of self-imposed punishment – is to enhance moral support for voluntary obedience of the law. It is based on the principle that, contrary to common belief, people who commit minor crime often do not believe they are acting improperly or immorally. Restorative meetings lead an offender to the conclusion that they are wrong, and should not repeat such behaviour. Compliance with outcome agreements is very high in community schemes, in contrast to compliance (for example) with court-ordered sanctions such as fines.

Restorative Justice approaches are therefore particularly useful in the neighbourhood context, for both Neighbourhood and Response officers and PCSOs, involving and engaging citizens and communities in solving disputes, tackling minor crime and antisocial behaviour and in taking control of their streets and open spaces. With minor offending it is effective as a stand-alone intervention and its use can always be backed up by the formal, conventional system when needed.

> "Restorative Justice is a positive way forward. As it is, young people get drunk and do something stupid and it affects them for the rest of their lives. I have people coming at forty saying 'I can't go to America because of something I did at 15.' But if I put people into Restorative Justice, I lose detections – which hurts me as a commander."
>
> *Chief Superintendent Brooke, Barnsley*

A common myth about Restorative Justice is that, it is "pink and fluffy" (in police parlance) or "soft on crime" (in public parlance). In fact this is contrary to facts and evidence about Restorative Justice, as one reformed criminal explained to the Group:

> *I was in prison waiting to be sentenced. I was asked to meet some people face-to-face who I had burgled to get money for drugs. I only did it to get out of the cell for an hour, I thought it would be easy. But it was different. When you hear about the damage you have done, when you feel the harm you have caused, you have to be a very, very bitter and twisted person for this not to affect you. I have had easier days at the Old Bailey.*
>
> Peter Woolf, reformed prolific burglar

In essence, CAMs are little different from the way in which the local bobbies of the 1950s, characterised by the mythical "Dixon of Dock Green", carried out their duties. They used discretion to a very large degree, but took their local

communities along with them by involving them in solving local problems. In fact the local bobby often became the role model for parents to copy in bringing up their children. These outcomes have, among other things, been lost in the focus on sanction detections, OBTJs and the unintended consequences of "arrest or ignore".

Case Study 5: A Neighbourhood Dispute

Two neighbours had an ongoing dispute over the noise and general antisocial behaviour, caused by one of the parties. Over a period of seven months, the police were called to deal with the dispute on an average of four times per week (totaling 121 calls) but were unable to resolve the issue.

A restorative conference was arranged with both parties. During the conference, an agreement as to the future conduct of the offender was agreed. Since that time, there have been no further calls to the police.

Police Time Used Prior to the Conference

It was estimated that each call to the police involved attendance and administrative time of 1.5 officers totaling approximately one hour of police time per call. This has been costed at £3,717.28

Police Time Used

The total time in setting up and delivering the conference was 2 hours 50 minutes, costed at £87.15

Estimated Savings in the Year following the Conference

171 hours of police time, costed at £5266.13

Case Study 6: Teenage Bullying

Two teenage boys were engaged in the persistent bullying and harassment of two younger girls. Over a period of 18 months, the behaviour became more regular and widespread, eventually taking place not only in public places but within the local high school. Parents from all families became involved and the situation began to escalate. Police were called a total of 234 times.

A restorative conference was held. Since that time, there has been no further police involvement.

Police Time Used Prior to the Conference

It was estimated that each of the 234 calls to the police involved the attendance and administrative time totaling approximately one hour of police time per call. This has been costed at £7,188.80

Police Time Used

The total time in setting up and delivering the conference was 4 hours 50 minutes. This has been, costed at £157.37.

Estimated Savings in the Year following the Conference

Savings of 156 hours of police time, costed at £4792.53

7.5 Solving Local Problems

When asked "What's good about policing?" police officers around the country invariably responded that making a difference to the community that they police motivated them to join the Police Service. However, many of the Response officers who spoke to the Working Group felt that the pressure they were under to make an arrest when responding to an incident often meant that they were unable to address underlying issues. This was a stark contrast to the evidence given by Neighbourhood officers and PCSOs, who were trained, resourced and encouraged to engage with other agencies – ranging from local authorities to grassroots voluntary groups, from social landlords to the local fire brigade – to solve local and individual problems.

7.5.1 PARTNERSHIP INTERVENTIONS

Social breakdown – characterised particularly by failures in education, spiralling rates of addiction and family breakdown (see the Introduction) – is creating pockets of society where serious antisocial behaviour and street crime are increasingly normal features. This is especially true in certain high crime, high deprivation neighbourhoods – where social breakdown compounds the risk factors associated with becoming an offender.

Police have frontline access to society's most deprived and hard to reach communities

Given that enforcement is inherently reactive, the police cannot, on their own, provide long-term solutions to these problems. Long-term solutions require addressing underlying drivers of crime, with targeted preventative work by partners – including both statutory and voluntary agencies committed to reducing crime and helping to divert those at risk of offending. The Centre for Social Justice has published extensively on how the voluntary sector is particularly well-suited and positioned to deliver outcomes on the ground (see, for example, Case Study 7 drawn from the CSJ report on gangs, *Dying to Belong*), and on how government approach to the voluntary sector can be reformed, allowing it to thrive and provide the dynamic solutions required – rather than be hindered and controlled.

Case Study 7: Chance UK

Chance UK is an early intervention mentoring programme working with 5–11 year olds with behavioural difficulties. On referral, children are assessed using the Goodman Strength & Difficulties Questionnaire and Chance UK then works with those most likely to go on to criminal, offending and antisocial behaviour later in life. Chance UK matches fully trained adult volunteer mentors with the children on a one-year, solution-focused and goal-orientated programme. Chance UK mentors develop an individual programme of meetings and activities in line with their child's interests and needs.

Chance UK mentors

Prospective mentors attend three consecutive Saturday training days and are then interviewed by two Programme Managers before being selected – or declined – as mentors. Training covers everything from child protection issues and safety when in the family home to solution-focused techniques and goal-setting.

Once chosen the mentor is then carefully matched to a child. The Programme Manager acting as the case worker for the child and their family also supervises and supports the mentor. A Parent Worker also provides advice and support to the parent(s).

The model

Mentoring occurs on a weekly basis and a session lasts between two and four hours. Session activities could include sport; museum, theatre or cinema visits; reading; and playing games. During the course of the year the mentor encourages and models positive behaviour to the mentee, tackles negative self-images and supports the child in developing life skills.

The process is closely monitored with monthly meetings between mentors and their Programme Managers and mentors are required to fill out a Session Planning Form (SPF) after every mentoring session. After three months mentors and their mentees jointly devise goals for each other; for the mentee this will include a behavioural as well as practical goal.

Mentoring lasts 12 months and concludes with a graduation ceremony attended by family and friends. As well as celebrating the mentees progress the graduation provides a clear "ending".

The results

An evaluation by Goldsmiths University in 2008 found that 98 per cent of the children mentored finish the programme with improved behaviour and 51 per cent finish with no behavioural difficulties at all.

Any attempt to address the increasingly entrenched pockets of social breakdown across Britain must be holistic. Neighbourhood Police have frontline access to society's most deprived and "hard to reach" communities and people, and should be armed with the resources and discretion to engage partner agencies in local problem-solving.

In conjunction with a wider policy agenda and social programmes carefully designed to address these failures, policing resources need to be focussed on those high-crime neighbourhoods where social breakdown is most acute – with the aim of creating a space for other agencies to operate and affect long-term change.

7.5.2 CRACKDOWN AND CONSOLIDATION

The techniques described above should be brought together and used as part of crackdown and consolidation cycles in high crime areas. In areas characterised by social breakdown (with prevalent drug and alcohol misuse, high rates of family breakdown and concentration of at-risk children), short-term police crackdowns can create space for other agencies to move in and address the problems underlying crime.

"Crackdown" strategies deploy a greater police presence in a specified area with the aim of improved enforcement, increased police visibility through patrols and greater deterrence. This would involve focused, high-intensity Neighbourhood police patrols in high crime areas. "Consolidation" strategies refer to coordinated partnership programmes deployed in the wake of the short-term "crackdown", with the aim of creating longer-term crime reduction. This must involve as wide a range of partnership interventions as necessary, ranging from addiction treatment to facilitating gang exit strategies.

Short-term police "crackdowns" can create space for other agencies to move in and address underlying issues

The point of these cycles is to bring together enforcement, which has short-term impacts on crime, with partnership intervention aiming to produce longer-term changes. These long-term changes cannot be brought about by police activity alone. Section 8 offers recommendations for streamlining and rationalising the coordination of police with the wider criminal justice system and other agencies, and how this could be linked with democratic oversight.

Recommendations

- All officers must be trained to deliver the widest possible range of interventions in response to crime or antisocial behaviour.
- Specifically, officers should be trained to deliver Restorative Justice disposals in situations where they deem a conventional criminal justice disposal to be inappropriate.
- Officers need to be properly trained and supported in the use of constabulary discretion to determine what type of disposal is appropriate in any given circumstance.

The Independence and Accountability of the Police

The Working Group took the view that its aspiration to see Interventionist Neighbourhood Policing delivered in every neighbourhood could not be achieved within the existing governance arrangements for the Police Service. The Tripartite structure in its current form is not fit for purpose and needs to be rebalanced.

According to one Chief Constable's evidence to the Working Group, "In the past decade, a lot of the power over policing has shifted to the Home Office." Interviews, with both frontline and senior ranks, suggest that this perception is widespread, and generally linked to the centralised managerial controls described in Section 6.

In addition, the current arrangements for partnership working at the local level have been allowed to develop in an ad-hoc fashion, tending to inhibit strong local leadership and making the structures more suitable to operate merely as effective deliverers of a centrally determined national agenda rather than being responsive to the needs and aspirations of local people.

Meanwhile, the Inspection Regime has the outward appearance of a "turf war" between competing bodies, mainly Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and the Audit Commission, leaving Forces in the invidious position of being unable to influence this struggle and simply having to cope with the demands being made, by these bodies, upon them. The impact of this upon Forces is evidenced in Section 5.6.

Principle 26: The Tripartite structure in its current form is not fit for purpose and needs to be rebalanced.

## 8.1 Rebalancing the Tripartite Structure

The landscape of police governance structures in England and Wales has been changing rapidly in recent years, with both the current Labour Government

and the Conservative Opposition having publicly committed to the introduction of an element of locally elected representation into the criminal justice system. Whilst this was a radical element of the recent Green Paper, it has been subsequently dropped by the Government after responses from various stakeholders.

The Working Group believes that the Tripartite structure, as originally conceived under the Police Act of 1964, was designed to give sufficient power to each party – the Home Secretary, Police Authorities and Chief Constables – to ensure that no one party could dominate the other two.

It is not the intention of the Working Group to detail how this balance has failed to emerge historically but, looking at the Tripartite structure today, it is clear to the Working Group that the Home Secretary is now the dominant party and has used this dominance to micromanage the delivery of local service. As has been illustrated in Section 6, this has been to the great detriment of local policing.

Police Authorities have failed to prevent or resist this movement of power to the Home Secretary. Furthermore, Police Authorities are engulfed in a network of partnership arrangements, all making alternative claims on the accountability of the Chief Officer, which the Police Authority cannot control or resist. Figure 11, which asks the rhetorical question "Who's In Charge?", attempts to illustrate this complexity and confusion.

Figure 11: Who's In Charge of the Criminal Justice System?

Ken Jones, President of ACPO, gives evidence on police governance to the Working Group

The Working Group had hoped to explore some of these issues with the Association of Police Authorities but was disappointed that they were unable to attend to give evidence.

Chief Constables have, willingly or unwillingly, ceded their independence to control by the Home Secretary and Police Authorities. The Working Group supports the existence of powers to remove a failing leader but, undoubtedly, the introduction of Fixed Term Appointments and Performance-Related Pay have created a generation of senior leaders who are, in effect, under great obligation to their political overseers for their continued tenure and enhanced remuneration. This, in the eyes of the Working Group, is compromising their operational independence or, at the very least, undermining the confidence of the public that they are acting with independence. If this situation is allowed to continue, the Working Group is of the opinion that it will become progressively worse.

> *I think we've gotten here starting with the erosion of the Chief Constable's operational independence… You get nationally set targets and micromanagement from Whitehall. What happens is, bit by bit, you take away the ability of the Chief Constable to do the job.*
>
> Senior Officer, Nottinghamshire

Historically, the enshrined operational independence of the Chief Constable has been the defining feature of the UK's unique local service. Operational independence is not merely a matter of principle, but also of pragmatism. As a given area's foremost policing professional, the Chief Constable is the person entrusted to take decisions of strategy. As one Chief Officer put it, "The Chief Constable's legitimacy is as a top cop – it's about professional experience." Once the independence of the Chief Constable is compromised, the effects permeate right down the command structure of the Force.

Senior officers readily point to examples of political directives which went beyond defining outcomes:

> *My Chief Executive will joke: 'One day, you'll be my Superintendent.' He's buying more and more of my capacity, PCs and PCSOs, which gives him more control. Over the next few years, I think we'll see a drift towards more control for the Local Authority.*
>
> Senior Officer, South Yorkshire

One Chief Officer informed the Working Group:

The Chief Executive came to us saying: 'I'd like to buy … one cop on every ward.'

I responded: 'Where did you get the evidence that that is the best way to allocate resources? If you want to fund the extra officers, I'll fund a few sergeants to manage them and make a mobile task force.'

He took that back to the council and came back saying: 'No, it needs to be one extra officer per ward.' It all came down to the media message – despite the fact that, in my opinion, one extra officer on each ward would make no difference to performance or public confidence.

In light of the evidence given by senior officers around the Police Service, the Working Group has strived to establish recommendations that secure a robust sphere of operational independence for Chief Constables to pursue democratically established policing priorities. The Working Group has sought to balance this independence with a level of local, democratic priority-setting and accountability. This is important not only to provide local police oversight, but to balance against the encroaching priority-setting power of the Home Office – which is currently alone in the Tripartite structure in having a direct electoral mandate. The effective aim of a local democratic mandate is the strengthening of the Police Authority in the Tripartite system, while also giving it the leadership and democratic feedback needed to be effective in its role. The following sections outline the Working Group's proposals for rebalancing the Tripartite Structure.

8.1.1 HOME SECRETARY

The Home Secretary should have the lead on setting standards for, and where necessary priorities for, the provision of Protective Services (as described in Section 1.2) across the country. The cross-border nature of these services and scale of their national significance make this responsibility only effectively dischargeable by the Home Secretary.

Recommendations

The role of the Home Secretary in the Tripartite Structure should focus on setting standards and objectives for Protective Services and cede greater control of local policing to local governance arrangements.

The Home Secretary should:

- Retain an involvement in the appointment and dismissal of Chief Constables only sufficient to act as a safeguard against the inappropriate use of these powers by the Policy Authority.
- Retain an overview of the delivery of local policing and a means of exercising accountability in cases of significant and persistent under-performance.
- Control and hold to account Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.

8.1.2 LOCAL GOVERNANCE

Every Police Force area should have a directly elected Crime and Justice Commissioner.

The Commissioner should have the responsibility and power to oversee all agencies responsible for the delivery of crime and justice related services at a local level. This will include chairing the local Police Authority and holding to account the Local Criminal Justice Board (including: Police Authorities, HM Prisons, Court Service, Probation Service, Crown Prosecution Service, Youth Offending Teams) and all Crime and Disorder Partnerships (see Figure 12).

The Crime and Justice Commissioner should have the power to set local priorities for all of these agencies and influence the spending of budgets across partnerships.

The Crime and Justice Commissioner should, in turn, be accountable to the Home Secretary where there is evidence of significant and persistent under-performance.

The Crime and Justice Commissioner should have a duty to consult the public and coordinate consultation by all of the partner agencies. The Commissioner should reach beyond the usual representatives of local interest groups by convening "Citizen Juries" in every Basic Command Unit (BCU). These Citizen Juries should be appointed locally and be regularly informed of crime and disorder trends within their area. This would enable them to give direct feedback to the Commissioner and relevant Crime and Justice agency senior officers on the reality of living in their area.

In evidence to the Working Group, many people expressed concern over introducing further politicisation into policing. British Crime Survey founder Mike Hough argued the case that issues of crime and justice should be largely insulated from public opinion. He supported delegating issues of crime and justice to an independent body, an analogue to the management of interest rates by the independent Bank of England.

Furthermore, it must be said that the Working Group found little support for this type of solution among senior police officers:

> Currently one electoral mandate elects the Local Authority and that produces a Police Authority. You have one political mandate. If I have a political PA with a separate view, you have competition with the LA. I don't think minority parties will exploit this. The issue is competing mandates.
>
> Senior Officer, South Yorkshire

> The elected commissioner is a politician's answer to local accountability. In my experience the public are more interested in the local answerability of the officers in their communities not political constructs.
>
> Senior Officer, Surrey

*Don't those with a democratic mandate have the right to set your agenda?
To a degree, yes. That's why I'm worried about two mandates. We don't
want two democratically approved mandates for policing.*

Senior Officer, South Yorkshire

*I personally see directly elected commissioners as politicisation too far.
There are the worries about single issue candidates. I don't want policing
politicised. It needs to be directly accountable to the people. And it needs
to be simple.*

Senior Officer, South Yorkshire

**It was felt by the Working Group, however, that the only possibility of
wresting control of local policing back into local hands was through the
route of a directly elected office. Where national and local priorities
conflict, only a directly elected local office-holder, with a mandate to
deliver safety and criminal justice outcomes locally, has any chance of
prevailing on behalf of local people.**

The Working Group identified three major risks with this proposal. The
first risk is that of electoral apathy. Participation in elections, and particularly
local elections, appears to be waning. This risk can best be mitigated by
holding the election for these Commissioners with parliamentary general
elections.

The second risk is the possibility of a Commissioner being elected who did
not have the necessary skills to perform what would be a highly complex role.
This risk can best be mitigated by requiring qualifying criteria for candidates
to stand for election. The Working Group recommends that all potential
candidates have five years experience in a senior role related to one of the
Crime and Justice professions. In order to encourage top quality candidates,
the Criminal Justice Commissioner position should also be appropriately
salaried.

The final risk identified was that of an individual being elected who
belonged to an extremist political party or held extremist political views. This
risk could best be mitigated by the above qualifying criteria and the further
explicit requirement that candidates stand as independents – without party
support and with no previous history of having stood for election representing
any political party.

Having said all of that, it is accepted that **local democratic accountability
for crime and justice will never be without risk – but if there is a genuine
desire to cede local control back to communities for local crime and
justice matters, the Working Group holds the view that it is a risk worth
taking.**

The Working Group recognised that this proposal may not be
appropriate for London, as it is in the exceptional situation of having an
elected mayor whose area is coterminous with the Metropolitan Police area.

However, this role could and perhaps should be performed by the mayor – or by a criminal justice professional appointed by the mayor who meets the criteria outlined above. Indeed, to have a separately elected Crime and Justice Commissioner alongside the mayor may well cause more problems than it solves.

Principle 27: The only possibility of wresting control of local policing back into local hands is through the route of a directly elected office.

Recommendations

A Crime and Justice Commissioner should be elected for every Police Force area in the country.
The Commissioner should:

- Act as a figurehead for community safety;
- Chair the Police Authority and hold to account the Local Criminal Justice Board and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships;
- Set local priorities for all of these agencies and influence the spending of budgets across partnerships;
- Be accountable to the Home Secretary where there is evidence of significant and persistent under-performance;
- Have a duty to consult the public and coordinate consultation by all of the partner agencies, including by convening Citizen Juries in every BCU.

8.1.3 POLICE AUTHORITIES

Under these recommendations, Police Authorities should remain in place at the Force level, to be chaired and led by the Crime and Justice Commissioner. Police Authorities could be smaller than at present, with ten ordinary members and the Crime and Justice Commissioner making the eleventh.

The election of the Commissioner will give Police Authorities a democratic mandate. The remaining members should be appointed in the same manner as the current independent members, being selected for the relevant skills they hold to assist in the discharging of the functions of the Authority.

The Authority should have the duty to maintain an efficient and effective Police Force, and should have the power to appoint, appraise and dismiss the Chief Constable. In carrying out this role, the Police Authority would be expected to hold the Chief Constable to account for his or her performance against the Crime and Justice Commissioner's priorities.

The Authority should have the power to set the police budget and set the precept for any contribution from local taxation.

Recommendations

Police Authorities should:

- Consist of ten ordinary members with the Crime and Justice Commissioner making the eleventh.
- Be appointed in the manner of the current independent members, being selected for the relevant skills they hold to assist in the discharging of the functions of the Authority.
- Have the duty to maintain an efficient and effective Police Force.
- Have the power to appoint, appraise and dismiss the Chief Constable.
- Hold the Chief Constable to account for his/her performance against the Crime and Justice Commissioner's priorities.
- Set the police budget and set the precept for any contribution from local taxation.

8.1.4 CHIEF CONSTABLE

If the Tripartite structure is to be effectively rebalanced, then it is vital that the operational independence of the Chief Constable be reaffirmed and any structures causing suspicion that a Chief Constable is acting from any other motives than his or her professional judgement should be removed. This is particularly so in cases where it might be believed that a Chief Constable's decision-making has been affected by political considerations.

The Working Group believes that, at the heart of this issue, are the current terms and conditions of Chief Constables. The engagement of Chief Constables on fixed term appointments of not more than five years with an option to extend, risks creating (and arguably has created) a generation of Chief Police Officers who are beholden to their political overseers. This creates a potential conflict for Chief Constables between following their professional judgement in the interest of the public, and avoiding conflict with either the Police Authority or the Home Secretary (or both) for their own professional interest. This is avowedly not in the public interest and, while there should always be a clear process for dismissing a Chief Constable who is failing to perform, fixed term appointments should cease.

In addition, the availability for Chief Officers of performance-related bonus payments risks creating an environment where the motivation for a particular decision by a Chief Officer may be (or, equally harmfully, may be perceived as being) driven by a desire to optimise a bonus payment rather than a response to unfolding circumstances in the best interests of the public. Likewise, this arrangement must cease. It is right that Chief Constables should receive some form of appraisal on their performance but it is wrong that this should be directly linked to the level of their remuneration.

> " Without operational independence, Chief Constables are too open to political pressure. I have been a Divisional Commander when my council wanted me to 'Get some guys in there and sort those queers out.' The freedom to be wrong is important because 20 years later you might be right. "
>
> *Chief Constable Hughes, South Yorkshire*

In evidence to the Working Group, Chief Constables were unanimously opposed to the current system of financial incentives tied to performance, offering comments such as: "I don't believe in the bonus system at all. If I don't perform, sack me"; "Chief Constables should not get bonuses – that is absolutely wrong"; and "The bonuses need to go. It undermines operational independence if performance targets are set by the Police Authority and tied to financial incentives."

Furthermore, the Working Group believes that Chief Constables should be able to select their own top team. This principle is supportive of their operational independence and removes a strong potential excuse for underperformance.

While the Working Group did not address the professional development of senior officers, it did feel that it should be possible for the Chief Officer to appoint officers from outside this scheme (of whatever rank) to their team on a fixed term basis. A precondition of this appointment would be that, at the end of the term, the appointed officer would be entitled to return to their former role. This would allow the Chief Constable the maximum flexibility to gather the team which he or she considers best suited to meet the needs of the local public

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Principle 28: The operational independence of the Chief Constable is crucial to the rebalancing of the Tripartite structure.

Recommendations

Chief Constables should:

- No longer be subject to Fixed Term Appointments.
- No longer receive performance-related bonuses.
- Have the power to appoint their own top team.
- Have the power to appoint top team members, from the lower ranks, on a fixed term basis.

8.2 Governance: Conclusions

In concluding this section on police governance, it must be pointed out that the above proposals are a package, not a menu. While there are aspects of this package which contain some flexibility, the aims of these changes could only be achieved if the whole package is implemented.

Figure 12: New Governance Model for the Criminal Justice System?

NEW GOVERNANCE MODEL

8.2.1 INSPECTION AND ASSESSMENT

In response to the concerns expressed in Section 5.6, the Working Group believes that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary should be the single gateway for all inspection and assessment activity within every Police Force. The aim of this recommendation is to streamline and rationalise the delivery of inspections by giving the best-suited agency the lead, as well as the positive duty to eliminate wasteful or redundant assessment.

This does not preclude other bodies from being involved in police inspections, however they should only do so with the express agreement of HMIC. HMIC should agree on an allocation of hours with the Police Service for each Force and should then be responsible for determining the priorities for utilising those hours for inspection activity. In doing so, they should be under a burden to balance the public interest in inspection against the cost to the public in police resources, and therefore public safety.

The effect of this change should be to reduce the burden placed on Forces by this type of activity.

Working Group members debate a new model for governance of the criminal justice system

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Recommendations

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary should:

● Be the single gateway for all inspection/assessment activity within every Police Force;
● Agree an allocation of hours with the Police Service for each Force and then determine the priorities for utilising those hours for inspection activity;
● Reduce the burden placed on Forces by this type of activity.

8.2.2 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

The national performance framework, APACS, should be replaced by a small number of indicators by which the Home Secretary can judge whether or not there is significant and persistent underperformance in a given Force. This should ideally be not more than five indicators in total. These indicators can be given context by targeted inspection activity coordinated by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.

In pursuit of Principles 9, 10, 12 and 23, at local level, the Working Group recommends the replacement of performance targets with a Harm Index (HI) as the main central measurement of police performance. **The proposed Harm Index is a weighted ranking that provides a common, sensible metric (total harm) on which all police-preventable harm to the public can be measured.**

The logic of any index is to capture in a single number the overall change across many aspects of a single phenomenon, each of which may have different trends. The best known example is a stock market index. When the London FTSE index goes down, it could mean that stock prices for many (or even most) companies actually went up that day. What the index shows is the change in the price of stocks overall.

It is also common for an index to give different weights to different aspects of a phenomenon according to their priority. Applying this logic to the harm of various crimes, the Home Office has given different weights to different types of offence based on their relative costs to the victims and the criminal justice system. The assigned weight of a murder, for example, is far greater than the weight of a car theft. These estimates are derived from auditing the records of hospital and court costs, along with interviews of victims about how many days of work they missed and how much financial damage the crime caused. By incorporating the relative weights of different crimes, what the Harm Index shows is the change in the harm from crime overall in an area.

The role of the Home Secretary in the Tripartite structure should focus on setting the priorities and objectives for Protective services

Police Forces should be required to use the HI as the basis for its predicted-versus-actual crime result, a literal "profit or loss" statement for the value added by local agencies of government. This value-added measure provides a single concise measurement of police performance, while still **allowing each Police Force to set its own priorities for reducing overall harm.**

Thus, if one Force has a major threat of terrorist attack, while another has virtually no such threat, the second Force could concentrate on burglary while the first Force could assign hundreds of officers to terrorism prevention. The reality of such differences across England and Wales illustrates the fallacy of a one-size-fits-all approach to assessing police performance. Given the enormous local differences in criminal problems, it is only common sense that different investments of resources should be made in different kinds of crime in different areas.

Does consolidating governance for all local crime and justice agencies represent a step too far? The Working Group debates


Recommendations

- Scrap APACS as the national performance assessment system.
- Replace APACS with a small number of national indicators (not more than five).
- Introduce the Harm Index to manage performance at local level.

8.2.3 A STEP TOO FAR?

In considering the governance of the police and the other Crime and Justice Agencies, the Working Group developed a model which consolidates the governance of all agencies at a local level and provides a more coherent structure for the Crime and Justice Commissioner to fulfil his or her responsibilities. In this model (see Figure 13), a Crime and Justice Authority would absorb the roles currently performed by the Police Authority, Probation Board, Courts Board, Youth Offending Team Board and Prison Independent Monitoring Boards and create one single unified body. It could also provide a measure of local accountability for the Crown Prosecution Service.

Not all of the members of the Working Group felt able to support this model, principally because of concerns over the wide range of services to be incorporated and the potential dilution of accountability which could ensue. The Working Group is, however, agreed that the model should be included in order that it could inform any subsequent debate.

Figure 13: A Step Too Far?

A STEP TOO FAR?

Embedding Evidence-Based Policing

"Evidence-based policing" is the use of the best available research on the outcomes of police work to implement guidelines and evaluate agencies, units, officers and practices. Put more simply, evidence-based policing uses the best evidence to shape the best practice. In just the same way that experimentation in medicine can show us that, for example, some method of reducing infection in a hospital is more effective and cost-effective than another, so in policing, too, rigorously designed experiments can show that some practices are better at reducing crime than others.

Evidence-based policing does not just produce guidelines of best-practice; it insists on evaluating the effectiveness of that practice in different circumstances. It encourages clear thinking about the objectives of a particular practice and transparency in the use of statistics and evidence, since the Police Service itself will benefit from a better idea of what works.

Evidence-based policing will not provide the answer to all questions about policing; however, greater concentration on it and investment in it will develop a body of rigorously researched, practically grounded knowledge of "what works", supplanting mere intuition. For example, research conducted in Milwaukee showed that, among 800 arrested offenders for domestic violence, those who felt they were not treated in a procedurally fair and polite manner were 60 per cent more likely to commit a reported act of domestic violence in the future (all other factors controlled for).[1]

Grounding police work in practical research will also act as a bulwark against political interference, and preserve professional discretion. If politicians demand a policy that has been shown by rigorous and impartial experimentation to be useless or counterproductive, police officers will be able to resist it by pointing to the available evidence, and not just their own experience.

This section makes proposals on the necessary institutions and funding to embed research and experimentation in policing in this country.

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[1]   Sherman, L., 'Evidence-Based Policing', *Ideas in American Policing* (Police Foundation, 1998), 7.

9.1 Promoting Research

If evidence-based policing is to be embedded across the Service, it is vital that an appropriate structure of institutions is built which will enable this to be achieved. This means foundations in research-intensive universities. For example, medicine and dentistry (in healthcare), law, town planning, education and engineering are all underpinned by schools in top rank universities around the world. The reasons for this are, first, rigorous evaluation (applied research) for the discovery, development and refinement of interventions delivered by practitioners in these professions; secondly, to provide links with the development of new theory on which new interventions can be designed, and thirdly, so that the training of professionals is carried out in a research context to sustain a culture of innovation and evaluation throughout professional life.

Foundations in universities are, of course, not the only important factor in increasing and maintaining the effectiveness of the professions. To keep the research agenda focussed on practical problems and to prevent it from becoming solely theoretical and largely irrelevant on the ground, it is important that university schools and institutes are led by practitioner-academics – like qualified practising surgeons in medical schools or qualified engineers in engineering schools. This means that in policing a small cadre of police practitioner-academics are needed. In the same way that some police officers are trained in particular areas of professional practice, a number also need to be trained in the business of research so that they can design, lead and deliver evidence-based innovation.

Another important feature of the professions in universities is the provision of dedicated research and development schemes funded from the Service budget. For example, the NHS has its own research and development scheme supported by an earmarked proportion of the Service budget – again in acknowledging that high grade research is essential.

As is the case in policing now, much of the drive to this more scientific approach to practice in other professions has come from practitioners themselves. For example, in medicine, the explosion in effective treatments now available came as a result of senior doctors, faced with few effective remedies, demanding an invasion of hospitals by universities through the establishment of medical schools. It is clear to the Working Group that there is a thirst for best practice in the Police Service and that it is important to harness the energy which is currently being expended to achieve this to best effect for the Police Service and for the public it serves.

Therefore, it is recommended that university police schools or institutes are formed in Russell Group (research intensive) universities, that arrangements are made to select and train a small cadre of police academics and that the generation of effective new police interventions is supported by a dedicated Research and Development national and Force-based scheme funded from the Service budget. The Group believes that this could be achievable in a cost

neutral way by bringing together the funds currently spent on "research" into this new organised scheme.

This does not imply, of course, that the Police Service should become a graduate Service or that research training is needed for all or most Chief Officers. If this approach is adopted, then decisions will be needed about which categories of members of the police family are priorities for training at policing degree level. Attaining a degree in police science does however, when the Service is compared to other professions, seem rational and valuable for future Chief Officers, Unit Commanders and Senior Investigating Officers.

The UK Research Councils are the principal way in which the state funds research across healthcare disciplines, engineering and technology. In health, for example, the Medical Research Council funds medical research. **The Working Group recommends that, in the absence of a research council specifically to support fundamental and applied research in crime and justice, a new research council should be considered and that one of its key objectives should be to support police research.**

This development should be cost neutral by gathering together existing non-streamlined Economic and Social Research Council budgets for crime research.

9.2 Establishing Excellence

A problem in policing is the profusion of guidelines, toolkits and "living documents", very few of which, apart from the authoritative Campbell Collaboration Crime and Justice systematic reviews, are underpinned by rigorous assessments of published and other available evidence. Solving this problem and promoting an evidence-based Service could also be achieved through the work of an excellence institute akin to the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence in the NHS which simplifies and codifies best practice in the form of authoritative national guidelines (though the Working Group acknowledge the existence of problems around NICE guidelines).

"Police schools should be established in Russell Group universities"

The Working Group therefore recommends the establishment of a new Excellence Institute for the criminal justice system.

9.3 A Professional Body

The Service should cultivate and maintain a professional ethos – through professional standards, training standards and the maintenance of an independent and professional body with which government could consult. As long as the Service relies, effectively, on the patronage of government to achieve these things, it can never truly regard itself as a credible profession.

The Working Group therefore recommends that Bramshill Police Staff College be re-established as an independent body funded on a similar model to that of the Medical Royal Colleges.

Principle 29: The Service should promote the improvement in its standards and elimination of political interference by developing itself as a strong profession with all of the necessary institutions to support this.

Recommendations

- Evidence-based policing should be the foundational doctrine for all police interventions.
- Establish university police schools in Russell Group universities.
- Establish a new research council to support police research.
- Establish an Excellence Institute for the criminal justice system.
- Re-establish an independent Bramshill Police Staff College.

SECTION TEN
The Crown Prosecution Service

When the scope of the Police Reform Working Group was originally established, it did not include any review of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), which is responsible for prosecuting all criminal cases investigated by the police. However, as evidence taken by the Working Group forcefully suggested, the CPS has an enormous and often unacknowledged impact on policing – which it would have been remiss to exclude.

Over the course of taking evidence from the public and the police, the impact of the CPS was one of the issues most commonly brought to the Working Group's attention. Frontline officers were outright disdainful of the current CPS role in the criminal justice system, typified by such comments as: "They're from a different planet, a different galaxy, from us" and "They're part of the problem." Senior police officers, on the other hand, tended to identify underlying structural tensions and resourcing issues which place the police and the CPS at cross-purposes. As one senior officer summarised, "The decisions that they're making are for their own internal reasons, not to provide a better service."

Where the public recognised the CPS's role in the criminal justice system, their comments mirrored frontline officers: "The police have a high rate of finding criminals and bringing them to justice – they appear to be let down at the last minute by the CPS" and "The police are doing OK, it's the CPS that is the problem."

At present the CPS is solely responsible for all decisions regarding the charging of arrestees. CPS lawyers have the ultimate authority to decline prosecution of offenders, based on their assessment of the probable outcome at trial, which is linked to the available evidence and its presentation. In practice, this has resulted in concerns about three main issues which will be addressed in this section:

1. Excessive bureaucratic requirements (Section 10.1);
2. Systematic risk-averseness in prosecution (Section 10.2); and
3. The CPS impact on public confidence (Section 10.3).

10.1 Bureaucracy

When asked about their bureaucratic constraints, frontline officers expressed particularly strong concerns over the proportion of police time taken up by the police/CPS interface (see Section 5.2). The CPS impacts on police bureaucracy in several ways, first and foremost in their demanding standards for evidence:

They are meant to proceed when there's a better than 50 per cent chance of success. But, the CPS always go on a Rolls Royce standard of proof.

Senior Officer, MPS

"A Rolls Royce standard of proof" entails comprehensive and time-consuming evidence gathering – even in the case of a trivial offence or a guilty plea. While detailed evidence-gathering is important to securing high conviction rates, it requires police time and therefore must be balanced against other priorities.

"'The CPS have decided not to proceed with this case' means nothing out there; the public don't understand it. They come back to the police and say 'Why haven't you done more?'"

This detachment often has to do with proximity, as the Crown Prosecution Services are often physically remote from their respective Police Forces. Some senior officers felt that, as a matter of course, distance between the CPS and frontline service undermines the service:

The CPS will always be risk-averse as long as they are removed. Right now, they don't have to look you in the eye when they make a decision. The closer you put the service to the frontline, the better it gets.

Chief Constable Hughes, South Yorkshire

For many Forces, the issue of proximity was a more immediate and practical concern:

If you arrest someone at one in the morning, on a Saturday night, you've got to drive half an hour to Middlesbrough, you then could be in the holding room there for two to three hours. Basically you've been taken off duty for four to six hours before you've even started dealing with it.

Neighbourhood Team Officer, Cleveland

Several other forms of delay chronically affect CPS service: bottlenecks in availability during the day result in officers spending time standing in queues when they could be out on the street; reliance on a remote telephone charging service outside of standard working hours; and, simply, the time they take to respond to requests. This led police officers to comment:

You can never get a CPS lawyer on the day. You have to book it in advance. It's easier at night ironically, using the phone service.

Neighbourhood Team Officer, Bow Road

You've got to make a phone call, you've got to fax it all off, you already know the answer, you've got to wait for it to come back, make an appointment. It's time, time, time.

<div align="right">Neighbourhood Team Officer, Cleveland</div>

10.2 "Working at Cross-Purposes": Risk-Averse Prosecution

Few things frustrate the police – and the public – so much as releasing an accused offender without charge. However, at present, police and Crown Prosecution Service targets work at cross-purposes which encourage a risk-averse approach to charging offenders. While the police are held accountable for maximising the numbers of offenders brought to justice, the CPS are held accountable for maximising the conviction rate, or the ratio of charges to conviction:

> **"**Right now we have two teams, and there are constant small breakdowns between the two teams. We are partners with conflicting, not just different, indicators of performance. The defence is one team, when they need something they work together to get it. The prosecution is two teams working sometimes at cross-purposes.**"**
>
> <div align="right">*Chief Constable Hughes, South Yorkshire*</div>

Since the CPS was introduced, numerical charges have gone down but conviction rates have gone up. Their measure of success is the conviction rate, not the total number of convictions. This directly contradicts the police priority, which is maximising the number of convictions. Say you have 100 burglary cases. Prosecutor A tries 100 and convicts 60. Prosecutor B tries 10 and convicts 10. Under police rules, Prosecutor A has performed better. Under CPS rules, Prosecutor B has performed better.

<div align="right">Senior Officer, MPS</div>

By targeting high conviction rates, the CPS is driven towards a certain type of efficiency whereby CPS and court resources are reserved for cases which are highly likely to result in convictions. Moreover, high conviction rates are a measure of a prosecutor's competence. However, the corollary of this screening efficiency is the fuelling of a suspicion among the police and the public that offenders in more difficult cases are pursued with much less vigour.

Case Study 8: Arrest and Release

We had a PPO (prolific and other priority offender) smash up a booking shop. The CPS wouldn't charge because there was no CCTV. There were witness statements. He was seen by us. That afternoon he was released and raped a 16 year-old girl behind the same shop. That's the kind of thing that gets to you.

<div align="right">Response Team Officer, Limehouse</div>

Many police officers believed that deciding the fate of offenders in marginal cases was the role of the courts, and described high CPS standards as "acting as the judge and jury", when they should "give everything a run and see how it goes at court." As one senior officer put it, "CPS targets are about outcomes, but a good CPS lawyer knows it's about whether a case will get to half-time, making the defence present its witnesses." Releasing offenders without charge in marginal cases sends the wrong message to the community, to victims and to the offenders themselves.

Police reported feeling routinely undermined by the overly stringent standards for charge, and several reported that the police were "adjusting our behaviour to meet their standards":

> *I've listened to officers' language and I'm hearing them giving up on cases too early. I'm hearing them saying: 'Why should I push hard on this difficult case if it's going to get rejected by the CPS anyway?' It's a problem on both sides – the CPS and the police – there are lots of cases that are winnable that just fall apart.*
>
> Senior Officer, Surrey

> *I wouldn't usually arrest for this, because I know the CPS won't run with it. But in this case I did, and it got a conviction. In the future, I'll think about doing it again.*
>
> Neighbourhood Team Officer, Bow Road

Given the impact of CPS standards on policing outcomes, the Working Group endorses the following principle:

Principle 30: Accountability structures for police partners generally (and the CPS particularly) should be aligned in pursuit of common outcomes.

10.3 CPS and Public Confidence

Does it lower your confidence in the police when a criminal is released without charge?

Yes it does	**69%**
No it doesn't	23%
Don't know	8%

CSJ YouGov polling results, Jan 2009

Levels of public confidence in the police are inherently wedded to decisions taken by the Crown Prosecution Service. As CSJ polling confirms, **69 per cent of respondents felt that a decision – taken by the CPS – not to charge an offender lowers their confidence in the police.** As public confidence is increasingly emphasised in assessments of police performance, senior police officers are keenly aware of how the Crown Prosecution Service limits their ability to serve and assure the public:

> *Our confidence is wedded to the courts and the criminal justice system as a whole. As long as the presumption is 'we won't put someone in the courts unless it's a sure thing', then confidence will never go up.*
>
> <div align="right">Senior Officer, South Yorkshire</div>

> *Who is accountable? 'The CPS have decided not to proceed with this case' means nothing out there; the public don't understand it. They come back to the police and say 'Why haven't you done more?'*
>
> <div align="right">Senior Officer, MPS</div>

Frontline officers are equally aware that a failure to even charge an alleged offender under arrest is perceived by the community and victims as an abdication of duty by the police. As the public face of the police, this has a palpable effect on morale of frontline officers:

> *When we arrest someone and a week later they're back out on the street, it's like they're putting two fingers up. And the members of the public that were involved think 'Well, what have you done?' You're the one the public deals with.*
>
> <div align="right">Neighbourhood Team Officer, Bow Road</div>

> *When the CPS just let someone go, I watch that person walk out and I cringe. I would love for that person to have to explain that one to a jury. I get the impression when dealing with the CPS that they're looking for reasons not to proceed, rather than the other way around. The whole idea of a justice system is to put someone in front of a jury.*
>
> <div align="right">Response Team Officer, Limehouse</div>

The performance of any one criminal justice agency is likely to impact on the others, especially in terms of public confidence. As the most publicly visible and accountable criminal justice agency, the police are also the most acutely affected by other agencies. And no agency has a greater impact on the public's perception of the police than the CPS.

If the CPS see themselves as members of a "prosecution team" with the Police Service, it is clear that the police officers interviewed did not feel the warmth of that team spirit.

Case Study 9: Speedy Justice

There was one night that some of our locals got drunk and they walked home from a party and took out every window of every car as they walked home. We got in and had to deal with thirty or forty crimes the next morning. We dealt with that, with the advice panel and CPS, and it must have taken them 9 months to look at that file. All this time, we're extending bail and the public are asking us what's happening ... We came back to the victims a year and a half later to say we did actually charge them.

Neighbourhood Team Officer, Cleveland

10.4 CPS Reform

Clearly, there are two sides to this story and the Working Group is happy to acknowledge that both sides should be examined before any sort of position is adopted. For example one senior officer said:

We gain nothing by taking charging back, we need to align our standards. We need a streamlined process. The CPS need appropriate resourcing – they can't sustain their current commitments with this level of resourcing. Lawyers need to feel accountable.

Senior Officer, MPS

The Working Group, therefore, recommends a full and urgent review of the CPS. The issues that a review of CPS should seek to examine include:

- The local accountability of the CPS;
- Appropriate resource levels for the CPS;
- The prosecution thresholds applied by the CPS; and
- The desirability of continuing with a Prosecution Service which is separate from the police.

As a first step towards CPS reform, the Working Group recommends that police should be restored the discretion to charge the so-called "volume" crimes, which combined make up the majority of crimes in England and Wales and occupy an estimated 20 per cent of officer time.[1] This category of crime is defined broadly by ACPO as including:

- Street Robbery;
- Burglary – Dwelling;
- Burglary Non-Dwelling;
- Theft (including shoplifting);

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1   Association of Chief Police Officers, *Investigation of Volume Crime Manual* (London: Association of Chief Police Officers, 2002) 9.

- Vehicle Crime (Theft of);
- Vehicle Crime (Theft from);
- Criminal Damage; and
- Drugs.[2]

Restoring police charging discretion over these high frequency and relatively straight-forward types of case would significantly reduce police bureaucracy, while simultaneously lessening the CPS workload.

Recommendations
- Restore police discretion over charging of volume crime.
- Commission a full review of the CPS to be conducted by the Centre for Social Justice.

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2   Ibid.

SECTION ELEVEN
Principles for Reform

Reform of the UK Police Service should reflect the following principles:

Principle 1: Addressing crime and disorder requires a holistic policy approach, not only criminal justice solutions.

Principle 2: Crime reduction requires police and partner agencies planning together, pooling resources and working together, which should be reflected in resourcing and accountability structures.

Principle 3: The Working Group endorses Peel's Nine Points of Policing and their emphasis on: local priorities, reducing crime and disorder, policing by community consent and measuring performance by outcomes rather than activity.

Principle 4: Before any further reform of the Police Service is attempted, the police mission should be clearly defined and the breadth of services it is required to provide should be clearly understood.

Principle 5: The resourcing of the Police Service should take adequate account of the requirements of its mission.

Principle 6: The Police Service should use its resources efficiently and effectively and recognise that its most precious commodity is the "resource hours" provided by its staff.

Principle 7: The commitment to public service demonstrated by police officers and staff is a significant asset and the Service should be led, managed and governed in a manner which fosters and encourages this commitment.

Principle 8: Public trust and confidence in the police and feelings of safety by members of the public are important outcomes in their own right and are unlikely to be achieved simply by the pursuit of national targets and priorities.

Principle 9: Local policing should be attuned to local priorities and perceptions of risk and this should take priority over any conflicting national priorities.

Principle 10: Police should be legitimately expected to prioritise non-criminal behaviour, such as disorder and other neighbourhood problems as identified locally.

Principle 11: There is a clear link between public perceptions of the police and the visibility of police interventions to tackle minor crime and disorder.

Principle 12: Crime statistics should take a wide view of crime and disorder, in order to capture elements of social disorder which affect public sense of safety and risk.

Principle 13: Crime statistics should enjoy the trust and confidence of the public and be clear, stable and comparable over time.

Principle 14: Street patrol, and public contact, is one of the most important police functions and allocated police "resource hours" must take account of the importance which the public place upon it.

Principle 15: Greater use can be made of technology to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and, more important, to keep officers out on the street for longer.

Principle 16: Discretion is at the heart of and fundamental to effective policing and must be exercised at all times when dealing with the public.

Principle 17: When determining an appropriate intervention against crime or antisocial behaviour, the consequences for resource hours committed to visible patrol should legitimately be considered.

Principle 18: PCSOs bring benefits to communities but action needs to be taken to remove any perception that they are less effective than an ordinary member of the public.

Principle 19: The amount of police resources required to service the inspection process must be justified in terms of the overall public interest.

Principle 20: Local policing will never succeed in a landscape dominated by national targets and performance frameworks.

Principle 21: Discretion will not be returned to officers simply by removing barriers, it will require training and leadership from every level of the Police Service.

Principle 22: The disparity in service between Neighbourhood and Response officers is unacceptable and needs to be closed.

Principle 23: The Police Service should develop a policing style which energetically tackles harm or the threat of harm in communities, but does so in a way which builds confidence among the public that the police are on their side.

Principle 24: The Neighbourhood Policing model represents the right direction of travel for policing in terms of discretion, problem-solving disposals and resourcing. Gains in these areas should be consolidated and built upon.

Principle 25: Every observed act of antisocial behaviour or crime, no matter how minor, should be subject to an intervention by police or other enforcement agency.

Principle 26: The Tripartite structure, in its current form, is not fit for purpose and needs to be rebalanced.

Principle 27: The only possibility of wresting control of local policing back into local hands is through the route of a directly elected office.

Principle 28: The operational independence of the Chief Constable is crucial to the rebalancing of the Tripartite structure.

Principle 29: The Service should promote the improvement in its standards and elimination of political interference by developing itself as a strong profession with all of the necessary institutions to support this.

Principle 30: Accountability structures for police partners generally (and the CPS particularly) should be aligned in pursuit of common outcomes.

SECTION TWELVE
Summary of Recommendations

The Working Group recommends:

1. Alternative sources of data should be utilised to enrich the picture given by crime statistics and inform crime reduction initiatives.
2. The responsibility for the collection and public presentation of crime or crime related data should rest with an independent body, which is free from control by the Police Service and local or national government.

THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF FULLY-SWORN POLICE OFFICERS AND PCSOS:

3. The effectiveness of PCSOs should be enhanced by their being trained to make full use of their citizen's powers of arrest.
4. The Chief Constable should determine the mix of PCs and PCSOs locally.

A COMMITMENT TO INTERVENE:

5. The Working Group recommends "Interventionist Neighbourhood Policing" as the natural progression from the current Neighbourhood Policing model.
6. The Working Group recommends the Surrey "Harm's Way" Policy for adoption by the whole Service.
7. All officers must be trained to deliver the widest possible range of interventions in response to crime or antisocial behaviour.
8. Specifically, officers should be trained to deliver Restorative Justice disposals in situations where they deem a conventional criminal justice disposal to be inappropriate.
9. Officers need to be properly trained and supported in the use of constabulary discretion to determine what type of disposal is appropriate in any given circumstance.

A REBALANCED TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE:

10. The role of the Home Secretary in the Tripartite structure should focus on setting standards and objectives for Protective Services and cede greater control of local policing to local governance arrangements.

11. The Home Secretary should:
    - Retain an involvement in the appointment and dismissal of Chief Constables; but only sufficient to act as a safeguard against the inappropriate use of these powers by Police Authorities.
    - Retain an overview of the delivery of local policing and a means of exercising accountability in cases of significant and persistent under-performance.
    - Control and hold to account Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.

12. A Crime and Justice Commissioner should be elected for every Police Force area in the country.

13. The Commissioner should:
    - Act as a figurehead for community safety.
    - Chair the Police Authority and hold to account the Local Criminal Justice Board and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships.
    - Set local priorities for all of these agencies and influence the spending of budgets across partnerships.
    - Be accountable to the Home Secretary where there is evidence of significant and persistent under-performance.
    - Have a duty to consult the public and coordinate consultation by all of the partner agencies, including by convening Citizens Juries in every BCU.

14. Police Authorities should:
    - Consist of ten ordinary members with the Crime and Justice Commissioner making the eleventh.
    - Be appointed in the manner of the current independent members, being selected for the relevant skills they hold to assist in the discharging of the functions of the Authority.
    - Have the duty to maintain an efficient and effective Police Force.
    - Have the power to appoint, appraise and dismiss the Chief Constable.
    - Hold the Chief Constable to account for his/her performance against the Crime and Justice Commissioner's priorities.
    - Set the police budget and set the precept for any contribution from local taxation.

15. Chief Constables should:
    - No longer be subject to Fixed Term Appointments.
    - No longer receive Performance-Related Bonuses.
    - Have the power to appoint their own top team.
    - Have the power to appoint top team members, from the lower ranks, on a fixed term basis.

STREAMLINED INSPECTION AND LOCAL ASSESSMENT:

16. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary should:
    - Be the single gateway for all inspection/assessment activity within every Police Force.
    - Agree an allocation of hours with the Police Service for each force and then determine the priorities for utilising those hours for inspection activity.
    - Reduce the burden placed on Forces by this type of activity.

17. Scrap APACS as the national performance assessment system.
18. Replace APACS with a small number of national indicators (not more than 5).
19. Introduce the Harm Index to manage performance at local level.

POLICE INTERVENTIONS BASED ON WELL-GROUNDED RESEARCH:

20. Evidence-based policing should be the foundation doctrine for all police interventions.
21. Establish university police schools in Russell Group universities.
22. Establish a new research council to support police research.
23. Establish an Excellence Institute for the Criminal Justice System.
24. Re-establish an independent Bramshill Police Staff College.

THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE:

25. Restore police discretion over charging of volume crime.
26. Commission a full review of the CPS to be conducted by the Centre for Social Justice.

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