IT CAN BE STOPPED

A proven blueprint to stop violence and tackle gang and related offending in London and beyond

August 2018
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Established in 2004, the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) is an independent think tank that studies the root causes of Britain’s social problems and addresses them by recommending practical, workable policy interventions. The CSJ’s vision is to give people in the UK who are experiencing the worst disadvantage and injustice every possible opportunity to reach their full potential.

Since its inception, the CSJ has changed the landscape of our political discourse by putting social justice at the heart of British politics. This has led to a transformation in Government thinking and policy. The majority of the CSJ’s work is organised around five ‘pathways to poverty’, first identified in our ground-breaking 2007 report, *Breakthrough Britain*. These are: family breakdown; educational failure; economic dependency and worklessness; addiction to drugs and alcohol; and severe personal debt.

In March 2013, the CSJ report *It Happens Here* shone a light on the horrific reality of human trafficking and modern slavery in the UK. As a direct result of this report, the Government passed the Modern Slavery Act 2015, one of the first pieces of legislation in the world to address slavery and trafficking in the 21st century.

The CSJ delivers empirical, practical, fully funded policy solutions to address the scale of the social justice problems facing the UK. Our research is informed by expert working groups comprising prominent academics, practitioners and policy-makers. Furthermore, the CSJ Alliance is a unique group of charities, social enterprises and other grass-roots organisations that have a proven track record of reversing social breakdown across the UK.

The 14 years since the CSJ was founded has brought with it much success. But the social justice challenges facing Britain remain serious. Our response, therefore, must be equally serious. In 2018 and beyond, we will continue to advance the cause of social justice in this nation.
About Criminal Justice at the CSJ

The CSJ has a strong legacy of work to improve our criminal justice system, ranging across issues as diverse as tackling inner city street gangs (Dying to Belong, 2009), the scourge of drugs within our prisons (Drugs in Prison, 2015), and the abuse and exploitation of young women and girls by criminal gangs (Girls and Gangs, 2014).

Recognising that the poorest and most vulnerable in Britain are disproportionately more likely to find themselves in touch with our criminal justice system – whether as victim or offender – the CSJ created a new policy unit for Criminal Justice in 2017.

Since then, the CSJ has produced publications proposing increased freedom for Police and Crime Commissioners to fund the fight against crime (Growing the Local, 2017), a Second Chance Programme to tackle the root causes of prolific drug-addicted offending (Desperate for a Fix, 2018), and setting out how a reforming government could free vulnerable women from the revolving door of crime (A Woman-Centred Approach, 2018).
Acknowledgements

We would like to pay thanks to the police officers who work tirelessly, often in hostile environments, to tackle gangs and fight crime. For their bravery in challenging those who carry and are prepared to use weapons, such as knives and firearms, we are grateful. We would also like to thank the healthcare professionals, were it not for their efforts alongside the police the death toll would be significantly higher. We commend the work of all of those involved in organisations already deeply involved in providing rehabilitative support for young gang members. Their consultations have been invaluable in creating this report.

We would, in particular, like to acknowledge the work and efforts of: the National Network for Safer Communities, Violence Reduction Unit, Redthread, the London Community Rehabilitation Company, London Gang Exit, Operation Peacekeeper, the Watt Gangs Task Force, the Parent Gym, OnSide, Northamptonshire PCC, the Sea Cadets, Homeboy Industries, Key4Life, Growing Against Violence, West Midlands Commission on Gangs and Violence, the Integrated Gangs Unit Hackney, and the London Borough of Hackney.

Particular thanks go to the sponsors of this report, the Bruderhof.
In 2009, the Centre for Social Justice provided the Government with a blueprint to reduce gang membership and to make the streets safer. Our approach was based upon the tried, tested, and approved model of Group Violence Intervention (GVI). This model has been successfully applied across the world: pioneered in Boston and implemented from Cincinnati to Glasgow, GVI has been adopted in 77 different cities.

In our original report, *Dying to Belong*, we highlighted these case studies of exemplary practice and drew upon their strengths in designing a plan for Britain. We acknowledged that this issue would not disappear without a concerted and perpetual effort on the behalf of the Government. Despite the findings and recommendations of that report, there has been little progress towards tackling the issue of gang membership and exploitation in many parts of the UK.

This is unacceptable. As we stumble over implementation challenges, that are largely of our own making, our young people live in dangerous conditions, subject to the pressures of gang membership and exploitation. An estimated additional 20,000 people have joined a gang since *Dying to Belong* was published, nearly a decade ago, bringing the total number of gang members to 70,000. In this time, 700 young people have been fatally stabbed or shot. We cannot afford to wait any longer. If the Government earnestly believes that their first duty is to protect the public, then they need to act immediately and effectively.

There is a clear, empirically supported alternative. The Government needs to take ownership of this issue and confront the reality of life for gang members. Since we published *Dying to Belong*, the approach of GVI has seen success in Glasgow. This Scottish city, once dubbed the “murder capital” of Europe, has seen a 46 per cent fall in violent offences, a 73 per cent fall in gang in-fighting and an 85 per cent fall in weapon possession. These life changing results are largely credited to the ‘pulling levers’ theory behind GVI – a targeted zero-tolerance enforcement message credibly paired with easy access to support services, offering young people a chance to get off the streets and into jobs and education.

It has been depressing to attend meetings on what has been described as London’s epidemic of gang violence to hear different people refer vaguely to the system being operated in Glasgow. This operation was referenced in our earlier report and it seems as quickly forgotten. That earlier report set out a template on what to do to take back control of our streets yet few authorities have used it comprehensively. Such a programme, as those in Glasgow will tell you, relies on support on the ground from local organisations, getting the young people out of the gangs and stopping the violence.
I am once again inspired by the amazing work of some of our grassroots charities. Throughout this report, we draw on exemplary practice from youth zones, referral services, mentoring practices, and community task forces. People in their local community are taking ownership, acknowledging that young people dying on our streets as a result of gangs is never acceptable. As we set out in this report, many organisations and much invaluable activity is already underway, such as London Exit, Gangs Unite, the Sea Cadets, Key4Life, Watts Gang Task Force, and Growing Against Violence, to name a few. In this report, we draw upon their successes to suggest a coordinated response to the gang epidemic.

Britain’s gangs are a product of its pathways to poverty. Young people born into disadvantaged and marginalised communities, with little hope of improving their life chances, turn to gangs for a sense of identity and belonging. It is time that we provided them with a credible alternative.

Rt Hon Iain Duncan Smith MP
Chair of the Centre for Social Justice
Executive summary

In the near-decade since Dying to Belong was published in 2009, gangs have remained a part of life in Britain. At the time, we estimated there were 50,000 gang members across Britain, today that number is estimated to be closer to 70,000.1 In London, the focus of this report, the police estimate that there are up to 250 gangs and 4,500 members.2

While gangs are not responsible for all serious violence, they commit far more than their fair share. It is estimated that gangs are responsible for as much as half of all knife crime with injury, 60 per cent of shootings, and 29 per cent of reported child sexual exploitation.3

The social and economic costs of serious violence are enormous – and for those left to pick up the pieces, the trauma and distress is almost impossible to measure. In 2003 the Home Office estimated the economic and social costs of each homicide to be £1.5 million, a figure that was subsequently updated to £1.8 million in 2010.4 Adjusting for inflation to 2017 prices, we estimate that the cost of a homicide today is £2.2 million.5

We must bring an end to the disastrous effects of gang violence. To this end, this report offers a Group Violence Intervention model, tried and tested globally with proven results. Based on extensive polling, statistical evidence, and case studies of outstanding practice, this paper proposes a new system that would focus on both law enforcement and community support.

The violence can and must stop – key recommendations

Almost a decade ago, in our report Dying to Belong, we highlighted the successes of Group Violence Intervention (GVI). This model is based on the work of Professor David Kennedy and its success has seen the implementation of GVI in Boston, Cincinnati, and Glasgow. In fact, GVI has now been adopted in more than 77 cities worldwide with dramatic results.

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2 Whittaker et al., From Postcodes to Profits (2018) p.23 [Accessed on 8 June 2018 via https://drive.google.com/file/d/1AvLo4A/1MrvzThuQ/JhKjojY1E/hChv-Chv]
5 Using the Bank of England Inflation Calculator to convert from 2010 prices to 2017 prices
Recommendation 1
A new Safer Streets Group Violence Intervention, taking the proven blueprint that has been successfully implemented in Glasgow, Boston, and Cincinnati, to tackle the problem of gang and gang-related violence.

Recommendation 2
The Metropolitan Police should conduct a detailed assessment of London’s 32 boroughs and 632 neighbourhood wards to identify those areas presenting the highest risk and harm, making them worthy of designation as Safer Street Zones.

Recommendation 5
The Mayor of London should create and appoint a Safer Streets Commissioner with responsibility for leading the Safer London GVI centrally and holding partners accountable for the effective implementation of the intervention.

Recommendation 7
The Mayor should convene an Implementation Taskforce with representation from the Metropolitan Police, National Crime Agency, HMPPS, the National Probation Service, the London Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC), housing enforcement, local authorities, HMRC and DWP to develop approaches in support of encouraging and/or compelling call-ins and the development of protocols and approaches to the consequences strand.

The law and order London needs
More broadly, the issues and proposals outlined in this section contribute towards creating a Metropolitan Police that is fit to face the future, a goal that the Commissioner set out during her first major media interview shortly after being appointed. Our polling suggests that a net 22% of Londoners are satisfied with the Metropolitan Police whereas only a net 5% of Londoners are satisfied with courts. There is therefore a clear need for a rebooting of the law and order response to the problem of gang and related offending.

Recommendation 14
The Government and Home Office should include provisions for a Serious Violence Reduction Order (SVRO) within the Offensive Weapons Bill that is currently progressing through Parliament. A SVRO is a suspicionless stop and search order allowing police to search any ex-offender still on sentence. The Order would only last for the duration of the sentence given by the court.

Recommendation 13
Initial and in-service training should better prepare and equip officers with the skills and experience to take heated high-stress encounters and convert them into a conversational style. Officers should be assessed on their ability to not just complete realistic stop and search scenarios lawfully and safely, but to demonstrate an ability and willingness to conduct appropriate after-care.

Recommendation 16
Youth Offending Services and Teams (YOS/YOTs) working with young people at risk of criminal exploitation or gang membership should, over the course of the supervision
period, connect that young person into existing youth services, provision, or centres that can provide a positive environment and trusted positive relationships for the long-term, beyond the length of the order.

Recommendation 17
The Government should initiate an urgent review of victim and witness intimidation and look to bring forward measures to better protect victims and witnesses from such intimidation. These measures could and should extend to consider the use of GPS tagging of suspected offenders and the provision of a paired handheld tag for victims and witnesses, alerting them in the event of proximity, and triggering safety plans. Courts must recognise the public interest in ensuring justice is done and be rigorous in remanding in custody individuals who engage in such activity.

Recommendation 21
The Metropolitan Police should overhaul their local communications strategy, ensuring that named borough commanders and Dedicated Ward Officers are better known within their communities. Both these roles should come with a minimum tenure to build trust and relationships.

Creating belonging

Young people need to feel like they are understood and that they have a sense of security in their relationships with others. It is necessary that young people, who may otherwise be susceptible to gang membership, know that there is an alternative community that is available and willing to offer them comprehensive support.

Recommendation 26
The Mayor of London should set an expectation that London’s 32 boroughs each provide access to services in their locality to help parents during the first 1,001 days, but also in relation to where parents have concerns about aggressive or anti-social behaviour or concerns about involvement in gangs or criminality.

Recommendation 28
Government should redirect funding from the National Citizen Service to create capacity in priority areas to support uniformed youth organisations and other local youth provision that signs up to the principles of a Safer Streets GVI.

Recommendation 30
All secondary schools and colleges in London should either have a Volunteer Police Cadet programme or be affiliated to one nearby. The roll-out and strengthening of the VPC should be prioritised to expedite roll-out across the Safer Streets Zones.

Recommendation 31
The Home Office should commission research to develop a behavioural detection training package for police officers in relation to identifying potential female gang members and/or behaviours associated with a female carrying or holding weapons or other items. This training package should help empower both male and female police officers to use their powers more effectively in relation to young women and gangs.
Beyond London

The issue of gang violence is prevalent in London, but it is not limited to our capital city. The rise of county lines has brought new regional turf wars over drug dealership and gang rivalry issues. Further, other cities have their own gang networks. We therefore recommend that other parts of the UK experiencing significant serious violence linked to gangs adopt the GVI approach.

Recommendation 34
The Ministry of Justice should develop a comprehensive devolution strategy for Police and Crime Commissioners that includes electronic monitoring and allows for local areas to commission electronic monitoring services that are suitable to their local needs and requirements, such as incorporating within a GVI approach.

Recommendation 35
In addition to joint intelligence-led enforcement activity between British Transport Police (BTP) and local police forces, the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) should work with BTP to develop regularly updated training packages for railway staff to facilitate the identification of rail-enabled county line activity.

Recommendation 36
The Home Office should work with the hire car industry to ensure the creation of a data-sharing tool allowing law enforcement to establish who should legally be in possession of and is insured to drive hired vehicles. This could be achieved through a monetary prize to encourage efficiency and innovation.

Recommendation 40
Police and Crime Commissioners, Mayors, and Chief Constables beyond London should consider the extent to which gangs and group violence are driving local patterns of knife crime, gun crime, and serious violence. Where identified, we encourage consideration of a Group Violence Intervention.

Leadership is needed today and for the next decade

The issue of gangs and serious youth violence is everyone’s problem. We set out proposals for how the Mayor of London – working with others – can and should deliver the sort of leadership that is so urgently required on this issue today and into the future.

Recommendation 43
The Mayor, DWP, HMRC, London Councils, and others to be represented alongside the Metropolitan Police on the Enforcement Working Group, aiding with the development of an enforcement toolkit covering the wide range of offences, regulations, and rules that can be used to target high harm players and help reinforce the message that “the violence must stop”.

Recommendation 44
In the event of a gang-related death of a young person or the death of any young person as a result of a knife, gun, or other incident of serious violence, an approximation to a Serious Case Review should be undertaken and a full public response made by the local authority and other relevant agencies.
Part I
Still dying to belong

People now dominated by the gangs are tired of politicians playing politics. Too many young people have died unnecessarily because the right action has not been taken. We should bin the rhetoric and work together to end this scourge that is blighting London.

Rt Hon Iain Duncan Smith MP

In the near decade since the CSJ published Dying to Belong, more than 700 young people been fatally shot or stabbed. In the last year alone, in London, more than 80 murder investigations have started in London, including more than 50 fatal stabbings and 10 fatal shootings.

Gangs – accounting for around half of knife crime and more than half of gun crime – have remained a part of life in Britain. At the time of Dying to Belong, there were 50,000 gang members across Britain, today that number is estimated to be closer to 70,000.

Gangs, serious violence, and other crimes are pressing social justice issues. While much of the last decade saw a decline in crime, there is growing evidence that the poorest are seeing less than their fair share of reductions in crime.

Worse still, since 2014, London – the focus of this report – has seen a rise in serious youth violence, knife crime, and gun crime.

In setting out our proven blueprint for tackling gangs and serious violence, we begin by shining a light on gangs and violence in London today: three quarters of Londoners saying it has become less safe in the last few years and almost half describing “no go” areas near where they live that they cannot safely go to or travel through.7

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6 ‘Cut the politics. Too many young people have been lost to knives’, The Telegraph, 6 April 2018 [Accessed on 2 August 2018 via www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/04/06/cut-politics-many-young-people-have-lost-knives/]
7 CSJ Crime in London Poll
chapter one

Serious violence and gangs in London today

A snapshot of serious violence in London today

London is currently caught in a toxic cycle of serious violence. The year to date has seen more than 80 murder investigations commence in the capital, in relation to more than 50 fatal stabbings and 10 fatal shootings. The 12 months to the end of June 2018 saw more than 25,000 incidents of serious violence recorded across London’s 32 boroughs.\(^8\)

The number of victims of serious youth violence in London has grown by more than 50 per cent since 2012, with more than 8,150 victims of serious youth violence in 2017. This means that almost 680 young people each month and 22 young people each day become victims of serious youth violence. If the average level of serious youth violence from 2012–2013 had been maintained, there would today have been more than 5,500 fewer victims of serious youth violence.

Figure 1: Victims of serious youth violence in London

Source: Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime\(^9\)

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While harrowing, when set against a city of more than 8 million Londoners and 19 million annual visitors, London’s figures for homicide and serious youth violence can seem insignificant, or even acceptable, when set against other countries or cities. However, the fact that London has recently seen significant increases in serious youth violence, knife crime, and gun crime, speaks to the reality that there is a need to arrest and reverse the current trend.

The ripples from the most serious violence reach far beyond the immediate victims

It is easy to imagine that the impact of fatal stabbings and shootings is limited to a relatively small group of Londoners. However, our exclusive polling finds that more than 1 in 10 Londoners say they or a friend know someone who has been killed in London with a knife or gun in the last 12 months.

Figure 2: Do you or a friend know someone who has been killed in London with a knife or gun?

The proportion increases to more than 1 in 5 over the last two years, 1 in 4 over the last three years, and almost 1 in 3 Londoners at any time in the past.10

The fact that the most serious violence – fatal stabbings and shootings – is indirectly or vicariously experienced by as many as 1 in 3 Londoners highlights how the experience, fear, and consequences of violence spread from a relatively small number of direct victims to affect a much wider community.

While the bulk of Londoners – a full 70 per cent – do not themselves, or through a friend, know someone who has been killed in London with a knife or gun, it is a real cause of concern that almost 1 in 3 adult Londoners do.

10 CSJ: London Crime Poll of 1,005 London adults by Survation, conducted 28 June 2018–3 July 2018
Young Londoners aged 15 to 24 are at greatest risk of fatal stabbings and shootings

We also know from an extract of the Home Office Homicide Index (excluding terrorism and domestic abuse cases) that in London nearly half (48 per cent) of homicide victims killed with a gun or knife are aged 15 to 24 years old, despite only accounting for 12 per cent of London’s population.\textsuperscript{11} The grim reality is that young Londoners, aged 15 to 24, are more than six times as likely to be fatally stabbed or killed than other Londoners.

Figure 3: Age distributions of London’s population and victims of fatal shootings and stabbings (2010/11–2016/17)

This is reflected in our polling of adult Londoners, which found that the youngest were most likely to know, either directly or through a friend, someone who has been killed in London with a knife or gun.

\textsuperscript{11} Homicide Index, Home Office, 2018
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid
Figure 4: Do you or a friend know someone who has been killed in London with a knife or gun?

Source: CSJ Crime in London Poll

Mixed and black ethnicities were also more likely to know, either directly or through a friend, someone who had been killed in London with a knife or gun. This fact is supported by the reality that black and minority ethnic individuals are over-represented as victims of fatal shootings and stabbings, when compared to their share of the population in London.

Figure 5: The presentation of black and minority ethnic 15–24 year olds in London

Source: Home Office

13 CSJ Crime in London Poll
14 Homicide Index, Home Office, 2018
While it is easy to point to statistics like these and to analyse them through the lens of race or ethnicity, the reality is that – like age – they are descriptive characteristics, rather than representing the root cause of their over-representation.

The recent increase in homicides is affecting a growing proportion of London

While the last few years have seen an increase in the number of homicides, it is also the case that murders are occurring in a growing number of distinct neighbourhoods. This can be counted in terms of the number of neighbourhood wards with a recorded murder. This number has grown from 79 in the 12 months leading up to June 2015 to reach 119 in the same period to June 2018: representing a fifty per cent increase.

Figure 6: Number of wards and number of murders (July–June)

This increased geographic spread is likely to drive up the number and proportion of individuals aware of a murder in their local area or where they may even know the victim. At the same time, the apparent increase in the number of wards subject to multiple murders, can be expected to drive even further fear and concern at the lawlessness of the streets.

The costs of homicide in London are huge and extend beyond the present into the future

Analysis of press releases made by the Metropolitan Police and coverage in the Evening Standard relating to sentencing reveals that in 2017 alone there were 68 defendants sentenced to offences involving homicide receiving a total of 1,274 years imprisonment.\footnote{Results obtained through an analysis of the Metropolitan Police news microsite (https://news.met.police.uk) referencing a person ‘jailed’ or ‘sentenced’ for murder or manslaughter over the period 1st January to 31st December 2017 and any (non-duplicate) Evening Standard articles identified using Google search terms “manslaughter/murder sentenced/jailed <month> 2017” site – standard.co.uk”}

\footnote{Update footnote to read: Metropolitan Police Crime Data by Ward, Metropolitan Police (2018)}
An average prison place using the overall resource expenditure costs £38,042 per year, meaning that homicides alone account for non-discounted future prison costs of £48.5 million.

The costs do not end with the completion of the homicide investigation. Last year, 68 offenders collectively received more than 1,270 years of prison sentences in relation to offences of murder, attempted murder, and manslaughter in London.17 With prison places costing £38,000 per year, on a non-discounted basis, that works out at a total cost of more than £48 million for just this particular subset of serious violence.

Things would be even worse were it not for medical advances and life-saving interventions

It is only thanks to advances in medical care and the expert work of London’s first responders, paramedics, air ambulance, and trauma specialists that more of the 25,000 incidents of serious violence and more than 8,000 victims of serious youth violence do not result in a fatality.

Last year stabbings and shootings became the most common cause for London’s Air Ambulance to be dispatched, with the number of such incidents attended growing by 29 per cent between 2014 and 2017.18

Quite often people will be stabbed and not end up with a life-threatening injury, but it could be life-changing and will need intervention. Although there’s a huge focus on the number of people who’ve died, there’s not so much on the number who have survived.

Duncan Bew, King’s College Hospital19

The reality is that even those who survive such attacks can be left with life-threatening and life-changing physical and mental injuries. Victims can be left disabled, or having to use a stoma or colostomy bag for life. Mentally, the nature of the violence and repeated victimisation can contribute to post-traumatic stress and related mental ill-health.

Beyond homicides the extent of other violence involving weapons is significant

Our polling found 1 in 10 Londoners reporting that they or someone they know had been threatened or attacked with a knife (or other edged or bladed weapon) in the last 12 months. The use or threat of acid or a corrosive substance was reported by 6 per cent

17 Analysis of Metropolitan Police press releases (https://news.met.police.uk) and the Evening Standard (www.standard.co.uk) referencing a person “jailed” or “sentenced” for murder or manslaughter over the period 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2017
of Londoners and the use or threat of a firearm by 5 per cent of Londoners. These proportions also serve to remind us that police recorded crime figures very rarely reflect the true picture of crime in a country, city, or neighbourhood.

Figure 7: Have you or someone you know been threatened or attacked with any of the following weapons?

When asked the same question over longer time periods, the proportion of Londoners reporting such an incident increases – with a knife being used or threatened increasing from 1 in 10 for the last year, to 17 per cent for the last two years, 21 per cent for the last three years and 33 per cent at any time in the past.

We must not be afraid to talk about gang and group-related violence: it affects Londoners

Amid a rising tide of violence, knife crime, and gun crime in London, it is unsurprising that our polling reveals 3 in 4 Londoners believe the streets of London have become less safe in the last few years. A majority of Londoners (52 per cent) state “gangs and serious youth violence negatively affects people like me” with almost as many (46 per cent) report a “no-go” area near where they live: “there are some areas near where I live that I cannot safely go to or travel through”.21

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20 CSJ Crime in London Poll
21 Ibid
Half of Londoners see gangs and serious youth violence as negatively affecting people like themselves. It is thus vital to be able to have a serious and honest discussion about gangs and serious youth violence.

While some still contest the use of “gangs”, we continue to use the term in keeping with the original definition devised in *Dying to Belong*, and that others have subsequently employed:

A relatively durable, predominantly street-based group of young people who (1) see themselves (and are seen by others) as a discernible group, (2) engage in a range of criminal activity and violence, (3) identify with or lay claim over territory, (4) have some form of identifying structural feature (5) are in conflict with other, similar, gangs.22

As already stated, referring to gangs is not meant to imply that they are the sole source of violence. For example, we know that domestic violence is an important component of knife crime and homicide, and that alcohol in both the domestic and night time economy environments can contribute to violence between both strangers and people who know each other.

While gangs are not responsible for all serious violence, they commit far more than their fair share. It is estimated that gangs are responsible for as much as half of all knife crime with injury, 60 per cent of shootings, and 29 per cent of reported child sexual exploitation.23

We also recognise that being in a gang or group can bring some specific benefits to young people. It provides a sense of belonging – especially for those young people who feel least

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safe at home – and can provide the promise of safety and security, even if that promise goes unfulfilled. We dedicate Chapter 5 to proposals for how young people can secure belonging and safety from positive pro-social sources.

The polling also challenges the claim made by the Mayor of London that London is “the safest global city”. It is a statement not only at odds with our polling and current crime figures, but also with The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Safer Cities Index that places London 20th globally.

That nearly half of Londoners in 2018 agree that “there are some areas near where I live that I cannot safely go to or travel through” – what might be considered “no-go areas” – should be a genuine cause for concern. This fear of crime is something that must be recognised and confronted head-on.

Figure 9: Proportions agreeing with the statement: “There are some areas near where I live that I cannot safely go to or travel through”

Source: CSJ Crime in London Poll

The group most likely to identify such an area were those who had previously been attacked or threatened with violence in the past. Other groups, in which more than half of respondents agree with the statement, included those aged 25–34 and 35–44, those with children under 18, and those identifying as Asian.


The possession of weapons on the streets is an important factor in violence and homicides

Throughout the course of our work the prevalence of weapons has been identified as a key issue linked to serious youth violence. Where once a fight – whether gang-related or not – would not have involved weapons, today there is an expectation that individuals “on road” will likely carry or have ready access to weapons.

Approximately 37 per cent of homicides over the last decade involved the use of a knife or other sharp instrument – and among men, 8 per cent involved firearms and another 8 per cent using blunt instruments.26 It is for these reasons that the possession of many such weapons in public is prohibited by the aptly named Prevention of Crime Act 1953, the Firearms Act 1968, and the more recent Criminal Justice Act 1988.27 It also forms the basis behind the Government’s current Offensive Weapons Bill.28

If you got a knife on the street and you get into a beef with someone yeah, you ain’t gonna have a fist fight these days, it’s 2018. It’s 2018 bro. They’re gonna pull out a weapon, so are you, it’s an eye for an eye. They don’t do no fist fighting.

Gang Member29

More broadly, the volume of police recorded offences where a knife or sharp instrument was used in an assault with injury or assault with intent to cause serious harm has also grown in recent years, though is showing signs of stabilising. The use of knives or other sharp instruments can also be seen at a national level, with increasing numbers of offences since 2013/14.

Figure 10: Offences where a knife or sharp instrument was involved in an assault with injury or assault with intent to cause serious harm

Source: Home Office30

27 The Prevention of Crime Act 1953 was passed in response to a large rise in violent crime
One in 10 Londoners considered carrying a knife or other weapon in the last 12 months

Our own polling of Londoners has found that almost 1 in 10 Londoners have considered carrying a knife or other weapon during the last 12 months. Furthermore, 7 per cent said they have carried a knife, 6 per cent a gun, 6 per cent any other weapon, and 5 per cent acid or a corrosive substance during the last 12 months.

Figure 11: Over the last 12 months have you done any of the following?

It is evident from 4 per cent stating that they had “been part of a group or gang involved in crime” during the last 12 months, that the carriage of weapons is not a phenomenon restricted to gang membership. Amid the reality of rising violent crime and concerns over “no-go” areas, it is a sad reality that some people will choose to carry a knife out of fear, especially where levels of trust in the police and criminal justice system may be low.

It is also worth noting that the question seeks only to identify a binary measure of weapon carriage, as opposed to the frequency of weapon carriage. This means that it is probable that while similar proportions reported carrying a knife as reported carrying a gun, the frequency of knife carriage is likely to significantly exceed the carriage of a gun – given the much more limited availability of firearms.

Our polling also found that 12 per cent of Londoners “know someone who regularly carries a knife or other weapon” and, perhaps unsurprisingly, a similar percentage said that they “know someone at risk from gangs, knife crime, gun crime, or other serious violence”.

Source: CSJ Crime in London Poll
Between 8 and 9 per cent of Londoners also said that they know someone who has or had an illegal gun or firearm, that they would be able to get an illegal gun or firearm if they wanted, and identified themselves as being at risk from gangs, knife crime, gun crime, or other serious violence.

Our polling – and other data – speaks to a small minority of Londoners among whom gangs, violence, and criminality is either directly present in their lives or else present around them. While the proportion of people saying they know someone who has or has had an illegal firearm and that they would be able to get an illegal gun or firearm appears broadly stable over time, it masks local variance in the frequency of gun crime and gun discharges.31

**Gun crime and gun discharges evidence the varied experience of Londoners**

The problem of gun crime – including gun discharges – is a serious one. Where once the focus would be on gun crime as it relates to serious violence and gangs, there is today a further focus on the availability of illegal firearms owing to the heightened terrorist threat. It also provides a useful lens through which the level of gang and serious violence in London’s different boroughs might be gauged.

Gun crime and gun discharge data obtained from the Metropolitan Police for 2016 showed that two thirds of London Boroughs averaged a recorded gun crime at least once per week in 2016 – with Newham, Lambeth, and Haringey recording a gun crime every few days.

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31 A poll of UK adults conducted by YouGov in 2007 found that 8 per cent reported knowing someone who has or has had an illegal gun or firearm and 12 per cent reported being able to get an illegal gun or firearm if they wanted. [Accessed on 8 August 2018 via https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/today_uk_import/YG-Archives-ilf-policyex-gunknife-071109.pdf]
The picture is similar for police-recorded gun discharges (gun shots), with Kingston and Havering recording just one gun discharge per year – while Newham and Lambeth record a gun discharge more than once per fortnight.

Source: Metropolitan Police

32 Freedom of information request, Metropolitan Police, 2017
Across London, these figures equate to a reported gun discharge almost every day (every 27 hours). However, we have heard evidence as part of our work to suggest that a significant volume of gun discharges and gun crimes go unreported.

My father lives on an estate in south London. The other night he thought he heard fireworks and looked out the window to see a kid with a gun running about shooting a gun at other kids. He didn’t call the police – and given no police turned up, clearly nobody else did either.

Anonymous ex-gang member

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33 Freedom of information request, Metropolitan Police, 2017

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It Can Be Stopped | Still dying to belong
Arguments supporting significant under-reporting point to victims of and witnesses to gun crime being extremely reluctant to come forward for fear of reprisals. While other arguments would suggest the very serious nature of the offence tends in favour of reporting.34

Experience from other cities that have sought to improve their understanding and response to gun crime through the installation of gunshot detection technology have found that, as in New York City, only between 1 in 3 and 1 in 4 gun discharges results in an emergency call to police.35

Applying this rate of reporting to London’s gun crime figures would mean a gun discharge in London every 6 to 9 hours.36 Applying the same formula to the 2016 borough-level data would also suggest that 9 of London’s boroughs experience a gun discharge at least once per week.

Gun crime and gun discharges are undoubtedly serious offences, however we also heard evidence that “a lot of the discharges can be against property”, such as against vehicles, houses or front doors.37 While such offences do not necessarily result in an injury to a person, they can clearly cause significant concern to those directly involved, their friends and family, and the wider community. They can also cause unarmed rivals to seek to obtain firearms themselves.

It really is a tale of two cities. You can have bullet holes left in someone’s bedroom window. Half the estate know it happened. The other half – young professionals and the like – live in their bubble and don’t know anything even happened.

Dedicated Ward Officer, Metropolitan Police

The increase in gun crime offences since 2014 has been the subject of a London Assembly Police and Crime Committee report. Published in January 2018, it found “a significant rise in gun crime in London” over the last three years.38 While the rise in gun crime and gun discharges is not confined to London, there has been a significant upward trend since 2014.

Robbery and violence against the person account for approximately 80 per cent of recorded gun crime, with violence against the person accounting for half of all gun crime. Met Police data shows that 1 in 3 of these offences involve the gun being fired, and in two thirds of these cases the weapons used were “lethal” guns.39

35 NYPD statistics for 2016 indicate that 34% of recorded gun discharges resulted in a 911 call
36 Applying the reporting rates of 25 per cent and 33 per cent to the recorded gun discharge figures
37 Evidence of Commander Jim Stokley, Meeting of the London Assembly Police and Crime Committee, 5 October 2017
In one of the most authoritative gun crime studies, conducted in 2006, 80 convicted firearms offenders were interviewed and it was found that half had been part of a gang, group, or crew. It was also identified that the vast majority had “grown up in disrupted family environments, under-achieved in and been excluded from mainstream education, and had poor work histories.”

The work also found that, of those convicted of firearms offences:

- half had previously been threatened with guns,
- more than a third reported they had previously been shot at,
- more than a third reporting they had previously been stabbed,
- one third reported that friends or family members had been shot and injured, and
- another third reporting friends or family had been shot dead.

The work also explored the issue of reporting and extra-judicial retribution. It found that victimisation would usually only be recorded by police in cases of fatalities or serious injury that required medical attention. In other circumstances, the study found “a preference for personal retributive action” coupled with “a fear of being labelled a grass.”

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It is widely accepted by both the Metropolitan Police and the National Crime Agency that the main drivers of gun crime in London are drug and gang activity. Furthermore, nearly two thirds of gun crime offenders are aged 25 or younger, with young people making up around one third of gun crime victims. From the healthcare perspective, the age of those being treated in hospital for shooting-related injuries appears to be falling. With “mid-to-late teens” being identified as a current hotspot, compared to an average age of around 25 years old in 2012.

During our proactive operations to recover firearms from a Trident perspective, we find that about 70 per cent of the time we recover a cache of Class A Drugs along with the weapon.

Detective Chief Superintendent, Kevin Southworth, Head of Trident and Area Command

The National Ballistics Intelligence Service has found that 90 per cent of gun discharges it investigates show the weapon has not previously been used in recorded crime, with this suggesting either a “ready supply” of weapons or that weapons are freshly stolen.

We believe that a lot of it [gun crime] is associated with the drugs trade and by that I mean people dealing drugs at a street level and disagreements between different groups of people in gangs dealing those drugs.

Commander Jim Stokley, Metropolitan Police

The link between the drugs market and violence is also well-established. It is also recognised by most Londoners, with 78 per cent of Londoners agreeing that “buying illegal drugs funds the criminal market and drives drug-related violence”, while just 7 per cent disagreed.

The experience of gangs and violence makes London a tale of two cities

Our polling also found that 70 per cent of Londoners did not, directly or through a friend, know someone who had been killed in London with a knife or gun, and between 65 per cent for knives and 84 per cent for acid/corrosive substances reported that neither they nor someone they knew had ever been threatened or attacked with such weapons. Within the same range, we found that 70 per cent of Londoners reported that they had not been attacked or threatened with violence since 1 January 2010.

There is therefore at least two-thirds of Londoners who likely have little or no direct exposure to violence, serious violence, or gangs. It does however, suggest that the remainder – between a quarter and a third – of Londoners have higher levels of exposure, even if much of it is vicarious – through friends, family, or other people they know.

45 Evidence from Detective Chief Superintendent Kevin Southworth and Andy French, NCA, Meeting of the London Assembly Police and Crime Committee, 5 October 2017
47 Evidence from Detective Chief Superintendent Kevin Southworth and Andy French, NCA, Meeting of the London Assembly Police and Crime Committee, 5 October 2017
We also know from our polling that just 4 per cent of Londoners state they’ve been part of a group or gang involved in crime during the last 12 months. Other data – collected from the Crime Survey for England and Wales and analysed by the Children’s Commissioner – points to there being around 70,000 gang members in England and Wales today, a 20,000 uplift on our estimates from *Dying to Belong*.

The experience of children points to a vulnerable minority at greatest risk

While our polling found the vast majority of Londoners (87 per cent) agree that every young person should grow up free of violence and the fear of violence, an uncomfortable truth is that 8 per cent of Londoners aged 11–18 – equating to 60,000 young children – say they feel least safe at home.48

Furthermore, 3 per cent say that speaking to a family member would make them feel less safe; and 6 per cent say that they are affected by violence at home on a daily or regular basis; and 11 per cent say that domestic violence/violence within the home is one of the three things that they think the police should focus on to help them feel safe in London. Similarly troubling is that 4 per cent said that the last time they felt unsafe in general it was a family member that worried them.49

It is therefore unsurprising that young people who feel least safe at home are drawn to or preyed upon by those professing to offer safety and security outside of the home.

> Gang members and elders will prey upon the young and the vulnerable. For example, they might target the kid who has a druggie mum, or simply wait outside the school gates looking for the kid who leaves school on their own with their head down.

*Police officer*

A recent report from Waltham Forest, *Postcodes to Profit*, finds a greater link between financial incentives and gang involvement. The link between gangs and business has drastically changed. There has been a shift towards a more organised operating model focusing on the profits from the drugs market. This model has rejected the previous “bad for business” narrative surrounding gang membership.

> Nobody woke up one morning and said I want to be in a gang... you all just grew up in the same area and both areas happened to be deprived areas with the same problems but the main problem you have is you live on an impoverished estate, people have not much money there, that’s one of the biggest problems, they’ve got no money. How can we make money? We can’t get no jobs so you turn to drugs.

*Participant 24, young person, focus group 1*

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Their study suggests that young vulnerable people are particularly susceptible to gang exploitation. Gangs have begun to recruit potential members from residential children’s homes. Research from MOPAC shows a link between being involved in gangs and young people missing from their homes.

Geography, drugs, and violence were all considered defining features of the majority or all gangs by 80 per cent of respondents in a survey of gang workers and practitioners conducted in relation to the Ending Gang and Youth Violence programme.

Figure 16: Defining features of current gangs based on ending gang and youth violence area survey (2016)

The same survey also asked about changes in the defining features and found that 40 per cent of respondents believed that over the preceding two years, more gangs were involved in drugs now compared with two years ago.

A story of state involvement, state failure, and unmet needs

There is relatively little information in the public domain about the present make-up of gangs in London. However, the broad demographics and characteristics are well-known and widely recognised. They often feature some combination of state failure and poor choices.

Source: Home Office50

The Gang Violence Matrix is an intelligence tool used by the Metropolitan Police to risk assess gang members in each of London’s boroughs. It seeks to reduce gang-related violence by scoring individuals both in relation to their potential status as victims and as offenders.

Analysis of one local borough Matrix found that:

- 38 per cent are or have been known to Children and Young Peoples Services
- 59 per cent previously known to Youth Offending Service
- Only 3 per cent currently under Youth Offending Service supervision
- 21 per cent known to the ASBAT
- 62 per cent known to probation
- 22 per cent have a history of special educational needs (SEN)

The same borough also identified:

- 10 or 11 active gangs, several peer groups, and one organised crime network (OCN)
- 202 individuals on the Gangs Matrix, 139 in the community, and 63 in custody
- Large proportion are aged 18–24, majority are black African/black Caribbean
- 50 per cent on gang exit have ADHD/LD and were excluded from school
- 46 per cent of victims of gang related crime are aged 10–19 years

These figures should be taken as illustrative of those individuals captured by the existing Gang Violence Matrix in London today. It should however be recognised that it reflects the risk assessment methodology and intelligence gathering capability of the Metropolitan Police, and so will not fully represent the entirety of gang membership in London.

We heard repeatedly that the choice and entry to a gang was often a rational and desirable choice for young people – and could bring real and material benefits to them, even if it brought costs and risks in other regards.

"It’s a difficult truth to face but some of the gangs genuinely do provide things that these children and young people need. The young person might finally have an adult male role model who takes an interest in them, and who stands by them and supports them."

Community centre manager

The spill-over of gangs into the lives of other young people

Gang violence is not a self-contained issue. Not only does it have a devastating impact on the lives of those caught up with gangs themselves or exploited by gang members, it has potentially disastrous spill-over effects into local communities.

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In our recent polling, 52 per cent of young people said that gangs and serious youth violence negatively affects them while 87 per cent strongly supported the statement that every young person should grow up free of violence and the fear of violence. Further, 62 per cent believed that if children from wealthier backgrounds were dying of knife and gun crime, much more would be done to stop it.

If the government is serious about social justice, tackling the issue of gang violence is key to giving some of the most vulnerable young people the best opportunities in life.
Part II
Time for action

If it is the case that gun crime and knife crime is going up, that is a huge concern to me. It will mark out my commissionership, trying to bear down on violence in general and those two crimes in particular.\footnote{Today, BBC Radio 4, 18 April 2017 [Accessed on 2 July 2018 via www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p050f34g]}

Cressida Dick CBE QPM, Commissioner, Metropolitan Police

The first duty of the government, and my highest priority as Home Secretary, is to protect the public.

Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP, Home Secretary

It has nearly been a decade since we released *Dying to Belong*. In that report we offered a credible and proven model for reducing gang membership and serious violence. This study was based on research through a working group of professionals, extensive polling, and case studies of outstanding practice. Despite this thorough investigation and the solid recommendations that we presented to the government, little has changed.

We cannot afford to neglect this issue any longer. While the image of crime has worsened in England and Wales over the past ten years, the story of Scotland is different. In Scotland, the government has demonstrated a commitment to a Group Violence Intervention, similar to that which we recommended in *Dying to Belong*. In the original report, we drew heavily on the success and experience of the Violence Reduction Unit initiative and drew the Government’s attention to its tangible successes.

Scotland has adopted the GVI approach and implemented it in both a thorough and consistent fashion. Over the same ten-year period, Scotland has seen a drastic reduction in sharp instrument fatalities, weapon possession, and gang fighting. The success of Scotland’s Violence Reduction Unit should not be ignored, instead it should be drawn upon. As Scotland reduced its homicide rate and levels of gang violence, London and other parts of England and Wales are now seeing rising levels of such violence.

It is the Government’s duty to protect its people. As such, we call upon the Government to take this report’s proposals seriously and to draw upon past failures and successes as learning opportunities.
The violence can and must stop. From UNICEF’s INSPIRE framework to the Group Violence Intervention set out by the National Network for Safer Communities and closer to home the work of the Scottish Violence Reduction Unit, we’ve seen enough evidence to tell us that it is possible to prevent and reduce violence.

Very often seeking to focus on the social causes of violence leads people to believe that adopting a “public health approach” can somehow prevent the violence without relying upon or requiring the involvement of policing or law enforcement. It is vital to recognise that this simply is not the case.

Police and healthcare workers who respond to gang problems know that after-the-event efforts are not enough. A trauma surgeon or paramedic who treats gang-related stabbings or a police officer who must tell a parent that their son has been killed in a fatal stabbing are likely to appreciate and understand the need for prevention. Both public health and law enforcement have roles to play in stopping the violence before it begins.

The problem of group violence is well-documented in cities across the world. Almost a decade ago, in our report *Dying to Belong*, we highlighted the Group Violence Intervention (GVI) that had proven so successful in Boston, Cincinnati, and Glasgow. The National Network for Safer Communities, based out of John Jay College in New York, is today the home of Professor David Kennedy and in total the GVI has been adopted in more than 77 cities worldwide.

Up to half of violent crime in London can be attributed to gangs or groups

Gangs – or groups – account for up to half of some violent crime types in London. For example, up to 50 per cent of knife crime with injury in London is believed to be gang-related.54

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In the case of gun crime, studies have suggested 60 per cent of shootings are believed to be gang-related.55

The GVI builds on the simple truth that gang and group violence often accounts for a large proportion of violent crime within an urban environment – a truth evidenced by the work of the National Network for Safer Communities and related organisations across North America, in Scotland, and elsewhere.

There have also been clear examples of how such gang and group violence can be prevented. We set out below three examples that featured in Dying to Belong in 2009 and remain classic examples of how serious violence can be prevented. They each represent a proven Group Violence Intervention and, as we set out in this report, we believe it is high time for London to adopt a GVI.

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**Case study: Operation Ceasefire, Boston, USA**

Operation Ceasefire was a Boston based response to youth gang violence. This problem-oriented policing initiative was originally implemented in 1996 and has since evolved into the National Network for Safer Communities’ Group Violence Intervention.

**The strategy**

Operation Ceasefire was a focussed deterrence strategy. Focussed deterrence strategies disrupt the group dynamics that promote violence as an acceptable response to perceived displays of disrespect.56 The “pulling levers” strategy was designed to deter gang members accordingly. Service providers simultaneously reached out to gangs to communicate that violence would not be tolerated, while offering support services.57

The deterrence message was…a promise to gang members that violent behaviour would evoke an immediate and intense response from law enforcement.

Anthony Braga58

Groups of offenders were invited (or directed if on probation) to attend face-to-face meetings with law enforcement officials, service providers, and community figures. Alongside this enforcement strand of the pulling levers strategy, ran the positive intervention strand. Youth Service Providers Network, churches, and community groups stepped in to provide gang members with an alternative support network. Gang members were helped to re-educate education, train for jobs, and provided with emotional support.59 Following this method, Operation Ceasefire was able to combine the logic of both enforcement and rehabilitation.

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57 National Institute of Justice (2011) “Program Profile: Operation Ceasefire (Boston, Mass.)”


This strategy was a unique development in problem-oriented policing. At the heart of this initiative was the Working Group approach that focused on assembling various front-line criminal justice practitioners. Members of this Working Group included: the Boston Police Department; the US Attorney; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services; and the Boston school police.60

The same practitioners involved in the strategic development stage also assumed responsibility for its implementation. The multitude of agencies involved and their local knowledge ensured that each gang who behaved violently could be swiftly dealt with.

Results

Operation Ceasefire soon earned the nickname “the Boston Miracle” as local authorities recorded significant reductions in gang crime. Analysts from Harvard showed that this initiative was associated with:

- 63 per cent reduction in youth homicide
- 44 per cent reduction in youth gun assaults in highest risk district (Roxbury)
- 36 per cent reduction in gang-involved shootings among gangs treated with crackdowns
- 27 per cent reduction in shootings among notified violent groups61

Case study: CIRV, Cincinnati, USA

The Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence was introduced in 2007 in response to rising levels of gun homicide and gang violence. The objective of the CIRV was to reduce violence, with particular attention paid to gun violence, perpetrated by gang members. The initiative’s goals over five years included:

- Reduction of group/gang related homicides by 40 per cent
- Average of less than two group/gang members involved in homicides per month
- 30 per cent reduction in fatal and non-fatal shootings

The strategy

The CIRV’s organisation was loosely based upon Boston’s Operation Ceasefire. Thus, CIRV similarly utilised a “pulling levers” strategy. Cincinnati’s political leadership formed a collaborative partnership with law enforcement officials, medical professionals, and community and business leaders.62

Violent street group networks (gangs) were convened at call-ins to clearly communicate the message that violence must stop. After the consequences of non-compliance were communicated, offenders who sought a more productive lifestyle were streamlined into social services, training, education, and employment, to assist their reintegration into society.63

References

Results

This program had tangible results, especially for the initial goal of reducing gun-related violence. In 2007, homicides experienced their largest single year decline since 1991. Full evaluation of this initiative was conducted after 3.5 years with results showing:

- 41 per cent reduction in homicides
- 22 per cent reduction in non-fatal shootings

Case study: Violence Reduction Unit, Glasgow, Scotland, UK

In 2006, the Violence Reduction Unit (VRU) was launched nationwide across Scotland. It targeted all forms of violence including gang violence, domestic abuse, and bullying. In 2008, VRU set up its gang initiative in Glasgow, the Community Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV).

The VRU adopts a public health approach to violence, under the belief that crime is preventable. Thus, their CIRV unit was adopted in a similar style to Operation Ceasefire in Boston with an ethos that focused on both strands of enforcement and support.

The strategy

In a similar fashion to Operation Boston, the Violence Reduction Unit's CIRV also operates using the “pulling levers” logic behind combating gang violence. Their approach follows a process of identification, engagement, management, and enforcement.

Figure 17

Gang members that are referred to the service are invited to call ins. Here, police provide a warning of their zero-tolerance approach: the crime must stop, every single gang member must be willing to change their ways, and they must be willing to accept the rehabilitation. Then, local charities and agencies pledge support to the members, offering them assistance through a range of services including housing, education, and job-finding.

65 CIRV Year 1 Report, Violence Reduction Unit
The results

The VRU’s results were dramatic. By 2011, among the 500 gang members who had been referred and engaged with the CIRV, violent offending had fallen by 46 per cent. This effect was not limited to the pool of referrals. Even among gang members that hadn’t been called in, violence was down by 24 per cent.

Violence reduction was further aided by the reduced number of gang members who carried weapons following involvement. Weapon possession fell by 85 per cent and gang fighting was down by 73 per cent.66

The key components of the Group Violence Intervention

The key elements of a Group Violence Intervention include:

- A thorough understanding of the local problem and what is driving it;
- Committed and visible leadership at the highest levels;
- Full multi-agency collaboration, data-sharing, and communication;
- A combination of enforcement, intervention, and prevention;
- An honest and targeted approach; and
- Meaningful community engagement.

This means that the Mayor of London and Metropolitan Police, working with other agencies and the community, must develop an understanding of the individuals and gangs involved. This information gathering and analysis phase should seek to incorporate information and intelligence from across agencies and, to the extent possible, the local community.

A successful GVI implementation requires committed and visible leadership at the highest levels. This leadership helps ensure that the whole organisation recognises it to be a priority and something to support rather than to either survive, endure, or derail. This leadership is vital to ensure that if the implementation strays then it can be refocussed on the core, rather than allowed to deviate.

It is vital that the GVI is communicated honestly within, across, and beyond the Metropolitan Police. The community voice component of GVI is vital, and without honesty and trust, it can be hard to engage and mobilise the community to speak up and send the clear message that is required.

Professor David Kennedy, who led the Harvard research team in Boston, has emphasised the importance of “pulling levers” in inhibiting criminal behaviour targeted at prevention. “Pulling levers” refers to the identification and application of external pressure on those involved in undesirable behaviour.67

66 Henley, Jon, (2011) “Karyn McCluskey: the woman who took on Glasgow’s gangs” The Guardian
Table 1: The core components of the GVI Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify the gangs and individuals</td>
<td>Identification of violent offenders in or otherwise linked to gangs, and those individuals at risk of committing either unprovoked or retaliatory violence in or otherwise linked to gangs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call-in the gangs and individuals</td>
<td>Process of “calling in” the identified individuals for delivery of the clear and simple message en masse and in order that entire groups are ultimately made aware of it. Vital for call-ins to be targeted at groups, to involve the community’s moral voice, and to demonstrate a united front in relation to the key message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple message: the violence must stop</td>
<td>The model relies upon a clear and simple message that the violence must stop. The message should be delivered with clarity and simplicity. It must be a message that the community’s moral voice is prepared to deliver at the call-in and through other appropriate forums, with leadership and commitment to the key message from the highest levels of leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genuine offer of help and support for desistance</td>
<td>The message is also accompanied by the genuine offer of help to those identified as involved in or at risk of committing violence. These services should be organised and prepared for immediate action at the call-in and be accessible via a single telephone number across the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences for violence</td>
<td>For those who do not follow the message that the violence must stop, then the final component is ensuring that there are consequences for violence. This is the “pulling levers” component of the model and involves robust and rigorous legal consequences for those who do not comply with the call to end the violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Boston’s Ceasefire this meant finding as many ways as possible of applying coordinated pressure on those liable to engage in serious violence, and informing them that they would trigger application of that pressure if they behaved in the specified ways. A substantial amount of publicity was targeted on gangs telling them that a co-ordinated crackdown would be applied across the board to all members of a gang in the event of one of their number engaging in violent acts. These acts included: “gun homicide, assault, brandishing, and firing; knife and other homicide and serious assault and possibly other violent and fear-producing behaviour to be assessed on a locale by locale basis”. 68

Further publicity was used where crackdowns led to arrests and heavy sentences. Pulling levers was, thus, the principal means of inhibiting gang engagement in serious, violent criminal events.

Londoners support a Group Violence Intervention

Just four per cent of Londoners we polled opposed the adoption of a GVI approach, with 69 per cent overall supporting the approach, with the remainder split between neither supporting nor opposing (17 per cent) and not knowing (10 per cent).

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The proportion supporting the approach was higher for Londoners who had themselves been attacked or threatened with violence since 2010, whether once (73 per cent) or more than once (78 per cent).

Figure 19: Support for a GVI in London by ethnicity

Source: CSJ Crime in London Poll

Question wording: “Group Violence Interventions (GVIs) are designed to reduce gang – and drug-related violence by directly engaging with those involved in gangs to promote a credible moral message against violence, notice about the consequences of further violence, and a genuine offer to help for those who want it. Supporters of GVIs say that they have been successful in many US cities, as well as Glasgow in the UK, by reducing the dynamics in gangs that promote violence by creating collective accountability and fostering social pressure that deters violence. However, opponents say that despite the success in Glasgow, GVIs are less likely to work in London due to differences between the UK and USA, such as gangs in London tending to be more fluid and less hierarchical than the US, making it more difficult to foster group-wide pressure and accountability. To what extent do you support or oppose a GVI approach being taken in London?”
The extent of support overall, and across London’s ethnicities, can be seen above, with a clear majority in favour across all breaks, with opposition fluctuating between 4 per cent (overall) and 13 per cent (mixed). The most supportive ethnic group were Black Londoners, with 73 per cent supporting and just 3 per cent opposing, while Mixed and Other ethnicities evidenced below average support and above average opposition.

As our polling suggests, those groups who are more likely to have been a victim of gang violence offer broad support of the GVI as a project with proven results globally.


Given the evidence of violence reduction, London should implement a GVI approach to tackle gang violence and related serious violence. We refer to such an approach as the Safer London GVI in this paper.

**Recommendation 1:** A new Safer Streets Group Violence Intervention, taking the proven blueprint that has been successfully implemented in Glasgow, Boston, and Cincinnati, to tackle the problem of gang and gang-related violence.

Creating safer streets zones

The Mayor of London and the Commissioner should work to identify those London Boroughs and neighbourhood wards with the most violent and harmful gang offending. These geographies should be designated by the Metropolitan Police, and with the full support of the Mayor of London, as Safer Streets Zones.

The assessment itself will need to be conducted using the information and intelligence available to the police and partners. Using open data we have sought to construct a preliminary assessment using a mix of recorded crime and public attitude data to give an illustrative indication of potential priority areas at a borough level in London.
### Table 2: Preliminary assessment of London boroughs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Borough</th>
<th>“To what extent do you think gangs are a problem in this area?”</th>
<th>Number of lethal barrelled discharge offences per 10,000</th>
<th>“To what extent do you think gun crime is a problem in this area?”</th>
<th>Number of knife injury victims non DA 1–24 per 10,000</th>
<th>“To what extent do you think knife crime is a problem in this area?”</th>
<th>Overall Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Haringey</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>8.64</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Waltham Forest</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10.01</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lambeth</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12.10</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Brent</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Hackney</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Newham</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Enfield</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9.91</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Lewisham</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>1.21</td>
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Source: Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime

70 This rate of gun and knife crime has been calculated using the number of lethal barrelled discharge offences and the number of knife injury victims. They have then been scaled as a proportion of the population of 1–24 year olds. The Public Attitudes Survey data captured the percentage of those surveyed who believe that the specified activity is a problem. To create the above rankings, the boroughs have been ranked on all of the above measures and their cumulative ranking has been calculated. Those boroughs with a higher ranking are the ones that have the highest levels of offences and proportions of the population who believe that gangs, gun and knife crime are a problem in their area. Sources: Gang Crime Dashboard [Accessed on 8 August 2018 via www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/mayors-office-policing-and-crime-mopac/data-and-statistics/crime%20/gangs-dashboard] and Weapon Enabled Crime Dashboard [Accessed on 8 August 2018 via www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/mayors-office-policing-and-crime-mopac/data-and-statistics/weapon-enabled-crime-dashboard]
The above table ranks all 32 London Boroughs based upon the Public Attitudes Survey measure of gang problems, rates of lethal barrelled discharges and knife injury victimisation, alongside relevant data from the Public Attitudes Survey on gun and knife crime.

At a sub-Borough level it is possible to identify hotspots at the neighbourhood ward level. This more local analysis should itself feed into the development of assessments both for London’s 32 boroughs and 632 neighbourhood wards.

Figure 20: Preliminary assessment of London Wards using gang violence indicator (number of knife injury victims aged 1–24 non-domestic)

The Jill Dando Institute at University College London has previously also developed a Vulnerable Localities Index – seeking to combine a range of variables, including community cohesion, social exclusion, social efficacy, and social capital – to cover thematic areas of crime, population, deprivation, and education. Taking such measures into consideration alongside Metropolitan Police and partner data should allow for a much more thorough assessment to be conducted.

This more thorough assessment would utilise the full range of data available to the police and partners, such as existing gang and violent offender matrices, local intelligence, problem profiles, and consideration of both the location of recorded offences and

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the home addresses and areas frequented by those individuals linked to or at risk of participation in gangs and serious violence.

**Recommendation 2:** The Metropolitan Police should conduct a detailed assessment of London’s 32 boroughs and 632 neighbourhood wards to identify those areas presenting the highest risk and harm, making them worthy of designation as Safer Street Zones.

The Mayor should support the Safer Street Zones with prioritised funding

The Mayor should use the Young Londoners Fund (YLF) to help encourage participation and buy-in from already-stretched local authorities, with the offer to prioritise the use of these funds on those local authority areas accepting the Safer Street Zone designation and signing up to the GVI approach.

The Young Londoners Fund offers up to £45 million over three years, of which £30 million is currently unallocated. This Fund should be prioritised towards Safer Street Zones.

This existing funding could be bolstered by a commitment from the Home Office to agree a similar prioritisation in relation to the distribution of Early Intervention Fund (EIF) grants. If half of the latest £11 million tranche of EIF money was earmarked for use in relation to Safer Street Zones, this would see up to £35.5 million in funding made available in support of local GVI programmes, helping ensure the availability of services in support of an effective GVI delivery.

**Recommendation 3:** The Mayor of London and the Home Secretary should prioritise the award of funding from the Young Londoners Fund and the Early Intervention Fund in support of those local authorities that have accepted the Safer Street Zone designation and agreed to participate in the GVI approach.

Ensuring a coherent and consistent gang exit offer across London

With a gradual roll-out of GVI across priority areas, there is real value in ensuring a coherent and consistent gang exit offer across London that is available even to those gang members who may be from or operate in areas without an active GVI.

The London Gang Exit programme should form the basis for a renewed and rebranded offer. We propose the government pioneers a support service that should provide one single phone number and email address through which individuals can ask for help and through which practitioners can make referrals. Guerilla marketing tactics should be used – such as reverse graffiti72 – to advertise and raise awareness of the offer in known hotspots.

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72 Reverse graffiti is also known as “clean tagging” or “clean graffiti” and involves the creation of temporary or semi-permanent images on pavements, walls or other surfaces by removing accumulated dirt and grime, commonly achieved through the use of a custom stencil and a high pressure washer
Recommendation 4: The Government should implement a new service to facilitate gang exit. This service should provide a phone number and email address through which individuals can ask for help and referrals can be made.

The service should also be accessible across media channels that may be more amenable to young people, such as WhatsApp and social media. The presence of the service on such channels being driven by a desire to help reduce the friction of reaching out and asking for help.

The Mayor of London should hold the Metropolitan Police and partners to account for delivery

The Mayor of London should also use his position to track progress against and hold accountable the delivery of a Safer Streets GVI. This means having a clear and publicly accessible dashboard showing the progress made by local authorities and the Metropolitan Police to deliver the Safer London GVI and supporting activity. The Mayor is ultimately responsible for policing and crime in London, and should use his powers to set up a Safer Streets initiative that offers a clear chain of accountability to the people of London.

Recommendation 5: The Mayor of London should create and appoint a Safer Streets Commissioner with responsibility for leading the Safer London GVI centrally and holding partners accountable for the effective implementation of the intervention.

London can learn from past efforts to implement a GVI on two prior occasions

On two prior occasions London has attempted to implement GVI, testament to the proven nature of the GVI model and the appetite to find a solution. The Mayor, Metropolitan Police, local authorities and the Home Office must take the learnings from these past efforts in order to avoid repeating history.

The recommendation that London pursue a GVI approach to reduce gang violence is not new. It was made in *Dying to Belong*, and London itself has twice sought to implement a GVI. We briefly describe these two prior occasions, in order to highlight the issues and learning from these failed implementations.
Case study: The London Pathways Initiative in 2009–2010

The London Pathways Initiative was agreed in late 2007 as a 2-year community-based multi-agency pilot project with the goal of reducing gang-related violence across the London boroughs of Croydon, Lewisham, and Southwark. It was based upon the well-evidenced Boston Ceasefire approach. The Pathways Initiative described itself as having three distinct strands:

- **Community Voice**: mobilising local communities to give constant reinforcement of Pathways key messages
- **Help for those who ask**: allowing individuals an exit strategy from their current lifestyle
- **Consequences for Violence**: identifying and focusing enforcement on those gangs involved in violent offences.

An extended period of scoping, planning, and consultation took place, though one of the three boroughs pulled out and had to be replaced by another. In June 2009 the first “call-ins” took place, with final “call-ins” occurring in April 2010.

The implementation saw changes made to the core logic of the GVI approach, for example there were no mandated large-scale call-ins, instead individual call-ins were conducted, with each borough implementing the approach to call-ins differently.

The London Pathways Initiative consisted of joint efforts from the Metropolitan Police, local authorities, probation services, youth offending teams, the Government Office for London, the Greater London Authority, and members of the local community.

The Met Police’s Evidence and Performance Unit (formerly known as the Strategic, Research and Analysis Unit) evaluated the programme and found that “there was a different way of selecting participants for the call-ins in each of the three locations”. 73

There were a total of 161 participants, identified from multi-agency intelligence about peoples’ involvement in violent offending, or the possible risk posed by local offending behaviour, with ongoing selection based on updated information and intelligence from across the agencies. While approximately one third were found to have no convictions, 89 per cent had received some form of police action prior to Pathways (e.g. arrest, caution, conviction). More than one in four had a previous conviction for robbery and one in five for possession of a knife. 74

Pathways did not adopt the large-scale call-ins implemented by Ceasefire, instead opting for smaller and less formal call-ins, where gang members’ attendance was voluntary. The participating boroughs viewed this as beneficial, citing “smaller meetings allowed more intensive work, were easier to manage, and posed less risk to staff and participants from potential conflicts between rival gangs.”

The average age of Pathways participants was 17 years old, ranging from 11 to 29. Just over two-thirds were aged between 15 and 20, with the vast majority (87 per cent) male.

As the evaluation concluded, the Pathways initiative was “delivered across the three boroughs differently”. Therefore, it is difficult to fully assess the success of this project.

In 2011, in the Pathways Final Report it was remarked that “Pathways is not a universal solution; it is not universally applicable, and will not be universally successful. It forms part of a much wider range of activity aimed at addressing violence and gang offending.” 75

The Pathways Initiative (aka Operation Pathways) was cited in Dying to Belong as a “promising forthcoming initiative”.

74 Strategic Research and Analysis Unit: Pathways Project Lessons Learned, Metropolitan Police, 2011
Case study: Operation Shield in 2014–15

The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) recognised the persistent and continuing challenge of gang crime and related violence in 2014, developing a plan to implement a GVI approach in three London boroughs under the branding of “Operation Shield”.

Shield was piloted and rolled out in three boroughs: Westminster, Haringey, and Lambeth. 19 gangs and 321 individuals were identified with a third being invited to call-ins. Over the course of a year, 8 call-ins were held and attended by a total of 27 individuals.

Key challenges in implementing Shield included:

- Poor engagement with local communities, with a general lack of support for the pilots
- Differences in interpretation across the boroughs of key elements of GVI
- Police practice of not storing risk

Comparing the Shield pilot to that of matched control gangs over the pilot periods, no significant difference was recorded in arrest and charge rates for serious violence. Using wider measures such as violence against a person or all offending still did not produce significant results.

This lack of evidence should not be seized upon as indication of GVI’s failings. As the evaluation impact report states, this evidence is more indicative of the implementation challenges faced throughout these pilots. These challenges seriously distorted the operations of this project and did not allow for a thorough test of this model.76

Learning the lessons of Pathways and Shield can help ensure “third time lucky” for London

The fact that London has twice previously attempted to adopt a GVI approach to tackle violence and gangs speaks to the appetite within London for a solution. Both Pathways and Shield suffered from a number of issues, many identified in the relevant evaluations. A new and third attempt at an enhanced GVI in London must avoid the key flaws of past implementations:

- Belief in London’s exceptionalism causing deviation from core GVI call-in principles;
- Inadequate mobilisation and empowerment of communities’ moral voice;
- Confused communication of the GVI programme to public and partners;
- Approaching GVI as a short-term pilot programme rather than core long-term business; and
- Shortcomings in the effective operationalising of GVI for the London context.

The Cure Violence model provides a strong reinforcement of the role of the community within the violence reduction effort, and by enhancing the GVI approach with the Cure Violence model, offers the promise of helping minimise the risk that a Safer London GVI fails to adequately mobilise and empower communities, an area of potential weakness identified from London’s past efforts at implementation.

We must accept that London’s problems are not unique and do not invalidate GVI

A common refrain from many jurisdictions around the world is that their social issues or crime problems are unique to them. That approaches tried and tested elsewhere simply cannot be readily translated or adopted – or that there must be major adaptations made in order to accommodate local differences that are generally either imagined or superficial in nature.

In the case of the Group Violence Intervention it has been applied in more than 77 cities worldwide. It specifically addresses group violence, it has already demonstrated that it can be effectively applied in different jurisdictions on both sides of the Atlantic. Those involved in the development and implementation of GVI are familiar with leaders, jurisdictions, and agencies having a scepticism about the transferability of the model.

In Don’t Shoot: One Man, a Street Fellowship, and the End of Violence in Inner-City America, Professor David Kennedy repeatedly describes a scepticism from leaders and others of the ability of the GVI model to “travel”. This idea of local exceptionalism is not unique to consideration of the GVI approach, but is a flawed argument against adoption of the GVI approach.

The history of this work shows very clearly that apparent differences between settings – size, location, race, ethnicity, types of criminal activity, variations in weapons, structural characteristics of groups and networks – just aren’t relevant. What matters is the underlying commonalities across settings: the concentration of the violence in groups and networks, the overlap of victimisation and offending, and the group dynamics and shared norms that drive offending and victimization. As long as those commonalities are present, and they almost always are, the differences don’t matter.

Professor David Kennedy

In London today, as part of our evidence-gathering process, we have heard suggestions that approaches taken elsewhere using GVI couldn’t be applied in London for such reasons as:

- “Glasgow’s gangs were much less ethnically diverse”
- “The problem in Glasgow was one of alcohol, that’s not the case here”
- “The gangs in London are much more fluid and less hierarchical than in the US”
- “Serious violence in London is linked to many more factors than gangs”
- “Glasgow didn’t have to deal with the problem of social media and murder music”
- “The scale of London is just so much bigger than Glasgow”

Factually, such statements are broadly true. However, these facts are not sufficient to undermine the GVI approach – since the fundamental requirement is that there is a concentration of violence in groups and networks, an overlap of victimisation and offending, and the existence of group dynamics and shared norms that drive the violence.

78 Private correspondence with Professor David Kennedy (25 July 2018)
These characteristics are indisputably present within London – and many other urban centres, such as the West Midlands and Greater Manchester.

The importance of a properly executed GVI

In our 2009 report, *Dying to Belong*, we recommended that a similar GVI model be adopted by Government. As the above case studies demonstrate, the models that were employed were not consistently implemented. The Pathways Initiative was unable to host the large-scale call-ins that the GVI model relies upon. By trying to tailor the enforcement message to individual gang members, the Pathways Initiative diluted the group-think logic that crucially underpinned the original Operation Ceasefire. In the second attempt to run GVI, large differences in interpretation prevented Operation Shield from realising its full potential. Impact reports further suggest that the community outreach was not large scale enough. Extant services were not built upon and integrated into the project. Ultimately, these attempts failed because of implementation challenges.

These failures were very costly. We are not any closer to resolving the issue of gang violence in in England and Wales than we were when *Dying to Belong* was published, nearly a decade ago. Compare this to the progress that Scotland has made with their Violence Reduction Unit (VRU). While England and Wales have seen their homicide figures remain stubbornly high, at a figure close to 600 in 2017, the story in Scotland is different. In fact, homicides have fallen by over 40 per cent since 2008 from 115 to 64.

Figure 21: Comparison – homicide rate for Scotland vs England and Wales

Of course, not all homicides can be accredited to gang violence, but these results are broadly consistent with the impact assessment of VRU. Studies suggest that gang members who were referred to VRU were 85 per cent less likely to carry a weapon and 73 per cent less likely to get involved in gang fighting. This reality is reflected in the homicide by sharp instrument figures.
In England and Wales, 164 cases of homicide by sharp instrument were recorded in 2017. This is only an 18 per cent reduction from the figures we recorded in 2008 in *Dying to Belong*. Scotland, however, over the same period, has reduced their homicide by sharp instrument figures by 44 per cent. In 2008, 55 homicides by sharp instruments were recorded in Scotland but that figure was reduced to 30 in 2017.

Figure 22: Comparison – homicide rate by sharp instrument for Scotland vs England and Wales

The operationalisation of GVI for the London context is vital

When John Carnochan and Karyn McCluskey co-founded the Violence Reduction Unit in relation to tackling the problem of gang and group violence in Glasgow and subsequently Scotland, they faced the challenge of having to operationalise a model or strategy born in the United States. However, instead of simply deciding that because it had never been done it could never work, or that because it had been invented elsewhere it would never work on this side of the Atlantic, they set about working through how the legal framework and local agencies and partners could work together to address the key requirements of the GVI model.

London must now do the same and resist the ever-present temptation to believe that London is a special case.

Both Pathways and Shield highlighted the importance of operationalising GVI for the London context. The approach to call-ins during prior implementations has proven inconsistent. Formal documentation relating to both Pathways and Shield has claimed that “due to UK legislation” it was not possible to “mandate attendance” at the call-ins. While this may be true in the broadest sense, we do consider there to be significant scope within existing probation rules, practice, and the “Community Compact” to encourage attendance at call-ins for those currently under probation supervision.
Case study: The Community Compact

The Community Compact is a high-level agreement, or contract, between the London Community Rehabilitation Company, the offender manager, and the offender. It sets out a series of mutual expectations and standards of behaviour while the offender is subject to a Community Order, Suspended Sentence Order, or on licence from prison. The compact details the offender’s rights, and what they can expect from us during their supervisory period.

It places expectations of the offender that include:

- To attend on agreed days and on time
- To work with and follow your sentence plan
- To actively join in your unpaid work and with any help offered you
- To join in reviews of your progress and talk about areas of your life which can help you stay out of trouble

Attendance at a Call-In – comprising the delivery of a violence reduction message and the offer of help – could be encouraged through reference to the above expectations. There is significant flexibility within approaches to supervision – ranging from telephone monitoring at one extreme to face-to-face and home visits at the other. We therefore consider it feasible to incorporate a Call-In as part of the Supervision element of Community Orders, Suspended Sentence Orders, and while on licence.

More broadly, the Metropolitan Police and criminal justice partners in London should agree criteria for both membership of a Safer Streets Matrix and for ensuring that at sentencing, while under supervision, and on release from prison, offenders either on the Safer Streets Matrix or at risk of future entry onto the Matrix are managed and dealt with appropriately.

For example, an additional mechanism by which sentencers might help compel attendance at a call-in, would be to attach Specified Activity Requirements (SARs) to Community Orders and Suspended Sentence Orders. This could be done for those already on a Safer Streets Matrix, but given the dynamic nature of the Matrix, it would also make sense to attach such a requirement to those who may be at risk of entry onto the Matrix.

For those who receive custodial sentences and are released on licence, there is significant scope for prison governors and the probation service to impose licence conditions relating to participation in call-ins. Ensuring the effective and appropriate use of this opportunity would require co-operation between HMPPS and the police.

We consider the call-ins to satisfy all three of the purposes – (1) protection of the public; (2) the prevention of re-offending; and (3) securing the successful re-integration of the prisoner into the community – outlined in Section 250(8) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. On this basis the Justice Secretary could readily prescribe participation in call-ins as an available licence condition for application by prison governors and probation to offenders being released from custody on licence.

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Recommendation 6: The Justice Secretary should specify participation in Group Violence Intervention call-ins as an approved and available licence condition, as permitted under Section 250(8) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This would enable the proportionate and necessary application by prison governors and probation of a condition to participate in call-ins to offenders being released on licence.

To help ensure that the effective operationalisation of a Safer Streets GVI, an expert group of relevant practitioners should be assembled across criminal justice agencies and other enforcement-oriented partners. Such a group would maximise the opportunities available to encourage and compel call-in attendance, and to develop protocols and approaches to ensuring maximum consequences for those continuing to commit violence.

This expert group should approach the challenge of operationalising GVI in London with an open-mind and a problem-solving approach. It should be grounded in practice and achieve the overarching objectives of reducing violence, rather than seeking to find reasons why it cannot be done and reasons why any necessary business change cannot be achieved.

Recommendation 7: The Mayor should convene an Implementation Taskforce with representation from the Metropolitan Police, National Crime Agency, HMPPS, the National Probation Service, the London Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC), housing enforcement, local authorities, HMRC, and DWP to develop approaches in support of encouraging and/or compelling call-ins and the development of protocols and approaches to the consequences strand.

The Government should be prepared to commit Parliamentary time to see through any legislation that is found to be required to support the GVI approach, though we anticipate the likelihood of such a requirement being limited.

The GVI approach is an opportunity to connect with and empower communities

Responses to crime problems are generally expected to come from the police. The GVI approach goes a step further by mobilising and harnessing the moral voice of the community to deliver a clear and simple message.

London’s Pathways Initiative, while ultimately unsuccessful, identified the community voice as a “highly valuable” part of the call-in process and recognised the importance of matching the community voice to the target participants.80

A Safer Streets GVI would provide members of the community in London’s most violent and most gang-affected areas to step forward and be part of the solution by delivering the very clear message that the violence must stop, and the genuine offer of help and support to those who wish to turn their backs on their violent and criminal lifestyle.

There are a number of existing structures in London that would benefit from this mobilisation. Safer Neighbourhood Ward Panels at the local ward level and Safer Neighbourhood Boards at the borough level seek to help connect the police with the community around priority setting and provide an existing mechanism by which voices from the community can be heard.

At a local level both Members of Parliament and Ward Councillors have a valuable role to play in helping ensure that the community’s moral voice is mobilised. Safer Street Zones would convene local Voices for Safer Streets Panels (VSSPs) that reflect and have credibility with the Safer Street cohorts.

The VSSPs would sit alongside Safer Neighbourhood Boards, an existing mechanism within each of London’s 32 boroughs, that bring police and communities together to decide local policing and crime priorities, solve problems collaboratively, and make sure that the public are involved in a wide range of other community safety decisions.

Local VSSPs would provide the mechanism by which, as part of the Safer Streets GVI, gang members could see a united front from the police and the community itself around the simple message that the GVI requires and provides. It is vital that the gang members know that their local communities are a driving force behind the approach.

**Recommendation 8:** Create Voices for Safer Streets Panels (VSSPs) to provide a mechanism for engaging and mobilising the community’s moral voice and to sit alongside existing Safer Neighbourhood Boards, helping diversify membership, and strengthen relationships.

The VSSP would be expected to have the same mix of credible and compelling community members as has been achieved in other cities that have adopted GVI, including local members of the faith community, trauma surgeons, and family members bereaved through gang-related violence.

For example, where a Safer Street cohort includes individuals of particular backgrounds, the Voices for Safer Streets community panel should include representation of those backgrounds. This would help ensure that where there might be a preponderance of young Somali men involved in gangs, there would be membership of the panel including, for example, a bereaved mother of Somali origin.

Creating a compelling and credible VSSP will require active support from various bodies – such as the NHS Trusts in London, the religious institutions serving London and the police – who are between them able to put a call out for credible and compelling members of the community who wish to hear more about how they can be involved in supporting the delivery of the message at the heart of the GVI.

For the avoidance of doubt, it is important to recognise that the role of the VSSP is not to develop a new bespoke approach deviating from the GVI model – but to deliver the voice of the community within the framework of the violence needing to stop, the availability of help, and that if the violence doesn’t stop then there will be significant consequences.
Recommendation 9: As part of the Safer Streets GVI the Metropolitan Police and London’s Victims Commissioner should extend an invitation to bereaved family members and survivors of serious violence offering them an opportunity to learn about the GVI and to join a local Voices for Safer Streets Panel. Comparable offers should be extended to London’s paramedics and trauma surgeons, and religious leaders who have experience of serious violence through conducting funerals and supporting families in the aftermath of bereavement.

The GVI approach would strengthen and support existing and desirable police activities

The Metropolitan Police – while subject to budget cuts like other forces across England and Wales – likely retains a significant advantage in relation to the continued, though diminished, presence of local community policing in the form of Dedicated Ward Officer teams consisting of two Police Constables (PCs) and one Police Community Support Officer (PCSO).

The Safer Streets GVI and the importance of the community voice presents an opportunity for dedicated local policing teams to engage with residents, especially those living in communities most affected by the issue of gangs and violence, and connect them into a constructive and effective programme to help tackle the problem. At the same time, the GVI demonstrates to the community that there is a real and sincere desire on the part of the police to meaningfully and effectively tackle the problem of violence.

The consequences strand to the GVI builds on existing good practice within policing, mirroring “Achilles Heel” tactics used in relation to prolific domestic abusers. It also provides an opportunity to build upon and cement relationships with partners in relation to both enforcement efforts specifically and broader problem-solving efforts that might be directed towards improving the quality of life more generally.

Recommendation 10: The Metropolitan Police’s Gangs and Organised Crime Command should be charged with developing a robust set of measures for the “Consequences” strand of the Safer Streets GVI, considering how to most effectively make use of proactive policing capabilities, as well as partner enforcement activity to maximum effect.

The GVI approach is an opportunity to support and strengthen existing gang exit offers and services

A Safer London GVI would create a new referral pipeline of individuals seeking to exit gangs, complimenting the existing touchpoints and referral paths for London Gang Exit.
Case study: London Gang Exit

London Gang Exit (LGE) is a £1.5m multi-agency intervention, jointly commissioned by the Mayor’s Office for Policing And Crime (MOPAC) and the London Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC). LGE commenced in February 2016 and was initially funded until September 2017. A DMPC decision in July 2017 committed to sustaining the MOPAC funding for this programme until September 2019. The programme is being delivered by a consortia led by Safer London, and includes Only Connect and Redthread.

The pan London service was designed to complement and enhance existing local services, filling gaps in provision of support services for young Londoners who are involved or affected by group violence. Young people are not compelled to work with LGE, rather engage on a voluntary basis.

LGE offers a holistic approach to reducing reoffending. The service is offered to anyone aged 16–24 to anyone who has been involved with a gang and to anyone who is at risk from gangs. Their support is tailored to the recipient’s specific needs. Young people are allocated a trained caseworker with whom they can build a trusting relationship with and who can provide them with intensive support.

A Safer Streets GVI would go further than the existing London Gang Exit. It would not only integrate the existing support services through the mechanism of call-ins but it would also provide the necessary enforcement powers to communicate the message to gang members that violence must stop.

The GVI approach can also help strengthen the effectiveness of the criminal justice response

There is also significant scope to strengthen the effectiveness of the criminal justice response to serious violence, in support of the GVI approach. As outlined above, there is significant scope to encourage and compel call-in participation through Offender Compacts, Specified Activity Requirements, and licence conditions.

In Chapter 4, we also set out proposals for how a more intelligent approach to the use of electronic monitoring and the creation of a new post-conviction Serious Violence Reduction Order could simultaneously aid desistance from gang membership, gang crime, and the carrying of weapons that are so often linked to serious violence. We also outline how the different components of the criminal justice system can be better held to account for delivery of outcomes in support of tackling gangs and violence reduction.

London should avoid the temptation to create standalone streetwork programmes

It is an unfortunate reality that some seek to deny the importance of enforcement within any effective approach to violence reduction.

Streetwork employs community outreach workers – streetworkers, violence interrupters, and interventionists – to meet group members and other high-risk people where they
take time to build relationships, disrupt conflicts, support norms against violence and for peace, and help connect them with community services and resources to help them change their lives.\textsuperscript{81}

\textbf{The most promising outcomes result when streetwork programs focus their efforts on the small networks of people at highest risk for violent victimisation and offending… Where streetworkers and law enforcement support each other on this single focus, the synergy can be potent.}

\textit{National Network for Safe Communities}\textsuperscript{82}

Historically, streetwork has featured in efforts to reduce violence – including in cities like Boston. However, it was only when Operation Ceasefire was implemented that violence reduced. The presence of such streetwork prior to Ceasefire had little or no impact on violence, and when the city abandoned Ceasefire in 2000 violence spiked again, despite streetworkers remaining active in the city. A similar story exists for Cincinnati, where a dedicated but largely ineffective standalone streetwork programme had been launched. It was only when the city folded it into its Group Violence Intervention that violence was reduced, with a reduction in group-involved homicide of 41 per cent.\textsuperscript{83}

For these reasons, the Safer Streets GVI should seek to ensure that any streetwork is conducted in partnership with the GVI, with strong working relationships between streetworkers and police. Examples of strong and successful streetwork partnerships that support the GVI approach exist and should be learned from.

\textbf{Case study: Operation Peacekeeper, Stockton, California}

The City of Stockton has adopted the Group Violence Intervention and alongside this demonstrates how it is possible to have streetworkers and police working together to reduce violence and create public safety.

The experience has seen the development of agreed protocols around the sharing of information and how to ensure that neither organisation is compromised through inappropriate association with the other.

The result is a trusted, productive and constructive relationship. In the aftermath of a shooting, as part of the GVI, the Peacekeepers collaborate with police on routine “shooting reviews” to track recent violence and to prevent new violence. The information flow is generally one-way, from police to Peacekeepers. The information being geared to help enable the Peacekeepers to ensure they are focussed on the right people that are at risk and the right groups. This approach helps maximise success in disrupting cycles of violence.


Other large global cities – like New York and Los Angeles – already operate streetwork programmes. These programmes can aid with the process of reconciliation between the police and communities. However, it is important that such programmes do have relationships with the police in order to ensure that they do not simply reinforce divisions between police and the community.

Examples of streetwork and violence reduction in global cities

**Los Angeles:** The Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) initiative operates streetwork programmes in 23 zones across the city. The GRYD provides a rigorous 12-week certification course to all streetwork organisations that contract with the city to deliver the programmes. This helps ensure streetwork practice is professional and ensures a common standard for what streetwork is and does. This accreditation process is also crucial for setting goals and expectations for how the police and streetworkers will and will not work together. The GRYD has also established a “triangle protocol” providing a framework for gathering information about conflicts, mediating between agencies, linking victims and families with services, brokering peace, and communicating with police and communities about incidents.84 An evaluation published in 2017 suggests that this structure has been crucial to preventing retaliatory shootings.85

**New York City:** The Mayor’s Office to Prevent Gun Violence works in 17 police precincts in the city, facilitating after-incident communication and information sharing from the NYPD to streetworkers. Streetworkers can then use that information to answer questions within the community and to mediate to avoid further cycles of violence.

**Recommendation 11:** The Safer Streets GVI should incorporate professional streetwork services for Safer Street Zones that are aligned to the core principles of the GVI, and that follow the good practice identified in other cities that sees such workers being certificated and having positive relations both with the community and the police, to help breakdown rather than reinforce barriers.

Another key advantage to ensuring that streetwork programmes are fully supportive of the GVI approach is that it provides an opportunity to deliver “custom notifications” that have been used in other cities to warn high-risk people about the consequences of serious violence and offer community services and resources to support them changing their lives and staying safe.

These “custom notifications” have parallels with existing police activity in the UK – known as threat to life or “Osman” warnings – that are issued where police have intelligence of a real and immediate threat to the life of an individual. Police may not have enough evidence to make arrests in such cases and must instead warn the potential victim through delivery of a notice that their life is endangered.

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For some, Osman warnings are viewed as trivial in nature, while others interpret them as the police ticking a box, protecting themselves from criticism, and not really doing a significant amount for the individual in receipt of the warning.

**Threat to life warnings are collected like birthday and christmas cards. The police just hand them out. It’s an everyday occurrence. It’s not a big deal.**

Gang Member

Last year the Metropolitan Police issued 425 such warnings, and anecdotally it is recognised that a significant proportion of these likely relate to gang and group-related violence. As with the Redthread programme seeking to capitalise on reachable and teachable moments in trauma centres, and the Divert programme doing the same in relation to police custody, the issue of a threat to life warning can provide another important opportunity.

The Safer Streets GVI, with a professional streetwork service, should therefore work with the Metropolitan Police to create a process through which the delivery of threat to life Osman warnings incorporates the moral voice of the community and the genuine offer of help and support to turn away from violence, to resist retaliatory action, and to make a positive change.

**Recommendation 12:** The Safer Streets GVI should incorporate a process by which the delivery of Osman warnings by the Metropolitan Police occurs alongside and with the support of a professional streetwork service, ensuring that both the moral voice of the community and the genuine offer of help and support is communicated at this important point of interaction.

Adopting a Safer London GVI also provides an opportunity for reconciliation

The creation of relationships between streetworkers and the police – and the existence of Voices for Safer Streets Panels – provide foundations on which space for dialogue between police and communities can be created, helping to heal division and mistrust that can hinder co-operation more broadly.

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86 Salford Gangs Threat Osman Warnings, YouTube
87 Freedom of Information
Case study: The Watts Gang Task Force (WGTF)\textsuperscript{88}

The Watts Gang Task Force formed in 2006 following a spate of violence that claimed the lives of seven young people. Watts residents, who had lost their children to the wave of gang violence, decided to work together to put an end to the needless killings.

Every Monday, this taskforce meets to discuss community problems, law enforcement, and violence prevention. This community-driven work has inspired people with a deep stake in the project to take ownership of the problem. A task force board – made up mostly of founding members – connects residents with the necessary resources to turn their lives around: employment training, mobile medical programs, and grief counselling for bereaved relatives.

The effort has been largely accredited with reducing gun violence amongst youths by two thirds and the near eradication of homicides in its four public housing projects.

WGTF has helped to override the neighbourhood’s dynamic of distrust and fear between residents and the police. There now exists mutual accountability between police and residents. Expectations exist about acceptable behaviour and they are reinforced by these weekly meetings. Police show respect for residents. This mutual empathy led to the creation of the Community Safety Partnership (CSP).

The CSP is a collaboration between the LAPD and the LA’s Housing Authority. Officers are placed at public housing developments. They don’t just patrol the developments but they actively engage with those living there, coaching football, leading Scouts, and attending prayer services.

The community has demanded a change in their approach to gang violence and Watts Gang Task Force has provided it.

We outline other opportunities for improving relationships between the police and the community in Chapter 4, including the use of mediation as a means of resolving complaints and greater support for uniformed youth organisations like the Volunteer Police Cadets.

Beyond the core Safer Streets GVI there are a number of supportive measures that can help reinforce the intervention and help increase the risk of detection and aid desistance from gang-life or gang-related offending. These include a new Serious Violence Reduction Order, outlined in Chapter 4 (see pages 70–72).

Summarising the approach around a Safer Streets GVI

As part of Dying to Belong we set out an overview of the model proposed to tackle the problem of gangs. We repeat it below, to reflect the reality that much of the core remains vitally important. We have also inserted additional elements to reflect those new aspects.

This model integrates both prevention and intervention approaches, dependent on the level of risk a gang member poses to both themselves and to society. Players who are involved with gangs to a greater extent are those that should be targeted with GVI. They should be targeted with the necessary enforcement powers. In this report, we further develop the Serious Violence Reduction Order, as a necessary enforcement power to reduce the use of weapons on our streets.

This enforcement needs to be matched with targeted support. Gang members need to be given the ability to reform themselves if they wish to reintegrate into society. Relevant support includes: therapy, training, education, and access to employment.

**Learning from the experience of Cincinnati**

London’s Safer Streets GVI should learn from the experience of Cincinnati. It should have a Governing Board, including the Mayor, the Commissioner, and other key individuals. The GVI must also have a dedicated Strategy and Implementation Team, along with Working Groups covering the Enforcement, Services, Community, and System elements of the model.
This structure should be replicated at a local Safer Street Zone (Borough) level, incorporating the local authority chief executive, the most senior local police officer, and other key partners. The various working groups would be tasked with operationalising the centrally developed approach, along with troubleshooting and problem-solving any local issues.

Not implementing GVI is simply not an option

The Safer Streets GVI represents a proven blueprint for preventing serious violence in relation to gangs. Coupled with a broader set of proposals that tackle the root causes of gang membership, the approach London must take is clear to see.

The timing of the fall in shootings in Boston, and comparisons with patterns in other cities, strongly suggest that Ceasefire was crucial. The Harvard team refer to Ceasefire’s creation of a ‘firewall’ behind which other measures could bite and have their effects.

Home Office\(^8^9\)

The creation of a Safer Streets GVI is integral to ensuring the delivery of sustained and city-wide reductions in gang – or group-related serious violence. The evidence is compelling, with the successful implementation of GVIs in other cities providing a clear blueprint for London to follow.

It may be unfashionable or uncomfortable for some to recognise the importance of enforcement within so-called “public health approaches”, however the evidence is equally clear that a well-implemented GVI strengthens and supports other programmes, rather than undermines them.

We therefore call for the creation of a Safer Streets GVI to stop the violence. The choice facing London’s political and public service leaders is not an “either/or”. They must embrace and support the implementation of a Safer Streets GVI – and, as we set out in the following chapters, take steps to support longer-term efforts that can tackle the root causes of violence and gang membership.

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89 Shootings, Gangs and Violent Incidents in Manchester: Developing a crime reduction strategy, Home Office, 2002  
chapter three
The law and order
London needs

The last decade has seen a sustained assault on policing and law enforcement. To achieve real and sustained reductions in gang crime and related violence will require an overhaul of the policing provided to London.

I want to leave an organisation that is in very good shape to face the future, and we need to modernise in lots of ways... I want to invest in my people.... And I want to improve confidence in the wider public, and in particular in our minority ethnic populations.

Commissioner Cressida Dick, Metropolitan Police

The immediate need to ‘stabilise the patient’ and ‘stabilise communities’

Viewing violence as a preventable phenomenon or disease is helpful in a number of respects, not least for recognising that the first order of business is to stabilise the patient. This means taking immediate action to help prevent the violence from spreading or escalating.

There are already troubling signs that the serious violence London has been suffering has been contributing towards the spread of violence.

Our polling has found that more than 1 in 10 Londoners (12 per cent) say they know someone who regularly carries a knife or other weapon, 9 per cent say they have considered carrying a knife or other weapon in the last 12 months, and unsurprisingly this translates into self-reported weapon-carrying over the last year:

90 Today, BBC Radio 4, 18 April 2017 [Accessed on 2 July 2018 via www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p050f34g]
• 7 per cent carried a knife;
• 5 per cent carried acid or a corrosive substance;
• 6 per cent carried a gun; and
• 6 per cent carried any other weapon.

There is a desperate need to shift the decision-making of those Londoners who carry or are tempted to carry a knife or other weapon on the streets of the capital – whatever the reason.

Education programmes, mentoring, youth work, and more can all help deliver messages that dissuade the carrying of weapons and change behaviour – but the single most effective and immediate action to increase the chances that those who carry knives and weapons on the street are caught is to increase the levels of stop and search in London.

Increasing the chances that those who carry knives and weapons on the street are caught is considered very or somewhat important by 89 per cent of Londoners in our polling, with just 8 per cent considering it unimportant. The evidence base also tells us that increasing the risk of being caught can help reduce crime, reinforcing the importance of upping the ante for those carrying weapons.\(^{91}\) Evidence that is reinforced by a more recent study finding that increases in the detection rate yield reductions in property and violent crime.\(^{92}\)

The last decade has seen stop and search fall significantly

The volume of stop and searches in London has fallen significantly over the last decade, from an average of around 600,000 searches under Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 per year in the years up to 2010/11 to a new average in the last few years of around 125,000. This represents a near 80 per cent reduction in the use of the power. The volume of searches under Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 has declined over the last decade.

92 L. Han et al, (2013) "Determinants of Violent and Property Crimes in England and Wales: A Panel Data Analysis" University of Birmingham
Over the same period the “arrest rate” became a focal point of reforms, with the Metropolitan Police adopting a target of 20 per cent, in order that one in every five searches would generate an arrest. The arrest rate did increase over the period. However, the reduction in volume of searches, even with an increase in the arrest rate, resulted in fewer people in London being caught. Had stop and search volumes and arrest rates remained at the three-year average for the period 2008/09–2010/11, there would have been more than 2.3 million additional stop and searches conducted and almost 54,000 additional arrests.
It is notable that in the period through 2013/14, even as the volume of searches declined, the volume of arrests increased. The arrest rate increased from an average of 7.3 per cent for the period 2008/09–2010/11, to gradually reach a peak of 19.4 per cent in 2016/17. During the period the Metropolitan Police had introduced a target arrest rate of 20 per cent.

The reality is that while the use of stop and search has fallen dramatically, it is not the result of any change in primary legislation. The reductions have instead been driven by economic and political considerations relating to shrinking police budgets, a reduction in the number of officers, increased demand, and a clear political message and policy shift from previous Home Secretaries.

However, on the streets, the perception – as reported by some young ex-offenders – is that the police lost their powers to stop and search and that community policing was taken away too:

> When I was dealing, I’d see the community police, and I’d be like the police are around the corner. You lot pop out, like bam. But now, you’re not about. It makes us, as dealers, confident. When you lost stop and search, when stop and search went, knowing that you can’t stop and search me… I’m not scared.
> Young ex-offender

Other young people with a history of involvement in crime also had positive things to say about the importance of stop and search as a tactic:

> Stop and search was useful to be honest with you. You’re walking down the road, you’ve got a knife on you, you see a police officer, you have to think: I need to get rid of this, throw it away, or run.
> Young ex-offender

Even as many young people recognised the importance of police being on patrol and doing stop and search, and a recognition that it does detect people with knives, there was also a sense that it could and did cause mistrust or resentment.

> I think they should be on patrol and doing stop and search. It does obviously stop those out there with knives on them. But there are police officers out there that know the kids, and go up to them over and over again. They’re a bit cheeky, this is why they hate police.
> Young ex-offender

On probing accounts of past “abuse” or “cheekiness” in relation to the use of stop and search, there were a number of recurring themes. There was a sense from many that where nothing was found this inevitably meant that the police had abused their power, a perception compounded by the obvious information asymmetry that exists between the person being stopped and the police officer doing the stopping. The regular or repeated use of stop and search against the same individuals was also raised as an issue by some young people, as were concerns about excessive use of force.
We found young people generally very aware of their rights in relation to stop and search – with many having heard of and understanding the mnemonic GOWISELY, that they had a right to film police, and that unless there was an offence they did not have to provide their name and address to police.

There was however a sense that many of the young people did not fully appreciate and had not – whether informally or as part of formal education sessions around stop and search – considered stop and search from the perspective of police officers. It was also evident that on many occasions young people felt more confident in their understanding of stop and search than the police officers they had come into contact with:

A lot of the younger ones you see ‘em shaking and they blast out a bunch of stuff like a robot. It’s like what the hell, are you even treating me like a person or just ticking a box. It’s madness.

Young person

Using existing stop and search powers to increase the risk of detection

Increasing the risk of detection for those carrying weapons was a key strand within the approach of Glasgow’s Violence Reduction Unit, with stop and search going “through the roof” alongside “increased patrols”.

We went through the roof with stop and search. We increased patrols because we needed – in medical terms – to stabilise the patient, we needed to stabilise communities and that meant more policing.

Will Linden, Acting Director, Violence Reduction Unit

Importantly, we know that Londoners broadly have high levels of support for stop and search, with fewer than 1 in 10 Londoners overall opposing the power. Support for stop and search is lower among non-white Londoners though more than two thirds still support the power. The real challenge is among those aged 18–24 years old, where just 49 per cent support the power and 21 per cent oppose the power.

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We also asked Londoners about their support for “suspicionless” stop and search, a power provided to police under Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. It saw similar levels of support to that seen for convention stop and search, with non-white Londoners and those aged 18–24 years old extending less support and more opposition.

Source: CSJ Crime in London Poll
It is easy for some to rush to judgement as to why support among young and non-white Londoners for these powers is lower than the average. The reality of strong media and political narratives of institutional racism and racial discrimination and profiling by police is one potential cause.

The roll-out of body worn video cameras in the Met, coupled with local scrutiny panels involving the community reviewing stop and search records, are both relatively recent developments that should provide optimism that stop and search is being more professionally conducted in 2018 than even a few years ago.

However, there is also the reality that both police training and training for the public is overly-focussed on ensuring that searches are lawful, rather than ensuring that searches are as effective as they can be and that the individual being stopped genuinely understands the motivations and purpose of the power. The key issue in training is very often ensuring that GOWISELY is provided.94

This focus on GOWISELY means that officers, especially those who do not use the power frequently, can appear or be robotic in the delivery of GOWISELY. The natural tendency for jargon to feature in repeated interactions is also present, causing a further cause of confusion or misunderstanding with individuals being stopped. At times a swift intervention by police is required – however, this should, whenever possible, be followed by a shift to a more conversational style.

The conversational style better conveys the individual humanity of the officer that is using their powers, and provides the potential at least for rapport to be built, and can help de-escalate stress and fear where innocent individuals find themselves subject to being stopped and searched. It is also the case that police need to have the time to deliver what might be described as after-care following the stop and search, seeking to ensure and check that the individual being stopped has the truest possible appreciation of the reasons for the stop and the motivations of the police officers involved.

There is a powerful moral narrative that is often conveyed by the best police officers as part of their work. It plays into the evidence around procedural justice – the idea that people care more about how they are treated than about actual legal outcomes. The academic theories and evidence around procedural justice and legitimacy suggest that the police can encourage greater compliance with the law by making simple changes to their own behaviour, such as explaining their actions, listening to grievances, and demonstrating respect.

To this extent we propose a draft proposal for Stop & Search aftercare for reinforcing the benefits of procedural justice, supporting confidence in the tactic, and more general appreciation for the work of the police. We reiterate that many of the most experienced and professional officers will already do their best to provide something approximating the below following encounters. We also recognise that some stop and searches will end with hostility that makes the completion of such aftercare impractical.

94 GOWISELY is an acronym for the key legal rights of individuals stopped and searched by police. Namely, the (1) grounds for the search, (2) the object being sought, (3) warrant card being displayed if officer is in plain clothes, (4) the identity of the officer, (5) the station to which the officer is attached, (6) the legal entitlement to a copy of the search record, (7) the legal power being used for the search, and (8) explaining that you are detained for the purposes of a search.
Table 3: Illustrative proposal for Stop and Search aftercare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locality</td>
<td>“I work in &lt;area name, recognisable to the person stopped&gt;”</td>
<td>Communicating a sense of ownership and care for the local geography, referring to a town or neighbourhood name that is recognisable to the person stopped, rather than the organisation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>“The community has problems in this area with &lt;issue, and specific insight&gt;”</td>
<td>Demonstrating a detailed understanding of local issues that can tally with the purpose and reason for the stop and search. The specific insight to local issues helping move beyond generic statements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finds</td>
<td>“We recently found &lt;examples&gt;”</td>
<td>Articulates the reality that even where a search results in no negative item being found, other occasions yield significant and specific results that help keep people safe and prevent crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion Care</td>
<td>“I’m really committed to tackling these issues”</td>
<td>Signalling a personal commitment to tackling local issues, helping personalise the encounter and help break down barriers created through the uniform and possible past experiences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Check Understanding</td>
<td>“I really want to check you understand why we conducted this stop and search today”</td>
<td>Clear commitment to procedural justice and helping maintain or build trust where otherwise mistrust and hostility can exist. This can include the offer to repeat the grounds for the search, but to elaborate further and add context that might not be practical to offer initially.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy Awareness</td>
<td>“I know being stopped and search can be a hassle”</td>
<td>Recognises that stop and search exerts a cost – whether in the time taken, the intrusion, or the general inconvenience. It also helps remind the officer that what they consider a routine stop and search may be a significant event for the person being stopped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appreciation Thanks</td>
<td>“I really appreciate your time and co-operation today”</td>
<td>Expresses gratitude and reinforces the understanding that the stop may have exerted some form of cost on the person stopped. It offers positive reinforcement for the co-operation of the person stopped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer</td>
<td>“Are there any crime issues affecting you, where you live, that I might be able to help with?”</td>
<td>Reinforces a sense in the person stopped that the officer does not leave the encounter viewing them as a criminal, but as a citizen – who may in fact be a victim of crime or otherwise have crimes to report or information to provide.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with GOWISELY, the intention and expectation are not for the robotic iteration of these points, but instead as a helpful prompt to encourage the effective delivery of key points during and following a stop and search.

**Recommendation 13:** Initial and in-service training should better prepare and equip officers with the skills and experience to take heated high-stress encounters and convert them into a conversational style. Officers should be assessed on their ability to not just complete realistic stop and search scenarios lawfully and safely, but to demonstrate an ability and willingness to conduct appropriate after-care.
Strathclyde Police accounted for 43 per cent of Scotland’s population and 53 per cent of Scotland’s drug and weapons offences, but carried out 84 per cent of Scotland’s stop searches. In 2010, following implementation of the Violence Reduction Unit, the rate of stop and search in Strathclyde was double that of the Metropolitan Police.

The police played a central role in the beginning. They campaigned really hard to get the legislation around knife crime changed so people would be more likely to get a mandatory sentence. There was also, at the outset, a lot of stop and search.

Christine Goodall, Medics Against Violence

If GVI is to be effective, it is necessary that it is backed with proportionate law enforcement. Police legitimacy needs to be respected and adhered to but, if we are to reduce the number of stabbings on our streets, we need to assess how we can reduce the number of people armed with weapons. Stop and search has a clear role to play in achieving this objective.

Creating a new search power to aid desistance and reduce violence

In addition to existing stop and search powers, we also believe that there is value in the creation of a new search power to help increase the risk of detection among those individuals most likely to carry weapons.

The latest proven reoffending statistics show that more than 1 in 3 (36 per cent) children and young people cautioned or convicted of carrying a weapon reoffend within a year.96 We also know that more than half of the children and young people cautioned or convicted for carrying a weapon in the year ending March 2017 had, as their first offence, carrying a weapon.

We also know that this speaks to a failure of existing sentences to sufficiently deter or aid desistance from crime. For this reason we outlined a proposal, in response to the Home Office’s offensive and dangerous weapons consultation, for courts to be able to make a Serious Violence Reduction Order (SVRO).97

We propose that this ancillary order would be made in relation to a specified schedule of offences linked to weapon-carrying and serious violence.

Within London, using the number of convictions relating to possession of weapons, firearms, and drug trafficking offences, it is possible to estimate that around 5,000 individuals could be subject to an SVRO granting a suspicionless stop and search power.98

We explore the potential reach of an SVRO in the rest of England and Wales in Chapter 4.

98 Criminal Justice System Statistics publication: Court Outcomes by Police Force Area: Pivot Table Analytical Tool for England and Wales, Ministry of Justice, May 2018
### Schedule of specified offences

- Possession of pointed/bladed articles (S139/S139A/S139AA Criminal Justice Act 1988)
- Possession of offensive weapon (S1/S1A Prevention of Crime Act 1953)
- Drug trafficking offences (Misuse of Drugs Act 1971)
- Firearms offences (Firearms Act 1968)
- Any offence involving the possession or use of a weapon
- Any offence involving the possession or use of a gun

Around half (52 per cent) of this cohort currently receive an immediate prison sentence in relation to these offences, meaning that almost 2,400 receive a sentence that sees them walk out of the court and back into the community. The addition of an SVRO would send a strong signal that violence will not be tolerated, that the carriage of weapons will not be tolerated, and provide a valuable aid to desistance.

In addition, for those who do receive a prison sentence, the addition of an SVRO would ensure that the period spent on licence – back in the community – often at the halfway point of such sentences, would also receive the same strong signal that violence will not be tolerated, that the carriage of weapons will not be tolerated, and again provide a valuable aid to desistance.

The aid to desistance element comes from their criminal associates not wishing to be around or rely upon individuals who may be stopped and searched by police without suspicion. Such an individual is of reduced value to a gang or group if they face an increased risk of detection. Similarly, it provides a mechanism for individuals seeking to turn their backs on crime with a credible excuse for refusing to get involved, for example, “You don’t want me around you, I’m getting stopped all the time”.

The SVRO would be made post-conviction (in the manner of a Criminal Behaviour Order) and would prohibit the offender from possessing listed weapons in private (as per Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988). It would also, for the duration of the accompanying sentence, provide a power for the police to stop and search the offender without suspicion.

It is a power that would aid the prevention and detection of crime, while also encouraging desistance from carrying weapons and providing a straightforward means of increasing intelligence-led and targeted stop and search activity on known offenders. It also offers the offenders a clear and credible reason they can offer to help distance or remove themselves from gangs, drug dealing, and other criminal behaviour.

Our polling of Londoners also tested support for a Serious Violence Reduction Order, which enjoyed support broadly in line with stop and search and suspicionless stop and search, with notably less opposition from non-white Londoners (7 per cent versus 12 per cent for stop and search and 15 per cent for suspicionless stop and search).
The young adult cohort – aged 18–24 – demonstrated less support and more opposition than the overall, but remained broadly in line with attitudes towards stop and search and suspicionless stop and search. The polling – as well as other evidence – points to a specific issue in relation to young people and their attitudes towards police proactivity. We outline proposals for improving the experience and perception of police proactivity among young people in Chapter 5.

The Order would only last for the duration of the sentence given by the court. This would mean that at the completion of the sentence, the Order would lapse. To prevent any abuse of the power, and to introduce a check and balance within the system, searches under the SVRO would be recorded and the volume and frequency of such searches would be supervised – as with existing stop and searches – by line management, with additional oversight offered by a Superintendent or above.

There would be an expectation on police officers using this power to do so responsibly, and to ensure that in recording the search, they would provide an objective view around the circumstances of the search and any information pointing toward continued offending activity or desistance. Coupled with other information and intelligence, this would allow for such individuals to be graded on a risk basis.

Being a Serious Violence Reduction Order the extent of the search would be limited to a more thorough – rather than intimate – search. If, as part of the search, officers established reasonable groups to suspect prohibited items were concealed more intimately, they would be free to invoke existing stop and search powers.

**Recommendation 14**: The Government and Home Office should include provisions for a Serious Violence Reduction Order (SVRO) within the Offensive Weapons Bill that is currently progressing through Parliament. A SVRO is a suspicionless stop and search order allowing police to search any ex-offender still on sentence. The Order would only last for the duration of the sentence given by the court.
“Trappin’ ain’t good, trappin’ is great” – drug trafficking has never been easier

In Chapter 1, we evidenced the reality that 4 out of 5 Londoners (78 per cent) agree that buying illegal drugs funds the criminal market and drives drug-related violence. We also heard evidence during our work from former drug dealers and those who had been involved or associated with the supply of drugs, that the police had “given the streets to the dealers” with reductions in stop and search and community policing.

In reality, the Metropolitan Police has been gradually prosecuting fewer offences of both drug possession and drug trafficking since March 2011. Overall, both possession and drug trafficking offences recorded by the police are down by almost 50 per cent, with drug trafficking having fallen significantly in the period mid-2014 through mid-2015, and again from mid-2017 through to the present.

Figure 30: Indexed rolling 12 month average police recorded drug offences in London (March 2011 = 100)

![Graph showing decrease in drug offences]

Source: Metropolitan Police

The 12 months from June 2017 to May 2018 saw the number of drug trafficking cases in London fall by more than 20 per cent. This most recent collapse is about far more than a reduction in stop and search, since stop and search has been largely flat during this period. Rather, it suggests a significant reduction in discretionary intelligence-led proactive policing.

It is of significance since so much of the violence and weapon-carrying on London’s streets is driven by the drugs trade, and because it means that drug dealers and drug runners face reduced risk of detection, not just through stop and search, but also it would seem through drug warrants too.

The risk of detection matters because it also means that it will take much longer for a hardened drug dealer to reach their third conviction for drug trafficking and the resultant 7 year minimum prison sentence afforded by Section 110 Power of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. This therefore reduces the likelihood that violent drug-dealers, aged 18–30 years, will be in prison at any given time, and thus means that violent drug gangs are on the streets.
London’s drug dealers have never, within living memory, been less likely to be detected. The volume of drug trafficking cases having fallen from around 400 per month in 2011 to just 227 today. In June 2018, there was not a single drug trafficking case recorded in the London Boroughs of Kingston-upon-Thames, Kensington and Chelsea, and Harrow. With the London Boroughs of Sutton, Richmond-upon-Thames, Merton, Hillingdon and Bexley each only recording one drug trafficking case in June 2018.99

99 MPS Borough Level Crime Data (Last 24 months), Metropolitan Police
Only Lambeth Police recorded an average of at least one drug trafficking case per week in each of the last 12 months, closely followed by Tower Hamlets, Lewisham, Hackney, and Brent. Given our polling data relating to the usage and dealing of drugs by Londoners – in which 3 per cent admitted to dealing illegal drugs to others at least a few times per week and a total of 8 per cent to dealing illegal drugs to others at least once per month.

The same statistics also tell us that 1 in 3 of all drug trafficking cases in London over the last two years originated from just six of London’s 32 boroughs: Lambeth, Wandsworth, Newham, Greenwich, Brent, and Ealing.

While resource constraints are clearly having a significant impact on the prioritisation of proactive work, it is also evident that some of London’s boroughs have essentially seen the dealing of drugs decriminalised with, for example, Richmond not managing to average at least one drug trafficking case in any of the last 12 months.

**Recommendation 15:** The Government must recognise the importance of resourcing policing to tackle drug trafficking and the Metropolitan Police must ensure police leaders understand the value of proactive policing and the Met must develop a drug crime strategy.

**The risk that more people are opting out of the formal criminal justice system is significant**

Looking at the volume of wounding and grievous bodily harm offences since April 2014, along with detection rates, tells a concerning tale. While the volume of such offences has grown by roughly 10 per cent over the four years, the detection rate has fallen from nearly 35 per cent to just above 20 per cent.

**Figure 33: Rolling 12 month detection rates and offences for wounding/GBH**

Source: Home Office and Metropolitan Police
The concern is two-fold: with fewer cases being closed with a detection, individuals may lose confidence in the system and choose to take matters into their own hands through, for example, retaliatory assaults. At the same time, it is possible that at least some of the decline in the detection rate is itself driven by a refusal on the part of those involved to speak to police or support the investigation. In 1 in 10 gang flagged incidents, victims refused or even obstructed police investigations.\textsuperscript{100}

In either case, the risk is that as individuals opt out of the formal criminal justice system – whether intentionally or out of frustration – we may see more retaliatory tit-for-tat assaults. At the same time, the Metropolitan Police has a large shortfall in the number of police officers trained as Detectives. This may in part be contributing to the falling detection rate.

**Building on Youth Offending Teams and Services (YOT/YOS)**

During the course of our work we were advised on a number of occasions that the work of Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) and Youth Offending Services (YOS) was, at least for some young people, of too short a duration and that not enough was done to use the opportunity provided by a YOT/YOS referral to connect the young person with more longer-term, sustainable relationships.

**Figure 34: Embedding trusted positive relationships within and beyond YOT/YOS**

Our proposed model would see young people at risk of criminal exploitation or gang membership under YOT/YOS supervision connected with existing services available in the community. This might begin with meetings being held in community centres, youth

\textsuperscript{100} Ending Gang and Youth Violence Self Assessment and Proposals for 2012/13, London Borough of Haringey, 2012  
centres, or other appropriate venues, and over time use the opportunity to scaffold trusted positive relationships in support of positive change for the young person.

Research into the societal impact of cadet forces strongly supports this theory. Results suggested that young people’s self-esteem was vastly improved following their participation with cadets. Interviews suggested that many young people believed that without their positive relationships formed through the cadets they may have fallen into the wrong crowds and gotten involved with gangs. The sense of community fostered in these schemes was instrumental in creating a sense of self-worth and security for young people who participated.101

We can and should expect every young person at risk of exploitation or gang membership to be engaged in this fashion. While this may mean additional work in the short-term in relation to building relationships with partners, the longer-term benefits suggest the potential for improved outcomes and more sustained positive engagement with the young people concerned.

The goal would be that by the end of the supervision period, the young people under supervision would not just have attended but ideally be actively involved in a local community centre, sports club, youth centre, local/London charities, voluntary groups, or uniformed youth organisations such as the Volunteer Police Cadets or other cadet or youth groups.

**Recommendation 16:** Youth Offending Services and Teams (YOS/YOTs) working with young people at risk of criminal exploitation or gang membership should, over the course of the supervision period, connect that young person into existing youth services, provision, or centres that can provide a positive environment and trusted positive relationships for the long-term, beyond the length of the order.

We also set out in Chapter 5 how existing budgeted resources can be utilised in support of growing expansion of uniformed youth organisations in priority areas.

**The Prosecution and Courts must deliver on their responsibilities under the social contract**

Much of the focus on the problem of gangs and serious violence in London centres on the police response, however it is also vitally important that we talk about the role of the Crown Prosecution Service and the Courts in delivering their responsibilities under the social contract.

The Government, in its recent Serious Violence Strategy, identifies the effectiveness of the criminal justice system as one of the drivers of crime and serious violence and states that “most academics agree that big shifts in crime trends tend to be driven by factors outside
of the police’s control”.102 Although we know that in relation to group violence there is a significant opportunity for police to have a significant effect, as evidenced by the group violence intervention (GVI) projects that have taken place in Glasgow and more than 70 other cities, predominantly in the United States.

It is therefore important for the Government to not only support effective enforcement activity by police, but to also hold accountable the other parts of the criminal justice system to ensure that the broader efforts in the fight against violence and gangs do not go to waste.

We polled Londoners to better understand how effective they believe the courts are at protecting and keeping people safe. Our polling found that a majority of Londoners (55 per cent) agree that “the courts do not protect or keep people safe”, with fewer than 1 in 5 Londoners (17 per cent) disagreeing with the statement.

Figure 35: To what extent do you agree or disagree “The courts do not protect or keep people safe”

This dissatisfaction may in part be the result of the continued failure of the courts to enforce the “two strike” minimum custodial sentence for a knife possession offence. The legislation was introduced following campaigning from a number of MPs in response to growing public concern over the issue of knife crime.

Subject to certain conditions Section 28 of and Schedule 5 to the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 1988 create a minimum custodial sentence for those aged 16 and over convicted of a second or subsequent offence of possession of a knife or offensive weapon (section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953) or of an article with a blade or sharp point (section 139 Criminal Justice Act 1988), including possession of such on-school premises (section 139A Criminal Justice Act 1988).

The minimum custodial sentence is at least six months’ imprisonment for an offender aged 18 or over when convicted, and at least a four-month detention and training order for 16- and 17-year olds.

However, the failure to protect or keep people safe should not be interpreted as limited to potential dissatisfaction with sentencing from courts. There are also very real and serious concerns about the experiences of victims and witnesses as they go through the criminal justice process – right up to and beyond the point of giving evidence.

Case study: Fatal shooting of Abraham Badru in March 2018

Abraham Badru, 26, received a bravery award from the Metropolitan Police in 2009 after he intervened to stop a girl being gang raped. Abraham was just 14 years old when he had witnessed the assault at a party in 2007, when he intervened to help the victim and prevent the crime.

He was subject to intimidation and threats at the time, with his home being pelted with eggs. Despite this, he went on to give evidence at court and a total of nine people were convicted, with one individual being jailed for life. The intimidation is reported to have left him “scared for his life”, causing him to have moved away from London at the age of 16.

On 25 March 2018, as he was opening the boot of his car in Hackney, London, he was fatally shot. The police are investigating whether it was a murder in revenge for having helped to bring the gang of rapists to justice. Abraham’s mother, Ronke Badru, has said she believes the killing was an act of revenge and in media reporting it was stated that the police have it as a line of inquiry.

The fear of being identified and intimidated is reflected in the reality that the leading reasons why Londoners would not provide information right now about gangs or criminal groups operating in their area are fearing reprisals or intimidation for giving information and the belief that it would not be possible to remain anonymous.

We, and I guess I mean the system really, is not geared up to protect victims and witnesses, especially those living in areas known to have criminal groups and gangs. The intimidation can be fearsome and it is all too common for people who had been doing the right thing, reporting the crime, giving statements, doing ID procedures, to subsequently withdraw their allegations and evidence in response to intimidation.

Detective, Metropolitan Police Service

The rise of social media and the increasing accessibility of private data relating to members of the public makes it relatively easy for offenders or their associates to not just identify but locate the addresses of witnesses and victims based on the information routinely supplied as part of disclosure.

Recommendation 17: The Government should initiate an urgent review of victim and witness intimidation and look to bring forward measures to better protect victims and witnesses from such intimidation. These measures could and should extend to consider the use of GPS tagging of suspected offenders and the provision of a paired handheld tag for victims and witnesses, alerting them in the event of proximity, and triggering safety plans. Courts must recognise the public interest in ensuring justice is done and be rigorous in remanding in custody individuals who engage in such activity.

Increasing the accountability of prosecutors for the decisions they take in relation to high harm offenders has been found to improve results. In New York City, the NYPD regularly review court results to identify cases that see high harm defendants have charges dropped.

103 'Shooting victim may have been killed for bringing rape gang to justice', Daily Telegraph, 25 April 2018 [Accessed on 2 July 2018 via www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/04/25/shooting-victim-may-have-killed-bringing-rape-gang-justice/]
104 CSJ Crime in London Poll
Such cases are then flagged to the District and County Attorney, providing an opportunity for the NYPD and Attorneys to identify how to ensure that enforcement activities are followed through and ensuring that any errors are remedied.

We propose that the Metropolitan Police’s Commander for Criminal Justice introduce a mechanism by which court results relating to individuals identified in the Safer Streets Matrix (or legacy Gangs and Habitual Knife Carrier Matrices) are reviewed to identify any potential shortcomings, and that a channel is created to allow for police officers to also refer questionable charging, prosecutorial, or sentencing decisions for review/feedback.

This is not about creating conflict between the Metropolitan Police and the Crown Prosecution Service in London, rather it is about helping ensure there is a standardised and readily accessible flow of information between the Police and Prosecution, ensuring that both can support each other and achieve the best possible outcomes for London.

**Recommendation 18:** Metropolitan Police to review court results relating to individuals identified in the Safer Streets Matrix, to identify any missed opportunities and potential shortcomings. The Criminal Justice Command should also introduce a clear channel through which police officers may refer questionable charging, prosecutorial, or sentencing decisions for review and/or feedback. Any flagged cases should be discussed in a joint meeting with the Chief Crown Prosecutors for London.

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**Sentencing**

As part of the work to tackle violence in Scotland, the average sentence for carrying a knife grew significantly, tripling from around four months in 2005–06 to an average around 12 months by 2014.

As Figure 36 shows, the increase in England and Wales has been much less pronounced with knife and weapon carriers facing half the average sentence length of such offenders in Scotland.

**Figure 36: Average custodial sentence length (days) for possession of knives/ offensive weapons**

![Figure 36: Average custodial sentence length (days) for possession of knives/ offensive weapons](source: Scottish Government and Ministry of Justice)
The average custodial sentence length for handling offensive weapons has tripled over the last ten years, from 118 days in 2005–06 to 370 days in 2014–15. While this is the case, in 2014–15 the average sentence length for this type of offence was similar to the previous year, dipping slightly from 374 days in 2013–14 to 370 days in 2014–15 (a decline of 1 per cent). The trend over the last ten years is similar for knife offences, with the average custodial sentence length being around 6 per cent longer than that of handling offensive weapons, at 391 days in 2014–15.

The picture in England and Wales is different. The average custodial sentence length has remained low, rising only slightly from five months to just under seven months. This increase has occurred over the same period as the rising trend in Scotland. Studies suggest that the certainty of punishment is likely to have a greater impact than its severity, deterring individuals from breaking the law. With average custodial sentences remaining low in England, police officers have expressed doubt about the authority of their enforcement powers.

I and a number of my officers are seeing an increasing number of young people in London who are simply not fearful of how the state will respond to their actions... They don’t see imprisonment as particularly likely or a serious threat and it does not in any sense deter them from criminal activity.

Commissioner Cressida Dick, Metropolitan Police

Since 2009, the number of under 18s held in youth custody – whether in youth offender institutions, secure training centres, or secure children’s homes – has fallen consistently. From almost 3,000 in 2009, to fewer than 1,000 last year.

Even as serious youth violence has risen in recent years, the youth custody population has continued to decline, with the result that some of the young people most in need of help, stability, and support are left in the community: often to the vagaries of social services, care homes, and the poor educational outcomes found within the alternative education sector.

There is therefore a clear need to ensure that sentencing sends the clear signal to both the offender and wider society that the carriage of weapons will not be tolerated. At present, the failure to ensure an effective criminal justice response to the carriage of weapons results in offenders being able to continue to carry weapons and, where they are used, cause serious harm to others, further fuelling the fear of crime and weapon-carrying, and ultimately resulting in some young people facing even longer periods in prison for violent offences that could and should have been prevented.

As we argued for in *Desperate for a Fix*, we believe that much could be achieved through improvements to the Pre-Sentence Report process and quarterly briefings to the judiciary on the nature, scale, and impact of offending in localities.

**Recommendation 19:** The Ministry of Justice should launch a review of Pre-Sentence Reports (PSR) and explore how they might be more effectively produced to better convey an accurate understanding of the root causes of offending, along with greater detail on the pattern of offending. Consideration should also be given to how technology might be used to help test the veracity of claims made by the defendant and to allow other agencies to feed into the PSRs. Quarterly Crime and Criminal Justice Briefings should be offered to the local judiciary, with inputs from police, probation, and the Mayor (or Police and Crime Commissioner). Locally, police forces and communities – through Voices for Safer Streets Panels – should undertake to make greater and more effective use of Community Impact Statements.

**Reconnecting with the public**

A recent poll evidenced growing concern that the police do not address the priorities and interests that matter to local people. When asked which statement came closest to their view, 38 per cent of adults opted for “the police feel like they’re on my side with my priorities and interests at heart”, but almost as many (35 per cent) went for “the police increasingly feel as if they have their own politically correct agenda which does not match my own interests”.

Even with these concerns, we also noted from our own polling considerable unity around the fact that most police officers and members of the community want the same thing: safer streets and young people.

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As Figure 38 demonstrates, the vast majority of Londoners want to live in a community where the police are known and trusted by me – and want to live in a community where people can and do speak to the police.

The sad reality however, is that a majority of Londoners do not currently want their friends or family speaking to police. This represents the gap that needs to be closed between the police and the community.

Figure 38: People and police in your local area

In addition to the need to bolster community policing, it is also vital to ensure that where members of the public are concerned about police conduct, there is a fair, swift, and effective process for dealing with such concerns. Existing police complaints processes too often fail both the public and the police officers. Complaints over even relatively minor matters can take years to reach a conclusion, creating a source of stress and frustration for police officers, and a real sense of injustice and frustration on the part of the complainant.

We therefore propose that the Metropolitan Police introduce a programme of independent mediation for complainants. This would see the complainant, the police officer, and the independent mediator meet to address the issues.

The evidence base has continued to grow in support of mediation as an improvement upon traditional complaint processing. A study of a mediation programme in Denver, Colorado, in 2012 found that both police and civilian participants in the mediation program were significantly more satisfied than individuals who participated in traditional complaint processing.109

More recently, the LAPD introduced a similar approach in 2014 and recently published results evidence strong support for the approach across a number of metrics.110

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110 Bringing Sides Together: Community-Based Complaint Mediation, Howard P. Greenswalid, PhD, Professor, Sol Price School of Public Policy, University of Southern California, and Charlie Beck, Chief of Police, Los Angeles Police Department, Police Chief Magazine, August 2018 [Accessed on 9 August 2018 via www.policechiefmagazine.org/bringing-sides-together/?ref=7e7204767b0ac016b78ddc36cb613a8]
We therefore think it important to take other steps to help improve relationships between the police and the community. This should include consideration of a swifter and more effective complaint resolution process.

**Recommendation 20:** The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime should conduct a pilot project for independent mediation of complaints against police with a focus on those areas with the lowest trust and confidence in policing. The pilot should be evaluated both in relation to the speed of resolution, the satisfaction of officer and complainant, and improved awareness and understanding on the part of both citizen and police officer. The Independent Office for Police Conduct should support such a pilot and afford latitude to operationalise such an approach.

Raising the profile of, and expectations from, local policing and local policing leaders

We also asked Londoners who they know by name or by sight. Unsurprisingly, the Prime Minister, a neighbour, and the Mayor of London achieved recognition in excess of 80 per cent, closely followed by a local General Practitioner (70 per cent).
While around half of Londoners said they would know their local Member of Parliament by name or by sight, just over 40 per cent saying the same of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. However, barely 20 per cent said they would know by name or by sight their police borough commander or other local senior officer, just less than the proportion who said they would know their local authority Chief Executive by name or by sight.

Slightly more than 1 in 4 Londoners said they would know a local neighbourhood police officer or PCSO by sight.

**Recommendation 21:** The Metropolitan Police should overhaul their local communications strategy, ensuring that named borough commanders and Dedicated Ward Officers are better known within their communities. Both these roles should come with a minimum tenure to build trust and relationships.

**Proactive community policing must be embedded and valued**

The Dedicated Ward Officer (DWO) role within the Metropolitan Police must be preserved, protected, and developed. It must be a role that attracts, retains, and develops proactive and community-focused individuals. We believe it is time for a new deal in relation to the DWO role, involving the following commitments:

- to require a minimum tenure of three years in the DWO role.
- to assign up to six DWOs for each ward in London.
- to be protected from both local and central AID requirements.
- to accrue personal training and development budgets over their tenure.
The minimum tenure ensures that DWOs can provide continuity to the community over a sufficient period to tackle even some of the more entrenched crime and disorder problems, and increasing the number of DWOs in each Ward will help to further reinforce continuity over the longer term. A phased uplift in DWO numbers would ensure that whole teams do not change or disappear overnight.

It is also vital that DWOs are protected from central and local AID requirements. Originally, the DWO role was protected from abstractions with the exception of Notting Hill Carnival and New Year’s Eve. However, in recent years this principle has been eroded, with local AID in particular now causing officers to be taken away from their specific neighbourhoods. This practice must stop and the Met Police along with MOPAC should publish data on a weekly and monthly basis regarding abstractions to local or central AID.

Outside of extremely limited Professional Development Days, The Metropolitan Police currently offers no specialist training for officers assigned to neighbourhood roles – and officers posted to neighbourhoods find themselves at the back of the queue for many other training opportunities, such as police driving, Taser, and source handling. The failure to provide both a foundation in proactive community policing and any continuous development undermines the ability of the neighbourhood role to recruit and retain the best officers.

We therefore propose that the Metropolitan Police should develop a training programme in support of proactive community policing. This should feature a foundation in community policing street-craft, consideration of proactive strategies and tactics, and specific work on how to best negotiate with and achieve positive outcomes from partner agencies and the wider community.

The College of Policing’s Neighbourhood Policing Guidance provides one conception for neighbourhood policing but the guidance falls short of offering the practical advice or guidance that would be of real value to frontline practitioners who may have limited experience or may be needing to rebuild capability and capacity.

**Recommendation 22:** Any future Home Office Transformation or Innovation Funds should look favourably on bids submitted by police forces and partners with a view to the development of practical proactive community policing training and tools. As with other Transformation Fund activities, progress and results should be shared freely with other forces.

**Creating and acting on community information and intelligence**

There should be a positive expectation on each enhanced neighbourhood Ward policing team that they have active investigations relating to gangs operating in or otherwise active in their area. Within the context of proactive community policing this means the creation of information reports, the development of intelligence, and the existence of Directed Surveillance Authorities in relation to key targets.

As many as 1 in 3 (34 per cent) of Londoners state that if they had information right now about gangs or criminal groups operating in their area, they would be stopped from giving the information to police today because they don’t think the police would do anything...
with the information (17 per cent) or they think that, even if the police act, it won’t make a difference (17 per cent).112

The fact that in the 12 months to the end of June 2018, 10 of London’s 32 Boroughs failed to record an average of at least one drug trafficking offence per week speaks to inaction in relation to drug trafficking, even as knife and gun crime linked to drugs has been on the rise.113

While some may attribute the entirety of this inactivity to recent resourcing challenges, the reality is that during the eight years since July 2010, a total of 22 wards in London have consistently failed to record an average of at least one drug trafficking offence per year. This speaks to the persistent failure of some local management and leadership.

Most recently, in the 12 months to the end of June 2018, 78 (12.4 per cent) of London’s 629 wards failed to record a single offence of drug trafficking, a doubling of the number of such wards since 2014, with the last year seeing a very pronounced jump.

Figure 41: Number of Neighbourhood Wards in London recording no drug trafficking offences (July–June)

Just as efforts to tackle drug trafficking have diminished, so too have efforts to tackle drug possession, with the number of wards not even managing to record at least one drug possession offence per month growing from 17 in 2011 to 49 in 2018. The proportion of London’s neighbourhood wards failing to record at least one drug possession offence per week has grown from 41 per cent in 2011 to 66 per cent in 2018.

112 CSJ Crime in London Poll
113 The London Boroughs of Barking and Dagenham (50), Harrow (44), Havering (43), Bromley (39), Hammersmith and Fulham (33), Merton (33), Kingston upon Thames (32), Bexley (29), Sutton (22), and Richmond upon Thames (18)
It is therefore vital that proactive community policing is reinvigorated, in order to not just detect and deter drug trafficking and drug possession, but to be able to demonstrate to the public that where information is provided there is timely and effective action taken in response.

This shall require an uplift in both the quality and quantity of resources within community policing, and in Chapter 6 we therefore call on Government to adequately fund neighbourhood policing.

**Recommendation 23:** London’s Safer Street Zones should be prioritised for the uplift in neighbourhood policing, taking total strength from 2 Police Constables and 1 PCSO, to a total of 6 Police Constables and 1 PCSO. Local policing teams should be expected to be actively developing intelligence and undertaking surveillance to tackle high harm local offenders.

The power of data and analysis to inform decision-making

With additional proactive community policing can be expected to come a great quantity and quality of information and intelligence. This is vitally important to understanding crime problems and developing operations and approaches to tackle such problems.

The importance of data and analysis to not only inform the Safer Streets GVI, but more generally to help ensure the effective understanding of crime problems and subsequent police activity or problem-solving approaches should not be overlooked.

The Violence Reduction Unit, in Scotland, has integrated data analysis into their approach, enabling them to further understand the demographic of gang membership. The identification stage of their initiative is heavily informed by intelligence and analysis of
Scotland’s currently active gangs. In the initial stages, this approach was trialled in East Glasgow. Community police officers and analysts merged their local intelligence with data from the Scottish Intelligence Database (SID) to form a map of potential clients for CIRV.

As Figure 43 shows, this exercise in intelligence enabled the authorities to chart out the gang territories and analyse the relevant gang profiles. They identified 55 named gangs in the area. The composition of these gangs was predominantly males aged 14–18 years old.

Figure 43: Mapping out gang territories in Glasgow

![Map of gang territories in Glasgow](image)

Source: Violence Reduction Unit

This information then fed into a CIRV gang database including:

- The name of the gang the person is affiliated with
- Identification details such as their relevant names, date of birth, address, and Criminal History System number
- Date of last recorded gang related intelligence and a short synopsis of relevant intelligence
- Involvement in youth programmes, community orders and agency engagement (this information was recorded to help identify possible gateways for engagement)

Individuals on the database vary greatly in terms of their anticipated levels of risk both to the community and to themselves. The CIRV uses this data that it collates so that it can channel their resources into targeting those that pose the greatest risk. CIRV’s core objective is to target violent gang offending.

Evidence broadly supports that the CIRV in Scotland has been successful. Studies show that CIRV participants are 85 per cent less likely to carry a weapon, 73 per cent less likely to be involved in gang finding and, on average, 46 per cent less likely to commit a violent offence. The VRU have further developed the Operation Ceasefire’s model, highlighting the role that data analysis can play in directing public resources towards tackling the violent gang epidemic.

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114 Glasgow’s Community Initiative to Reduce Violence, First Year Report
115 Glasgow’s Community Initiative to Reduce Violence, Second Year Report
The need to rebuild analytical capability within the police service

When the police budgets were cut from 2010 onwards, with workforce costs accounting for in excess of 80 per cent of total budgets, it was always likely that a headcount reduction would be required. While the police service across England and Wales lost 20,000 police officers and 5,000 PCSOs.\(^\text{116}\)

In the case of the Metropolitan Police, more than 2,000 civilian staff (excluding PCSOs) were lost. While many of these civilians were in administrative roles that changes to business processes or business technology could make redundant while improving productivity, it is also true that the civilian workforce included the vast bulk of the Metropolitan Police’s crime analysts.

**Some of the first roles to be lost with austerity were analysts.**

*Today, that means when I want a problem profile to better understand a particular type of crime to help inform deployments, I simply can’t get it.*

Inspector, Metropolitan Police

The latest police workforce data reveals a total of 200 civilian staff employed in an intelligence analysis/threat assessment role in the Metropolitan Police – fewer than the 209 civilian staff employed in the same role in West Yorkshire Police.\(^\text{117}\) This is surprising since West Yorkshire Police serves just a quarter of the population covered by the Metropolitan Police, and has just one sixth as many police officers.

**The Met has traditionally always had the ability to throw resources at crime problems. It was only ever a short-termist approach and an approach that other forces would view as hugely wasteful of a precious police resource.**

Superintendent, Metropolitan Police

If we are to build a GVI approach that can target its resources on identified gang members, we need to invest in analysis. The shortage of crime analysts within the Metropolitan Police is undermining the productivity of the wider service and therefore impacting upon public safety.

**Recommendation 24:** Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) should conduct an urgent thematic review into the availability of crime analysts and analytical capability within the police service. The Review should be accompanied by joint-working between forces and HMICFRS to understand the current gap in analytical capability.

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\(^{116}\) Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2017

The need to tackle gun crime and the availability of illegal firearms

Almost 1 in 10 Londoners (9 per cent) said that they know someone who has or has had an illegal gun or firearm, and a similar percentage (8 per cent) said that they would be able to get an illegal gun or firearm if they wanted. Figures that are broadly comparable (10 and 13 per cent respectively) to a poll conducted in 2007. A recent Home Office study also found that: “in general guns were kept at home, buried, or otherwise accessible – typically being minded by third parties”.

Further, we have heard evidence in support of the five-year minimum prison sentence for the possession of a firearm. This sentence compares favourably with European counterparts – Denmark, for example, is only now, as part of efforts to have “no more ghettos by 2030”, looking to double their equivalent sentence from one – to two-years in prison. It is noteworthy that among the criteria for identifying ghettos in Denmark, is whether, on average over a two-year period, more than 2.7 per cent of residents aged 18 or over have received convictions in relation to weapons, drugs, or the penal code.

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The need to create a real and genuine sense of belonging for young people is important. The risks of failing to do so are greater today than ten years ago. Those factors that make young people vulnerable to the predations or allure of street gangs are often the same for those who find themselves drawn to Islamist terrorism.

It is also a hard truth that while we readily recognise that street gangs cause significant harm to communities and to young people themselves, they also are very often the only constant within the life of that young person. For a young person that has had a challenging background, the structure and protection offered by a gang – no matter the cost – can be hard to turn down.

Why creating belonging matters now more than ever

The rise of Islamist terrorism within the UK and Europe over the last decade highlights just how deadly the consequences can be when vulnerable young people are excluded or otherwise disengage from society and grow vulnerable to the predations of extremists. The same factors that contribute to the allure or aid the predations of a street gang, are very often the same factors that contribute to the allure or predations of Islamist terrorists.

*Isis offered everything a street gang does – adventure, status, even financial and sexual opportunity – but with the bonus of redemption from past sins and resolution of a complex identity crisis.*

Jason Burke, The Observer

The Government’s updated Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) describes how Islamist extremists “cynically groom the vulnerable and the young to join their movement”. So too, we see criminals specifically target and groom the vulnerable and young for criminal activities.
gain. This manifests itself in relation to gangs and the harrowing reality of on-street sexual grooming gangs. The need to safeguard young people who are vulnerable to exploitation through radicalisation, sexual grooming, or criminal gangs has never been clearer or more obvious.

With sexual grooming, the perpetrators take those who feel unwanted and unloved, manipulate them, then abuse them. With radicalisation, it’s the same; perpetrators take teenagers who feel misunderstood, show them propaganda about a better world and a better life, and distance them from their family and friends. Then they take them.\textsuperscript{125}

Nazir Afzal OBE, former Chief Crown Prosecutor for the North West

For these reasons, the proposals we set out in relation to creating belonging are applicable to populations beyond those involved in gangs or at risk of gang membership, they may as readily apply to populations at risk of radicalisation or at risk of sexual exploitation.

The approach must take on multiple levels

We must not be complacent; in creating a sense of belonging we must assess risk factors spanning from the individual level up to the societal. For this purpose, we propose the government takes an INSPIRE Framework approach.

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Case study: INSPIRE Framework: Risk factors for violence against children and young people}\textsuperscript{126}
\end{quote}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{inspire-framework-figure}
\caption{Figure 44}
\end{figure}

\begin{quote}
Individual-level risk factors include biological and personal history aspects such as sex, age, education, income, disability, impaired brain and cognitive development, psychological disorders, harmful use of alcohol, drug abuse, and a history of aggression or maltreatment.
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{126} INSPIRE: Seven strategies for Ending Violence Against Children
Close-relationship level risk factors include a lack of emotional bonding, poor parenting practices, family dysfunction and separation, associating with delinquent peers, children witnessing violence against their mother or stepmother, and early or forced marriage.

Community-level risk factors include how the characteristics of settings such as schools, workplaces and neighbourhoods increase the risk of violence. These include poverty, high population density, transient populations, low social cohesion, unsafe physical environments, high crime rates and the existence of a local drug trade.

Society-level risk factors include legal and social norms that create a climate in which violence is encouraged or normalized. These also include health, economic, educational and social policies that maintain economic, gender or social inequalities; absent or inadequate social protection; social fragility owing to conflict, post-conflict or natural disaster; weak governance and poor law enforcement.

It’s not just the academic evidence that points to the need for a multi-faceted approach, Londoners themselves recognise that the response to violent crime and gangs requires interventions from a range of actors.

Figure 45: How important or unimportant are the following to help tackle gangs and serious youth violence?

Source: CSJ Crime in London Poll

In our poll, Londoners ranked parents and families as the most important entity in tackling the problem of gangs or groups involving serious violence.
Londoners were almost twice as likely to pick parents and families as their top choice (40 per cent ranked 1st) than the next closest option, of the police (23 per cent ranked 1st). The importance of ensuring that parents and families are engaged, empowered, and supported as part of the broad approach to tackling the issues has clear public support from Londoners.

Figure 46: Which of the following agencies or institutions do you think are most important in tackling the problem of gangs or groups involving serious violence?

![Bar chart showing rankings of different agencies and institutions](source: CSJ Crime in London Poll)

Supporting families and parents in their efforts to stay together and bring up their children

Providing support to parents and families with children showing early signs of aggressive or anti-social behaviour receives significant support from Londoners, with 90 per cent believing it either very important (57 per cent) or somewhat important (33 per cent).127

At present the options for parents who are struggling with such behaviour are limited. A similar situation exists for parents where they may have concerns about their child being involved in crime or at risk of exploitation.

The option to call police is ever-present, but for many the fear of their child being arrested and receiving a criminal record, is enough to cause them to suffer in silence, or to take the difficult decision to kick their own child out of their own home.

I know that what happens at home has a significant impact on what happens at school ... it’s really important that parents have the skills to be able to manage their children’s behaviour, to support them with their learning, and to give them the emotional resilience they need to succeed.

Headteacher128

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127 CSJ Crime in London Poll
128 https://youtu.be/_Ua0U2EWByg
Case study: The Parent Gym – An evidence-based parenting programme

The Parent Gym is a six-week programme comprising six two-hour sessions run in primary schools located in areas of multiple deprivation with ‘missions’ to complete in between each one, covering how to communicate, how to balance warmth and discipline, how to be consistent with setting boundaries, how to raise healthy children, how to encourage learning, and how to build a solid family support network.

Results from Parent Gym’s own parent feedback gathering and from evaluations conducted by the University of Hertfordshire, University of Warwick, and Canterbury Christ Church University, make the following findings:

- 100 per cent of parents who were interviewed two months or more after they had completed the programme reported that their relationships with their children had improved;
- 96 per cent of parents rated Parent Gym sessions as very good or excellent;
- 96 per cent of parents would recommend the Parent Gym sessions to others; and
- Parents who have been through the programme show statistically significant improvements on every dimension of the Tool to measure Parenting Self Efficacy (TOPSE).

Most people around here, their parents have two jobs, meaning you’re not going to see your parent most of the time, meaning you’re going to have to do certain stuff by yourself, which means you’re more vulnerable to stuff in an area, when you’re already vulnerable… it just adds things together…

Young person, London

Recommendation 25: The Mayor of London and frontline public services and partners across London should promote accessible helpline services for parents struggling with early signs of aggressive or anti-social behaviour.

There are a number of existing helplines for parents that would be able to scale up and provide a combination of advice and wayfinding. The Metropolitan Police – among other services, such as GPs, the NHS, and others – could confidently refer parents to such a service to help connect them with both advice and appropriate local support and schemes.

The importance of the first 1,000 days in the development of a child is well-recognised and is something that must be better incorporated within and across public services and communities in London and beyond.

Recommendation 26: The Mayor of London should set an expectation that London’s 32 boroughs each provide access to services in their locality to help parents during the first 1,001 days, but also in relation to where parents have concerns about aggressive or anti-social behaviour or concerns about involvement in gangs or criminality.

We also continue to fully support the recommendations made by the Centre for Social Justice’s Early Years Commission and the Family Breakdown Working Group and the recommendations made in the Early Intervention report by Rt Hon Iain Duncan Smith MP and Graham Allen MP:
Recommendation 27: The establishment of Family Hubs in the heart of disadvantaged communities, with the provision of non-stigmatising relationships and parenting education and support provided by effective third sector organisations, with an enhanced role for Health Visitors in the delivery of both targeted and universal support for families.

Family Hubs have been a key recommendation of the Centre for Social Justice, ever since 2007. In Dying to Belong, we highlighted their importance with respect to reducing gang membership. Family Hubs are key to preventing family breakdown and providing parenting education to those from disadvantaged backgrounds. It is necessary that young people feel like they have a sense of belonging and identity at home and this starts with family.

Creating safe inspiring youth zones

In conversations with our working group from Dying to Belong, young people cited boredom as a key driver behind their gang involvement. It is therefore vital that young people have access to stimulating and meaningful activities to occupy their time.

Youth zones can therefore play a necessary bridging role between the individual and their local community. Our polling suggested that there is wide support for the role of youth organisations in tackling the problem of gang violence. One way in which youth zones can do this is by providing young people with inspirational role models, youth workers who individuals can engage with on their terms, removed from outside pressures.

Case study: Onside Youth Zones

OnSide is a national charity based in the UK which focuses its efforts on building a network of state-of-the-art Youth Zones. Their mission is to ensure that every young people, regardless of their circumstance, has the opportunity to achieve their potential. Each Youth Zone provides young people with activities ranging from sports to arts and leisure, seven days a week, fifty two weeks a year.

Their universal offer is supplemented with the provision of targeted services including: employability, wellbeing, health, and mentoring. In 2017, OnSide Youth Zones recorded 444,471 visits.129

OnSide has based their Youth Zones in areas where they can have the greatest impact. These areas have high levels of unemployment and low life satisfaction estimates. Each Youth Zone works in partnership with local businesses and the local authority. Their efforts integrate local services in a cross-community collaboration.

Impact reports suggest that for every £1 spent on operating costs, OnSide Youth Zones generate £2.03 of social benefits, or £6.66 for every £1 of Local Authority contributions. OnSide has proven results in strengthening community cohesion as 90% of those who have engaged with OnSide report they now get on better with others. Further, local police have reported a 30–77% reduction in youth anti-social behaviour in areas with a Youth Zone.

OnSide Youth Zones are proven to reduce anti-social behaviour and have a hugely positive impact on young people’s physical health and mental wellbeing.

Rt Hon Sir Lindsay Hoyle MP

Securing maximum impact from funding allocated to the National Citizen Service

The National Citizen Service exists to provide or arrange for the provision of programmes for young people in England with the purpose of enabling participants from different backgrounds to work together in local communities to participate in projects to benefit society, and enhancing communication, leadership, and team-working skills of participants.\[130\]

The National Audit Office’s 2017 assessment of the National Citizen Service identified forecast underspends in 2017–2019 totaling £195 million, following on from lower participation and underspends amounting to £55 million between 2014–2016. At the same time, we know that other youth organisations with comparable aims are facing both oversubscription and a shortage in available capacity. It is our belief that these underspends could be redirected for greater investment in youth organisations for our young people.

Uniformed young people are between 6 and 23 percentage points more likely than non-uniformed young people to say that they spend time with people who are different from them. 84 per cent of uniformed youth report that at least some of the members of their group are different from them in some way. Young people who attend uniformed youth groups are also more likely to recognise the importance of mixing with people who are different from them: 79 per cent say this in comparison to 66 per cent of non-uniformed youth.

Interviews with uniformed young people, their parents/guardians and adult volunteers also suggest that the environment of uniformed youth groups fosters positive interactions with others, particularly the small group sizes and individual attention from group leaders. The fact that uniformed youth attend their groups for a sustained period of time helps to foster strong relationships and allows social bonds to grow, showing that long-term involvement contributes to positive social mixing.

Uniformed youth, parents/guardians, and volunteers report feeling that uniformed youth groups help to increase collaboration and young people’s connection to British society, and that they foster the values felt to be a fundamental part of British citizenship such as freedom, tolerance, and equality. Uniformed youth groups are felt to have a positive impact on the confidence and resilience of young people, and to foster a sense of belonging.

The demographic profile of uniformed youth reflects the profile of young people nationally in many ways: the ethnic background of uniformed youth does not differ significantly from the average, they are similarly likely to be from a non-Christian faith and similarly likely to receive free school meals.

I’m reminded of a young man I worked with who used to be very challenging in school. After a year or so at cadets he had changed. He ended up at one of the best secondary schools in the country got a music scholarship and even played in the Albert Hall. He’s gone on to do so much with his life as a result of that encounter with police cadets.

Volunteer Police Cadet, Kensington and Chelsea\[131\]

Funding should be redirected from the National Citizen Service to help create capacity to accommodate the estimated 180,000 waiting list for uniformed youth organisation nationally, of which almost 60,000 are in London and the south east. The Funds should be prioritised to those local areas identified as Safer Street Zones.

**Recommendation 28:** Government should redirect funding from the National Citizen Service to create capacity in priority areas to support uniformed youth organisations and other local youth provision that signs up to the principles of a Safer Streets GVI.

### Making the most of the Mayor’s Young Londoners Fund

The Mayor of London’s Young Londoners Fund makes £45 million available for projects that support children and young people, aged 10–21 years old, from across London, who are either at risk of exclusion or involvement in criminal activity or have been involved in criminal activity. The three year fund will see £30 million made available for projects in local communities, with the remaining £15 million to be invested in existing projects funded by City Hall.

It is vital that these funds are targeted in support of the gang and group violence intervention. The Mayor of London must resist the temptation to spread these funds too far and too wide.

### Helping prevent school exclusions becoming a pipeline to prison

Throughout our fieldwork the issue of school exclusions was regularly cited as a key driver behind young people feeling disenfranchised from wider society and being more at-risk of gang membership. Our own polling of Londoners identified significant public support for efforts to improve outcomes for children vulnerable to gangs, such as those in care and excluded from school.

CSJ’s recent *Providing the Alternative* finds that 58 per cent of the current prison population have been excluded from school at some point of their life. More needs to be done to understand the root causes of school exclusions and to use the point of engagement that schools provide as a way to embed young people into a community of support.

> There’s times I’d bunk because people are waiting outside the school but then you get in trouble because it’s misunderstood and seen as naughty…
> Young Londoner

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133 *Providing the Alternative*, Centre for Social Justice

Schools are failing to address the reasons why young people are acting out. Young people interviewed by the Centre for Mental Health explained how they felt unsafe when attending school. One young respondent said that teachers misunderstood the measures they were taking to protect themselves. Their concern amounted to carrying around knives in self-defence: “a knife was part of the uniform” said one young person. This is not a new finding. In our 2009 report, Dying to Belong, young people reported to our working group that they were carrying knives “for protection, not to use”.

In 2009, Marc Edwards, Young Disciples, detailed to us the experience of several young people involved in gangs who had not attended school for “three or four years”. Quantitative research has indicated a link between school exclusion and later involvement in crime or prison, and a study tracking 4,000 students found that those excluded from school were 12 times more likely to be jailed as an adult.

Recent analysis by the Ministry of Justice and the Department for Education found that 83 per cent of young offenders convicted of knife possession had been excluded from school for a fixed period, and that 18 per cent of young offenders convicted of knife possession had been permanently excluded. The analysis also found that approximately 41 per cent of young offenders convicted of knife possession had been eligible for free school meals. 83 per cent of knife possession offenders were persistently absent from school in at least one of the 5 academic years from 2008/09 to 2012/13.

The analysis notes that “it is not possible to identify from this analysis whether there is an association between exclusions and knife possession offending”, however in evidence to the CSJ we have repeatedly been advised that those young people subject to fixed or permanent exclusion find themselves at risk of both gang membership, offending behaviour, and exploitation.

Anecdotally, people report that more children who aren’t in mainstream education are being marginalised and are more vulnerable to gangs, who are preying on them and grooming them.

Anne Longfield, Children’s Commissioner

As cited in the CSJ’s recent Providing the Alternative: How to transform school exclusion and the support that exists beyond, Police and Crime Commissioners are increasingly aware of the need to address young people who are excluded or at-risk of exclusion and are prepared to make investments in early interventions relating to this cohort.

136 “Dying to Belong” Centre for Social Justice (2009)
Case study: School exclusion support from the Northamptonshire Police and Crime Commissioner

A good example of understanding local drivers to promote early intervention presents itself in Northamptonshire. The Police and Crime Commissioner has invested in an early intervention measure to support pupils who might be at risk of being drawn into criminal activity.

The Northamptonshire PCC, Stephen Mold, has top-sliced his own budget to create seven new expert posts to identify pupils at risk of permanent exclusion, involvement in anti-social and criminal activity, or being on the periphery of involvement in gang activity.

The experts will build a clearer picture about those pupils’ family circumstances; identify reasons why they might not be regularly attending schools; and understand the underlying drivers of any behavioural challenges that exist. They will then provide early family support; refer or signpost families to appropriate specialist help; and continue to engage them to ensure progress or adjust their support as necessary.

These experts will also work with local authority colleagues in collaborative multidisciplinary teams, all with the aim of creating a continuum of support from early intervention to statutory social care support. And the PCC is looking to invest in greater capacity in the local Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS); the aim here is to provide support to schools and other professionals who are helping children and young people with lower level mental health needs, and to help individuals in specific youth support roles to provide a more targeted offer to adolescents.

While it is too early to evaluate the outcome of this work in Northamptonshire, there is a lot of learning to be done around the drivers of exclusion. Wider understanding needs to be created around young people’s needs and the connection to offending later in life. Schools owning the pupils that they exclude is key in achieving this objective. Young people who are excluded from school should not just fall through the cracks.

Recommendation 29: Schools should be responsible and accountable for the pupils they exclude, and funds should be devolved to them to support vulnerable pupils early. This would involve three main reforms:

- schools, not local authorities, are given responsibility for finding suitable education for the pupils they exclude;
- schools remain accountable for the educational outcomes of the pupils they exclude, which will count towards their performance statistics; and
- all local authority funding for AP is devolved to schools to give them additional resources to support pupils with complex needs.

The Department should consult on whether the accountability we outline above should be weighted to reflect the proportion of time excluded pupils spend in different mainstream schools.
Alongside gathering a deeper understanding of young people excluded from schools, it is necessary to provide schemes that suitably increase their engagement and improve their behaviour. The Sea Cadets in East London provide a good example of how such support can be provided.

Case study: Sea Cadets and alternative provision in East London

As part of Uniformed Youth Social Action Fund 2, the Sea Cadets (SCC) in east London worked with schools and also an alternative provision (AP) provider of education to children who had been excluded from mainstream schooling. Qualitative feedback recorded in the evaluation found:

- Increased attendance and engagement in lessons from the group on SCC activity days
- Less challenging behaviour from most members of the group during other school sessions
- Noticeable improvement in the behaviour of the group after residential activity
- Three members of the group showed a substantial improvement in behaviour
- One member of the group found and accepted a college place on a course he was inspired to choose following the residential activity
- SCC Instructors found the sessions challenging but the changes in personality and behaviour made them the most rewarding

School exclusions should be treated as a key intervention stage and as an early warning. Young people who are excluded from school should be targeted with support services that focus on improving their sense of belonging. Excluded should not mean forgotten.

More broadly there is the reality that youth crime generally takes place outside of traditional school hours. The most recent and extensive attempt to survey the youth services landscape in London found that between 2011/12 and 2017/18, at least £39 million has been cut from council youth service budgets in London, across 25 councils 81 youth centres and youth projects had been cut, and across 22 councils 800 full-time youth service posts had gone.

The creation of opportunities for young people to safely and productively occupy their time in evenings, at weekends, and during school holidays can have positive effects in crime reductions and in the quality of life for the young person, their family, and the community.

140 Uniformed Youth Social Action Fund 2: Results and Internal Evaluation, London Area Sea Cadets, 2016
Learning from Homeboy Industries

Nothing stops a bullet like a job.
Father Greg

Case study: Homeboy Industries, Los Angeles, California, USA

Homeboy Industries began life in 1988 when members of Dolores Mission Church created their “Jobs For a Future” program. Young people were offered a way out of gang life through the church and 70 people took this opportunity to start work. The project was inspired by a simple question: “Can we improve the health and safety of our community through jobs and education rather than through suppression and incarceration?”

Four years later, following substantial investment from Hollywood producer Ray Stark, Homeboy Bakery was born. Shortly after, the job program expanded to become “Homeboy Industries” as it is known today. Homeboy Industries not only offers jobs but also free services ranging from tattoo removal to Baby and Me classes.

Homeboy Industries has offered a second chance to thousands, offering community and family to those that turn to them. Homeboy currently employs over 200 formerly gang involved and recently incarcerated youth. They have fostered a sense of community and a place of welcome for those in desperate need of it.

Inspired by the success of the Homeboy Industries model, the Scottish Violence Reduction Unit has embarked on a similar project of creating Braveheart Industries (BHI) with the goal of creating a network of social enterprises offering sustainable employment opportunities for young people exiting gangs or otherwise at risk of gang membership.

In London, there are already examples of an emerging network of similar organisations that seek to connect young people at risk of gang membership, criminality or are ex-offenders, with employment and entrepreneurial opportunities.

Case study: Key4Life

Key4Life is a British charity launched in 2013 providing innovative solutions to help reduce gang warfare and youth offending. The charity assists young men in prison who may struggle to leave the criminal justice system once they have entered it. Key4Life replaces the “gang family” with a clear alternative. Offenders are surrounded by positive role models who help them to reintegrate into their communities.

Prisoners are encouraged, pre- and post-release, to tell stories of their lives as part of their journey of reintegration. They provide intensive one-on-one mentoring support to help offenders develop self-confidence and the necessary skills to find employment.

142 Home Boy Industries [Accessed via: www.homeboyindustries.org/]
143 Key4Life [Accessed via: www.key4life.org.uk/]
Creating new and stronger relationships between young people and the police

If we are to see successful implementation of the above plans, it is necessary that a mutual respect and accountability exist between young people and the police. Our polling also explored how Londoners would like to see the police better connect with young people in the capital. The two most popular requests were for police to be on foot and accessible in the local area more often (53 per cent), and to visit secondary schools more often (45 per cent).

Figure 47: Which of the following would you like the police to do in order to better connect with young people in London today?

![Figure 47: Bar chart showing preferences for police actions.](source: CSJ Crime in London Poll)

While there is a notable gap of 12 percentage points between white and non-white Londoners in relation to wishing to see police to on foot and accessible more often in their local area, support for this and for visiting secondary schools is significant.

We have meetings with youth leaders who are very anti-police. We invite them into the police station and ask what they would change about how we operate, in order to make them feel safer and do our jobs better. For some of them it’s the first time they’ve been into a police station without being arrested. They all came up with really good, valid answers.

Volunteer Police Cadet, Kensington and Chelsea

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The desire to see police participate in community events is broadly even across white and non-white London. A fair challenge for the Metropolitan Police in this regard is to ensure their mapping and engagement with such community events, and to develop packages that local neighbourhood teams can easily and readily offer in relation to such events. For example, recognising the value and public interest in having assets that can be deployed to support non-confrontational and non-threatening public engagement, such as the Metropolitan Police Historic Vehicle Collection.\textsuperscript{146}

Almost 1 in 3 non-white Londoners supported the promotion and expansion of youth organisations like the Police Cadets. The Volunteer Police Cadets (VPC) are nationally recognised as the police uniformed youth group. It is important to note that the purpose of the VPC “is not to recruit police officers of the future, but to encourage the spirit of adventure and good citizenship amongst its members.”\textsuperscript{147}

The VPC in London comprises of more than 5,000 young people, with 54 per cent from black and minority ethnic backgrounds and 29 per cent identified as coming from vulnerable backgrounds, including a “significant proportion of cadets from extremely disadvantaged and poor socio-economic backgrounds”.\textsuperscript{148}

I heard so many things against the police in my school, and I found myself wondering why. I wanted to find out for myself, rather than following the trend. One of the staff members from Tower Hamlets cadets came to visit, and when they told us about all the things we could achieve I was very interested. I thought I’d give it a shot.

\textit{Volunteer Police Cadet, Tower Hamlets}\textsuperscript{149}

The Mayor of London should lead a fundraising effort, working with businesses across London, to sponsor and support the expansion of the Volunteer Police Cadets in the Safer London Zones. Funding could either be routed through a new Police Foundation for London, or through the existing Safer London charity.

**Recommendation 30:** All secondary schools and colleges in London should either have a Volunteer Police Cadet programme or be affiliated to one nearby. The roll-out and strengthening of the VPC should be prioritised to expedite roll-out across the Safer Streets Zones.

Furthermore, Safer Schools Officers should be rolled out to all secondary schools and colleges in the Safer Streets Zones. Each school or college should have a fully operational police officer seconded full-time, either as part of the senior management team or the behaviour and education support team.

\textsuperscript{146} For examples of such engagement, see https://twitter.com/MPSClaphamTown/status/878615527668756482 or https://twitter.com/MPShavering/status/756393920175673346 or https://twitter.com/MPHVC/status/628634646529293312

\textsuperscript{147} About Us: The Volunteer Police Cadets [Accessed on 16 July 2018 via https://vpc.police.uk/about-us/]


The Metropolitan Police is due to complete roll-out of 600 Safer Schools Officers by the end of 2018, providing a named officer for all schools in London.\textsuperscript{150} In April 2016, there were just 282 Safer Schools Officers.\textsuperscript{151} There will also be an increase focus on supporting young people in more challenging environments such as Pupil Referral Units, children’s homes and other youth projects not within educational establishments.\textsuperscript{152} This is vital work as we believe all young people need to be able to turn to a named police officer for help and assistance.

The role could be funded or part-funded by schools through the proposals in Providing the Alternative: How to transform school exclusion and the support that exists beyond, that would see all local authority funding for alternative provision (AP) devolved to schools to give them additional resources to support pupils with complex needs or otherwise at risk of exclusion or transfer to AP.

We must also not be complacent about the issue of girls and gangs

The CSJ has previously explored the issue of girls and gangs (see Girls and Gangs, 2014). Practitioners reported that women and girls were involved in the commission and facilitation of gang-related crime, for example through storing drugs or firearms, or setting up attacks on rival gang members. From the data collected it was not possible to get a sense of the extent to which this is widespread.\textsuperscript{153}

There have been growing concerns from practitioners about young people being used to transport and sell drugs, and the sexual exploitation of women and girls, and there was some evidence that these issues were perceived to be more prevalent now than two years ago. However, practitioners also recognised that there was increased awareness and prioritisation of these issues locally through the work of the EGYV programme, which could have influenced perceptions about the extent of the problem.\textsuperscript{154}

**Recommendation 31:** The Home Office should commission research to develop a behavioural detection training package for police officers in relation to identifying potential female gang members and/or behaviours associated with a female carrying or holding weapons or other items. This training package should help empower both male and female police officers to use their powers more effectively in relation to young women and gangs.

\textsuperscript{150} Met Business Plan 2017–18, Quarter 3 Update (October to December 2017), Metropolitan Police, 2018 [Accessed on 8 July 2018 via www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/metropolitan-police/priorities_and_how_we_are_doing/corporate/met-hq---media-communications---met-business-plan-quarter-3---monitoring-report]


There was evidence of increasing awareness among practitioners of issues related to women and girls associated with gangs, in particular, risks of sexual exploitation and physical and sexual violence. Sexual or physical violence against women and girls affiliated with gangs, and sexual exploitation were reported to happen sometimes or often in EGYV areas. Overall, practitioners reported that the situation around sexual violence and exploitation had worsened, but this must be interpreted carefully, as it is not clear whether the extent of these problems have increased, or whether practitioners were simply more aware of these problems now compared with two years ago.\textsuperscript{155}

Each gang-associated girl is unique. While there are some common themes, girls become involved for a variety of reasons, take on different roles, and experience different things within gang life. What will motivate them to exit will also vary.

The mentoring they receive needs to reflect and respond to this. Frequently we have been told that a bureaucratic, tick-box approach to mentoring is not effective. Interviewees told the CSJ that it does not allow for relationships to develop between the mentor and mentee.

Many of those who have given evidence to the CSJ argued that the relational element is especially critical, not least given that many of the girls and young women often become involved in gangs through a relationship with a gang member and so need another (positive) relationship to replace the gang-related one in order to leave.

The importance of relational work is increasingly understood and also featured in our recent \textit{A Woman-Centred Approach: Freeing vulnerable women from the revolving door of crime} and in the Government’s response in their Female Offender Strategy.

\begin{quote}
The biggest issue with girls in gangs is that we simply don’t know the full extent of the problem. The data we have is merely the tip of the iceberg and at XLP there is no doubt that we see increasing numbers of girls dragged into this appalling world of exploitation, criminality and hopelessness.

\textit{Patrick Regan, CEO, XLP}
\end{quote}

We especially welcome the recently published draft Relationships Education, Relationships and Sex Education and Health Education (England) Regulations 2019.\textsuperscript{156} Not only do the proposals support the important institution of marriage, but they create an obligation on schools to better prepare and equip young people for having positive relationships and avoiding negative relationships.


\textsuperscript{156} Relationships Education, Relationships and Sex Education and Health Education (England) Regulations 2019
Recommendation 32: Government should progress the proposed Section 80A amendment to the Education Act 2002 that places schools under a legal requirement to ensure that pupils learn about “safety in forming and maintaining relationships”, “the characteristics of healthy relationships”, and “how relationships may affect physical and mental health and well-being”, and “the nature of marriage and its importance for family life and the bringing up of children”.

As part of our work we have also taken evidence on the reality that the provision of such and related education in schools can often result in disclosures of either offending or risk factors and safeguarding concerns. Such issues can range from the disclosure of offending against the young person from an adult at home, or the disclosure of peer abuse or violence.

Case study: Growing Against Violence

Growing Against Violence (GAV) is a public safety programme seeking to protect young people at risk of association with gang violence and exploitation. It is a program that is centred around three principles: “protection”, “prevention”, and “partnership”. 157

GAV provides gang related preventative education for young people at risk. Their curriculum covers policy relating to gun and knife crime and young people’s victimisation. Further, GAV commissions publish evidence-based research on law enforcement and public health in relation to gang membership. These studies are disseminated for the widest possible benefit.

The myth of the “hard to reach” individuals and communities

Throughout the course of our work we heard evidence criticising a culture in which the label of “hard to reach” is used to describe individuals or entire demographic groups. It was a criticism that was most commonly levelled against public bodies, with a sense that the label “hard to reach” was used to justify decisions to ration services, manage caseloads, or otherwise cherry-pick easier individuals to work with.

Beyond the use of the phrase within bureaucracies, we also heard evidence describing how it had become a term and concept that had potentially become self-reinforcing. The mere existence or perception of potential barriers to engagement contributing to viewing particular groups or populations as being “hard to reach” when the opposite was true.

Results from the Uniformed Youth Social Action Fund demonstrate how groups perceived to be “hard to reach” can in fact be easy to reach with significant appetite for the service being offered. In the case of the Sea Cadets, they used funding to fill 220 cadet places with 13–14-year olds from disadvantaged communities and recruit 50 adult volunteers across Tower Hamlets, Hackney, Barking and Dagenham, and Newham – where 77 per cent of participants came from a non-White British background, compared to 32 per cent for the rest of London. 158

158 Uniformed Youth Social Action Fund 2: Results and Internal Evaluation, London Area Sea Cadets, 2016
This project has shown that there is demand for the services we offer in the area and that groups that we previously thought were ‘hard to reach’ are quite the opposite.

London Area Sea Cadets

Young people who are currently labelled “hard to reach” are in fact those who most need the support and intervention. Labelling them as “hard to reach” only serves as a meagre excuse for their neglect. To this end, we suggest that we should move from a culture and lexicon of “hard to reach” to one of “need to reach”.

**Recommendation 33:** Adopt the term “need to reach” to replace the term “hard to reach” in all future government policy papers.

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159 Uniformed Youth Social Action Fund 2: Results and Internal Evaluation, London Area Sea Cadets, 2016
The problem is not limited to London, or other major cities

It is often assumed that the problem of gangs and group violence is limited to London and the UK’s other major cities. This assumption is a dangerous one, not least given the long-standing phenomenon of “going country” or “County Lines” as it has come to be known.

Parents have told me that police and teachers don’t believe what they are telling them about gangs – it’s still not seen as a countrywide threat.

Anne Longfield, Children’s Commissioner

Outside London, other parts of the country are suffering from the failure to tackle the problem of gangs and relate criminality in major urban centres like our capital city. In recent years, the phenomenon of county lines coupled with growing violence has seen the modal age for those caught carrying a knife fall from 27 years old to 14 years old. 161

County lines is a term used to describe gangs and organised criminal networks involved in exporting illegal drugs into one or more importing areas within the UK, using dedicated mobile phone lines or other forms of “deal line”. They are likely to exploit children and vulnerable adults to move and store the drugs and money and they will often use coercion, intimidation, violence (including sexual violence), and weapons.

Knife crime has been rising beyond London

The problem of gangs and serious violence is not limited to London. Almost every police force has seen an increase in knife crime since 2014, with the number of assaults with injury or intent to injure reaching 13,220 in 2017/18. 162

161 [Hertfordshire PCC]
It is vital that other regions also look to tackle their issues with gang related violence. The Group Violence Intervention model has proven results globally. This logic is not limited by region or city. We encourage other cities and areas across England and Wales with a group or gang violence issue to adopt a Group Violence Intervention, adapting structures and partners, but not the core logic of the model, to reflect local circumstances.

The Serious Violence Reduction Order

In Chapter 4, we outlined how a Serious Violence Reduction Order could help the police in London tackle the problem of weapon carriage by introducing a post-conviction suspicionless stop and search power on known offenders for the duration of their sentence (see pages 70–72).

It is also possible to estimate the reach of an SVRO across the other forces in England and Wales. The number of convictions in each police force area relating to the possession of weapons, possession of firearms and drug trafficking, across England and Wales, excluding London, sum to 17,500, with a distribution as outlined in Figure 49 below.
As with London around half (46 per cent) of those convicted walk free from court and return into the community. The creation and application of an SVRO on these offenders would send a clear and strong signal to them that the violence must stop and that the possession of weapons will not be tolerated.

Furthermore, for the 54 per cent who do receive a prison sentence, the creation and application of an SVRO would ensure that on release from prison – generally at the half way point of their sentence – they would return to the community with a clear and strong signal that the violence must stop and that the possession of weapons will not be tolerated.

Both groups – as with London – would also have a strong aid to desistance, whether through criminal associates not wishing to work with them or being less inclined to do so through the increased risk of detection that it would bring, or the use of the SVRO as a credible excuse for the individual who is trying to distance themselves from further offending.

As per the detail outlined in Chapter 4, there is also significant scope for utilising GPS tagging technology to further reinforce the SVRO – by providing the police with real-time and historical data relating to the location of offenders under supervision. This again would both aid the prevention and detection of crime by the police, but also provide a powerful and credible excuse for offenders to desist and move away from crime. We repeat and endorse the calls made by others in the past in relation to the devolution of electronic monitoring budgets to the Mayors or PCCs overseeing police force areas.

164 Criminal Justice System Statistics publication: Court Outcomes by Police Force Area: Pivot Table Analytical Tool for England and Wales, Ministry of Justice, May 2018
Recommendation 34: The Ministry of Justice should develop a comprehensive devolution strategy for Police and Crime Commissioners that includes electronic monitoring and allows for local areas to commission electronic monitoring services that are suitable to their local needs and requirements, such as incorporating within a GVI approach.

County lines

The phenomenon of “county lines” in which drug-selling gangs from the major urban areas, like London, Birmingham, and Liverpool, have sought to exploit markets in other towns and areas. The phenomenon is not new.\(^\text{165}\)

We know we have these organised criminals coming into the county preying on the young and the vulnerable, bringing with them increased levels of violence.

Chief Superintendent Paul Wells, Commander South Local Policing Area, Essex Police\(^\text{166}\)

For Southend, police arrest data for the period January 2007–December 2011 confirmed the early presence of OTD within the local heroin and crack cocaine markets there, with 33 (34 per cent) of the 96 sellers arrested during the period associated with home residence postcodes outside of Southend – and principally from London boroughs such as Hackney, Lambeth, Barking, Ealing, Newham, Croydon, Westminster, and Haringey.\(^\text{167}\)

Figure 50: Map of county line research sites (arrowed) and other commuting locations

\(^\text{165}\) Knight, G., Hood Rat, 2012
\(^\text{166}\) https://twitter.com/BBCEssex/status/94389522903659008/video/1
\(^\text{168}\) Ibid
Swindon, much like Reading, Oxford, and Chelmsford, is a location not in immediate proximity to London, but one that is located within a commutable radius of the capital. Due to both its "active" street sex market and its geographical location, it appears to be experiencing a burgeoning county lines presence, with intelligence suggesting that around 12–18 county lines are established in the area.\textsuperscript{169}

The scramble to coordinate an effective national response that controls the saturation of commuting, holidaying and cuckooing dealers in provincial locales has been said to pose a number of ‘wicked’ operational challenges for local forces and national policing bodies.\textsuperscript{170}

County line gangs selling drugs are generally much more violent than the local dealers who had previously controlled the market.\textsuperscript{171} 58 per cent of forces reported county line turf wars occurring in the last year. These turfs centred on market dominance. Violent and destructive conflicts were waged in an attempt to intimidate rival groups. Anecdotal evidence suggests that turf wars are a major cause of increasing violent incidents in rural areas.\textsuperscript{172}

In 2017, 77 per cent of forces (33) documented incidents of cuckooing that were associated to county lines activity. Cuckooing clearly remains the dominant method of obtaining access to suitable premises to operate and deal from. Virtually every force that reported the presence of a county line end-point reported cuckooing. The vulnerable adults targeted are predominantly class A drug addicts but also include the elderly, those with mental or physical health impairments, female sex workers and single mothers.\textsuperscript{173}

The use of rail transport as the primary method highlights an important role for the British Transport Police in tackling the problem in partnership with other forces. The British Transport Police have a key role to play in increasing intelligence around county line gangs.

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid
Recommendation 35: In addition to joint intelligence-led enforcement activity between British Transport Police (BTP) and local police forces, the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) should work with BTP to develop regularly updated training packages for railway staff to facilitate the identification of rail-enabled county line activity.

The use of hire vehicles by gang offenders is well-established and long-standing. The great advantage being that offenders are able to use the road network without having their details known to police, and the police’s ability to fully investigate hire cars at the roadside is limited.

Therefore, in support of efforts to tackle county lines, and the use of the road network by organised criminals including gang members, we propose the creation of a database for use by law enforcement to establish who should legally be in possession and is insured to drive hired vehicles. The database should include the ability to identify payment methods and repeated patterns and transactions.

This new data service would fill an important gap and, alongside the PNC, PND, and the national ANPR infrastructure, be a valuable tool for detecting and disrupting gang and related criminality. Additional benefits could include a reduction in credit card fraud and money-laundering relating to hire car usage.

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176 ‘Six drug dealers have been jailed for more than 40 years’, Metropolitan Police, 29 May 2017 [Accessed on 2 July 2018 via http://news.met.police.uk/news/six-drug-dealers-have-been-jailed-for-more-than-40-years-243695]
Getting and sharing data across force boundaries remains an issue. In our case there were only two users – one worked part-time and the other couldn’t touch type.

Former police officer

The National Fraud Database and Internal Fraud Database, operated by Cifas, demonstrate how a membership organisation can develop useful and value-creating tools. A new data service in relation to hire cars could operate on a similar basis and be funded through a mix of public and private funds.

**Recommendation 36:** The Home Office should work with the hire car industry to ensure the creation of a data-sharing tool allowing law enforcement to establish who should legally be in possession of and is insured to drive hired vehicles. This could be achieved through a monetary prize to encourage efficiency and innovation.

Understanding the scale of gang-related crime outside London also suffers from the same measurement issues as in London. For example, West Midlands Police only recorded an average of five gang-related crimes per month between March and May 2017. 177

The creation of a Police National Database (PND) was the key recommendation of the Bichard Inquiry that followed the murders of Jessica Chapman and Holly Wells. Today, the PND contains approximately 3.5 billion records. To facilitate a greater understanding of the scale of gang violence, the National Law Enforcement Data Programme (NLED) must facilitate data sharing among multiple agencies.

**Recommendation 37:** The Home Office’s National Law Enforcement Data (NLED) Programme must facilitate information sharing and the timely provision of data. The programme must support the creation of appropriate safeguarding markers, action plans, and points of contact.

**Proactive policing and operations can deter and detect**

**Case study: Joint working in Kent between local, regional, and national policing** 178

In March 2018, Kent Police – working with the Regional Organised Crime Unit (ROCU), National Crime Agency (NCA), and British Transport Police (BTP) – conducted an operation with the intention of disrupting the activity of county line offenders; maximising any safeguarding activity against vulnerable persons exploited by London gangs carrying out this activity; increase intelligence submissions; publicise the law enforcement activity against this threat to increase knowledge and understanding within communities; test the ability of the forces and ROCU to coordinate activity into one week against a priority threat area; and to test a model that could be shared with and enhanced by other ROCU partners.

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177 Gangs special interest marker crimes (7152_17), West Midlands Police, 22 June 2017 [Accessed on 2 July 2018 via http://foi.west-midlands.police.uk/gang-special-interest-marker-crimes-ref-number/]
178 Example provided by the Office of the Kent Police and Crime Commissioner, August 2018
Kent committed resources to the operation using ANPR to target travelling routes by road and to ensure that there was capability to carry out enforcement activity on receipt of actionable intelligence. The results for Kent during this operation were:

- 30 arrests;
- 12 warrants executed;
- 2 knives seized;
- £15,000 cash seized;
- £21,000 of Class A drugs seized

The myth of racial disparity in stop and search must be challenged

Proactive policing in the form of stop and search has been under sustained attack for years. The most common criticism relating to alleged racial disparity based on census data. This sees pressure groups and activists citing disparity ratios that are methodologically flawed. The failure of most police forces, the College of Policing, and the Home Office to openly challenge or improve upon these flawed statistics has allowed them to go unchallenged and enter the mainstream consciousness.

The official statistics show that, if someone is from a black or minority ethnic background, they are up to seven times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police than if they are white.

Rt Hon Theresa May MP, Home Secretary, 2 July 2013

While the methodology behind the racial disparity figures for stop and search is fundamentally flawed, it is also fundamentally misleading. Even if one subscribes – as many do – to the flawed methodology, the disparity figures that are generated and promoted by activists are misleading and overstate the extent of the alleged problem.

Case study: Dorset and the challenge of a flawed measure for racial disparity

Dorset is regularly cited as the police force in England and Wales with the “biggest racial disparity” in stop and search and arrests. Pressure groups, like StopWatch, publicise a disparity ratio for stop and search of 20.3:1 according to their latest figures – a ratio that has worsened in recent years, even as the volume of stop and search has fallen significantly.

179 HC Deb, 2 July 2013, c773 [Accessed on 1 August 2018 via www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2013-07-02a.773.1]
180 Black people still far more likely to be stopped and searched by police than other ethnic groups, The Independent, 6 August 2015 [Accessed on 2 July 2018 via www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/black-people-still-far-more-likely-to-be-stopped-and-searched-by-police-than-other-ethnic-groups-10444436.html]
The headline that “a black person is 20 times more likely to be stopped and searched than a white person” in Dorset is hugely damaging and can easily be misunderstood. Anecdotally, some mistake the figure for implying that Dorset Police stop 20 times more black people than white people.

The metric itself is also fundamentally flawed. It uses ONS census population data that simply does not reflect the street population. After controlling for the available street population, academic studies have found the alleged racial disparity in stop and search virtually disappears – as the examples below from the towns of Reading and Slough in the Thames Valley Police area demonstrate:

Figures 52: Available population in Reading (Thames Valley)

![Figure 52: Available population in Reading (Thames Valley)](image)

Figure 53: Available Population in Slough (Thames Valley)

![Figure 53: Available Population in Slough (Thames Valley)](image)

Source: P.A.J. Waddington et al. (2004)\textsuperscript{182}

This academic evidence, and the original Home Office study on which it is based, appear to have been deliberately ignored or overlooked by some who appear to have been intent on crafting an anti-police or anti-stop and search narrative.\textsuperscript{183}

A further issue with the current racial disparity methodology is that it compares unique people from census data, with individual stop and searches, rather than the volume of unique


people subject to a stop and search. Therefore, a police operation targeting a prolific offender with a specific racial or ethnic identity can generate multiple stop and search records even though they all relate to just one offender.

This has real implications for proactive policing at a local level. For example, generally county lines are run out of major cities which are far more racially and ethnically diverse than the “counties” in which they operate. As a result, if county forces seek to use stop and search to tackle these offenders, then the alleged racial disparity can be expected to increase significantly.

In the case of Dorset, if they were to stop a county line dealer who happened to be black, just once a week, this would see their racial disparity ratio increase from 20.3 to 25.0. If they were to stop such a drug dealer once per day, it would increase to 52.4.

As identified above – Dorset appears to be the most “racist” force with a black person 20 times more likely than a white person to be stopped. However, this in fact works out at the equivalent of Dorset Police stopping barely half of one (0.6) too many black people on the average day.

Using this calculation for every force reveals that, excluding the Metropolitan Police, just seven police forces stop and search more than one “too many” black people on an average day.

Figure 54 shows how the disproportionality ratios behind the flawed methodology translate into the actual volume of black people stopped and searched by police on the average day. As is evident, the flawed disproportionality ratios are out of all proportion to the actual “excess volume” of people being stopped and searched.

As the Lammy Review into race and the criminal justice system articulated, it is vital for public confidence that alleged disparities are understood and explained or, if there is no explanation, then they should be tackled. In the case of stop and search, it appears as

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though little effort has been made by either police chiefs, Mayors or Police and Crime Commissioners, to offer a meaningful explanation, with many preferring instead to parrot the flawed statistics peddled by pressure groups and activists.

Therefore, we propose that, in line with the recommendations form the Lammy Review, the Home Office and partners consult on the development of new measures for assessing and understanding potential racial disparity in the use of tactics like stop and search. At a minimum it should seek to consider both the available street population in a given area, the racial breakdown of suspected offenders for appropriate crime types, and the breakdown of local prolific or high-harm offenders.

**Recommendation 38:** The Home Office must consult on the development of a new methodology for assessing and understanding potential racial disparity in the use of tactics like stop and search. This is vital to ensure that the public, politicians, and police leaders are armed with methodologically sound facts in relation to this important crime-fighting and life-saving tool.

Police forces have gone to great lengths – along with other organisations and groups – to educate young people on their rights in relation to stop and search. It is a very significant concern that in many cases the racial disparity statistics have been incorporated in training packages and presentations. These flawed statistics – presented as fact – have undoubtedly contributed to significant concern about the use of stop and search by young people. We believe that they should be removed from all presentation and training packages and replaced with a methodologically robust measure.

We are especially concerned that in fuelling a false narrative around policing, young people are inadvertently believing that when they are stopped and searched, they are victims of discrimination. This is potentially causing some young people to obstruct or otherwise resist police in the lawful use of their powers. It is vital that young people are equipped with the facts and we consider there to be significant scope for improving the quality and objectivity of the information provided to young people.

**Recommendation 39:** Police forces, their partners, and those groups using flawed racial disparity statistics for stop and search in training packages and presentations for young people should desist. They risk fueling a false narrative that undermines the confidence of young people and breeds fear and suspicion of police.

If one racial disparity should concern us in 2018 it is victimisation

While some activists and pressure groups continue to promote a narrative of “police” or “institutional racism” and put forward misleading statistics around racial disparities in the use of stop and search, the Home Office Homicide Index reveals a racial disparity that should be a very real concern.

We already know that those aged 15 to 24 years old are some of the most likely to be caught up in serious violence, gangs, gun crime, and knife crime. Excluding terrorism and domestic abuse cases, the Home Office Homicide Index from 2008/09 to 2016/17 shows that across England and Wales young people aged 15–24 who were non-white were on
average 3.5 times (excluding London) and 5.8 times (including London) more likely to be fatally shot or stabbed than young people aged 15–24 who were white.

Figure 55: How many times more likely a non-white 15–24 year old is to be fatally shot or stabbed (excluding terrorism and domestic abuse)

It is also possible to compare the share of population accounted for by non-white 15–24 year olds across England and Wales, both including and excluding London. This can then be compared against the share of non-terrorist and non-domestic homicide victims, fatal stabbing victims, and fatal shooting victims.

Figure 56: Disparity in victimisation of non-white 15–24 year olds

Source: Home Office and ONS185 (*excluding London)

Source: Home Office and ONS186

185 Home Office Homicide Index (15–24 year olds, method: sharp instruments or method: shooting, excluding terrorism and domestic abuse) for 2008/09 to 2016/17 and ONS NOMIS Population Data by age and ethnicity (2011)

186 Home Office Homicide Index (15–24 year olds, method: sharp instruments or method: shooting, excluding terrorism and domestic abuse) for 2008/09 to 2016/17 and ONS NOMIS Population Data by age and ethnicity (2011)
Across England and Wales, non-white 15 to 24-year olds account for just 18 per cent of the population – but, excluding terrorist attacks and domestic abuse cases, they make up 44 per cent of homicide victims, 52 per cent of fatal stabbing victims, and 76 per cent of fatal shooting victims.

Excluding London, they account for 13 per cent of the population – but, excluding terrorist attacks and domestic abuse cases, they make up 26 per cent of homicide victims, 31 per cent of fatal stabbing victims, and 55 per cent of fatal shooting victims.

It is a shame that such disparities as these have not been at the centre of government and political discourse in relation to the problems of gangs, serious youth violence, and the enormous trauma that each homicide causes to communities.

Similarly, while many politicians and others have parroted flawed statistics on the alleged racial disparity in stop and search, few have seemingly dared to confront the far more concerning reality that young non-white 15–24 year olds are more than twice as likely to be killed at the hand of another, and four times as likely to be fatally shot and killed, than a white 15–24 year old.

**The recommendations for London could be applied elsewhere**

Many of the recommendations made in relation to London and the Mayor of London could as easily be applied to other geographies across England and Wales, substituting the Mayor of London for either the local Mayor with responsibility for policing and crime or else the Police and Crime Commissioner.

### Case study: West Midlands Commission on Gangs and Violence

The Police and Crime Commissioner for the West Midlands set up a Gangs and Violence Commission. The Commission published a report by Reverend Dr Carver Anderson, that included a recognition that:

The Commission’s report, while not referencing the work of the Violence Reduction Unit in Glasgow nor the broader GVI movement, did recognise that the criminal justice and law enforcement responses should be set within a broader public health framework:

> The research says that there are more possibilities for real change where the criminal justice, law enforcement approaches are considered within a public health framework.

The report identified the potential for bringing in expert negotiators to arrange ceasefires and peace deals between rival gangs, a mentoring scheme to guide youngsters at risk of offending, more support for ex-offenders to find work and make a fresh law-abiding start after prison, alternative activities for young teenagers at risk of school exclusion or offending such as the Volunteer Police Cadets.

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In particular, we believe that where there is an identified gang or group violence problem within a locality, there is scope for a Group Violence Intervention that combines the simple clear message, and the genuine offer of help, with the sure and certain knowledge of consequences in the event that the violence does not stop.

**Recommendation 40:** Police and Crime Commissioners, Mayors, and Chief Constables beyond London should consider the extent to which gangs and group violence are driving local patterns of knife crime, gun crime, and serious violence. Where identified, we encourage consideration of a Group Violence Intervention.
Part III
Time for leadership

It’s a question of leadership. We know what works. We know it can be done. It now needs someone to make it happen and ensure that it gets delivered.

Karyn McCluskey, former Director, Scottish Violence Reduction Unit

There has been far too little action at all levels to tackle the situation we are in. But leadership is without doubt the most important element of this, at central and local government level, and in the police.

Simon Antrobus, Chairman of the Gangs Working Group, Dying to Belong

On the issue of serious violence and tackling gangs in London, the need for leadership on the issue has been long overdue. Leadership that can offer the promise to extend beyond existing political cycles and leadership that is clear, visible, and committed to getting results.

Today, it is the Mayor of London who, through the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), has responsibility for policing and crime in London. Accountability and leadership on this issue should come from the Mayor.

But with barely 1 in 5 Londoners believing that the Mayor of London should take the lead on delivering a strategy that tackles gangs or groups involving serious violence in London, there is clearly a need for the Mayor to step up and take on these challenges.

Almost 1 in 3 Londoners believe that the Metropolitan Police should take the lead, and as many again, look to the UK Government. The relative lack of backing for the Mayor to lead on the issue, speaks to the need for renewed leadership on this issue of vital importance to Londoners.
It is vital that the issue of gangs and serious youth violence is recognised as being everybody’s business. Very often it is only considered as a problem for the police to deal with. We explore, in this Chapter, how the safeguarding agenda provides a key avenue through which awareness and action in relation to gangs and serious youth violence can be driven.

Making use of existing multi-agency structures to achieve results

Adopting a Safer Streets GVI does not mean starting over from scratch. There is already a great deal of work being conducted by hard-working and dedicated professionals across local authorities, Youth Offending Teams/Services, the Metropolitan Police, probation services, prisons, charities, community centres, social enterprises, and individuals within communities.

The reality of London having 32 boroughs means that there will be 32 starting points for local authority involvement with a Safer Streets GVI, with some local authorities operating Integrated Gangs Unit, some having more or less youth provision, some having more or less support for parents and families struggling with challenging behaviour from their children. The Safer London GVI should therefore accommodate these different starting points and provide a framework against which service gaps and provision can be effectively mapped and closed.

Case study: The Integrated Gangs Unit in Hackney

The Integrated Gangs Unit brings together the police, Council, and other strategic partners in Hackney to divert young people at risk away from gangs. It is a co-located service, bringing key officers from a broad range of organisations to work together in the same building.

The Hackney IGU works with around 150 people who are involved in gangs at any moment in time. The IGU works with them to support them to change their behaviour. The IGU works with a number of partners including:

• **St Giles Trust** – providing one-to-one sessions to the 150 members of the caseload, providing support, training, and education to prevent offending.

• **Crib’s Parents Voice Project** – bringing together parents worried that their children are at risk of becoming involved in the gangs. The sessions are free, with a range of professionals to help parents recognise the signs of gang involvement and give advice on how they can support their children to avoid getting involved with gangs.

• **Empower Safer London** – offers one-to-one support to hundreds of young people across London who have experienced sexual exploitation associated with gangs or are displaying harmful sexual behaviour.

• **Mentivation** – a mentoring, motivation, and mediation service that works one-to-one with young people experiencing difficulty in education, the community, or at home.

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### Case Study: Operation Bastion Debriefing

The Metropolitan Police has begun to use a new form of debriefing – based on routine activity theory – that promises to achieve much improved results from follow-up debriefs of young people who may go missing, be at risk of exploitation, or otherwise be vulnerable and potentially involved in crime.

The work demonstrates that it is possible for police officers to establish vital relationships with both young people and their parents, guardians or family – even where there may have been a history of distrust.

We believe that this approach should feature within the Safer Street GVI programme, hitting key objectives of helping understand local issues, safeguard young people, and build new and trusted relationships between the police and individual young people and their families.”

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### The Mayor of London

Our polling finds that the Mayor of London enjoys wide recognition in the capital, with 83 per cent of Londoners saying they would know the Mayor by name or by sight – the same proportion that would know one of their neighbours by name or sight. Only the Prime Minister achieves greater recognition.

But this recognition fails to translate into public expectations when it comes to leading on the delivery of a strategy that tackles gangs or groups involving serious violence in London.
The Mayor of London is legally responsible for policing and crime

The legal picture is clear on this point. The Mayor of London, through the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), is required by law to produce a plan that explains how the police, community safety partners, and other criminal justice agencies will work together to reduce crime.

The Police and Crime Plan reflects the Mayor’s manifesto and priorities for making London a safer city for all Londoners and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) is the strategic oversight body tasked with devising the Police and Crime Plan and ensuring that it is delivered over four years, with an appointed Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime.

But Londoners are more than three times as likely to look to Whitehall or the Met directly

Despite this legal reality, the political reality is that barely one in five Londoners (19 per cent) say the Mayor should take the lead on delivering a strategy that tackles gangs or groups involving serious violence in London. With the remainder of Londoners evenly split between looking to the UK Government (34 per cent) or the Metropolitan Police (32 per cent).

There is a clear need for the Mayor of London to step up and visibly demonstrate real leadership on the delivery of a strategy to tackle the problem of gangs or groups involved in serious violence. At present for every Londoner who looks to the Mayor, almost three and a half Londoners are looking to either the UK Government or the Metropolitan Police to lead on the issue.

Londoners are most satisfied with police and educators, less so the politicians

Asking Londoners who they think has done enough over the last five years to keep young people out of and away from gangs or groups involving serious violence, both the Mayor of London and the UK Government fare much worse than the police (net agree rating of 22 per cent) and schools and colleges (net agree rating of 16 per cent).

While the Mayor of London at least enjoys a positive net agree rating (5 per cent) compared to the UK Government’s negative net agree rating (minus 2 per cent), there is clearly a sense that both of them could and should have done more in recent years to tackle the issues.
Figure 57: To what extent do you agree or disagree that each of the following has done enough over the last five years to keep young people out of and away from gangs or groups involving serious violence?

![Bar chart showing agreement levels for different entities](image)

*Source: CSJ Crime in London Poll*

Within the broader context of austerity – whether in relation to policing budgets or local authority and youth services – Londoners are more dissatisfied with the efforts of the UK Government than the Mayor of London.

Taking “satisfaction” as the percentage of Londoners who net agreed that the particular entity had done enough over the last five years to keep young people out of and away from gangs or groups involving serious violence in London, and “expectation” as the percentage of Londoners who believed that the specific entity should take the lead on delivering a strategy that tackles gangs or groups involving serious violence, we can see that Londoners view the police more favourably than both the Mayor and the UK Government.

The other conclusion one might reach is that while the Mayor of London currently enjoys a slightly higher satisfaction rating, even when the UK Government enjoys a negative net satisfaction rating (-2 per cent), more Londoners look to the UK Government with expectation than either the Mayor (19 per cent) or the Met (32 per cent).
Londoners look at the UK Government with dissatisfaction and expectation

As the CSJ warned in *Time to Wake Up: Tackling gangs one year after the riots*, Government must remain committed to tackling violence and gangs.\(^{189}\) Allowing policy in this area to drift, or to otherwise undermine efforts to preserve public safety and tackle gangs, is to give up on children and young people who have already been badly let down or made bad choices. It would leave communities ever more vulnerable to even larger, more active gangs in the future.

Austerity – whether the narrative or the reality – has likely contributed to the dissatisfaction, not least given the realities of the Mayor blaming the government for cuts to policing and reductions in budgets.

The Home Secretary has signalled clearly his desire to see an improved funding settlement for policing in the next Comprehensive Spending Review period. We consider this to be essential to preventing the further erosion of proactive community policing and the rebuilding of other capabilities key to the fight against crime.

The extent to which the problem is linked to “austerity” risks effective action

The reality that the rise in violent crime commenced in or around 2014, means that the origins of the current problem pre-date the tenure of the current Mayor. The political

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realities – which see the current Mayor attribute the problems to cuts made during the period of the Coalition government, and the mantra from the UK Government previously of “crime is falling and police reform is working”, creates a situation which risks seeing politicians defend and debate their respective political positions, rather than being focussed on implementing the solutions necessary to tackle gangs and violent crime.

The former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Lord Hogan Howe, himself recognised the “warning lights” were “flashing” as he left the Metropolitan Police:

\begin{quote}
After the last few years when we have reduced crime significantly in London, as you’ll have seen from the crime figures today, the warning lights are flashing.
\end{quote}

Commissioner Hogan-Howe QPM, Metropolitan Police (2017)

The Home Secretary’s recognition and desire to fight for an improved settlement for policing in the next Comprehensive Spending Review is a welcome sign, but remains a number of years off. In the meanwhile, options for securing additional funds have been limited by the flat cash settlement.

Figure 59: Political overview of Westminster and the London Mayoralty 2009–2018

![Political overview of Westminster and the London Mayoralty 2009–2018](image)

The flat cash settlement for policing – in which Mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners have only been able to maintain budgets by increasing the police precept to the maximum – means that, even at a time of rising demand, forces are limited to cutting costs, efficiency savings, or redesigning services as a means of protecting or improving service delivery.

As we set out in Growing the Local, the Government should ensure flexibility and freedom for Mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners to make use of the policing precept. We therefore welcome the adoption of the increase in the cap and the switch from a percentage cap to a cash cap – and believe that it is necessary for the Government to create additional flexibility if the Government refuse to add resources to policing directly.

Creating the freedom to fund the fight against crime in London

In December 2017, in *Growing the Local* we called for greater freedoms to enable Mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners to better resource the fight against crime. The Government adopted these proposals – shifting from a percentage cap to a cash cap and raising the cap to the equivalent of £1 per month for a Band D property.

The Mayor has taken full advantage of this increased freedom. However, our polling of Londoners found that while 1 in 4 opposed an increase in council tax rates for the purposes of boosting community policing, there was significant support from others for potential increases in council tax.

**Figure 60: Proportion of Londoners and the sums they are prepared to pay through increased council tax for additional community policing**

Source: CSJ Crime in London Poll191

That 3 out of 4 Londoners would support an increase in Council Tax speaks to the public appetite for more proactive community policing and – at least hypothetically – a willingness to pay for it. Given the shortcomings of Council Tax as a means of raising taxation, it seems reasonable to expect that other funding mechanisms would likely have solicited even greater support.

We estimate that the approximate cost of employing four additional officers to ensure each of London’s 629 wards would have six dedicated police officers to be in the region of £100 million. This sum could be raised through an increase in Band D council tax of £3 per month.

Split by income group it is possible to identify that around half (51 per cent) of Londoners with a household income of £40,000 or more would be prepared to pay at least £3 per month for such an uplift in service.

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Unfortunately, a more progressive mechanism for raising taxation locally to fund local policing does not currently exist. The Mayor of London is already increasing the precept for MOPAC by the maximum £12 per annum permitted by the Home Secretary, along with a £2.20 increase in the non-police precept, representing a £14.20 increase for a Band D property in London.

The Government has – thus far – failed to deliver on the pledge for an improved police funding formula and has also failed to deliver any improved mechanism by which the Mayor or Police and Crime Commissioners might more equitably increase or decrease taxation locally.

In either event, it is for the Government to decide on which basis to support the necessary investment in proactive community policing. The Government may choose to fund the increase themselves, to increase the cap on the police precept, or to offer a combination of the two that would enable the necessary £100 million to be secured for proactive community policing.

Given the dissatisfaction with the Government on the issue (see Figure 58) and the widespread recognition (82 per cent) on the part of Londoners that “law and order is a fundamental duty of any government”, with just 3 per cent disagreeing, it is our belief that the most equitable solution would be a joint approach.

We therefore call on the Government to honour their repeated pledges to “protect the police” by considering a matched funding scheme that provides £1 of additional funds for every additional £1 raised through increases in the police precept. While it would require £2:£1 matched funding to fully resource the additional proactive community police officers, there is a lead time to recruitment and training, meaning that in the short term and in the run up to the CSR the Government could, at a minimum, look to offer a £1:£1 matched funding arrangement – securing valuable resources for frontline proactive community policing without significantly extending beyond existing spending levels or risking undermining existing transformation, efficiency saving, and cost reduction programmes. By restricting the use of these funds to ensure dedicated proactive community policing, the Government would not undermine planned or forthcoming efficiency drives.

The business case for HM Treasury is, on this occasion, a simple one: the provision of law and order is a fundamental duty of the state and the failure to maintain proactive community policing risks surrendering local communities to gangs and drug dealers, undermines key elements of the Counter Terrorism Strategy, and only creates larger economic and social costs elsewhere in the community and wider society.

**Recommendation 41:** The Government must recognise it has a fundamental duty to ensure law and order. In the absence of any more comprehensive settlement, it should consider a matched funding scheme that provides £1 of additional funds for every additional £1 raised through increases in the police precept.
Creating the leadership London needs to tackle the problem

The fact that just 19 per cent of Londoners look to the Mayor of London to lead on delivering a strategy that tackles gangs or groups involving serious violence in the capital speaks to the need for a reinvigorated effort on the part of the Mayor of London to create the profile required to lead London on this important issue.

In London, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police answers to the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime, with a separate reporting line to the Home Secretary on national matters. She must at all times retain the confidence of both the Mayor (and DMPC) and the Home Secretary.192

The Commissioner has said that the issues of gun and knife crime will be “defining” in relation to her Commissionership. We therefore believe that as a priority plans should be prepared for a Safer Streets GVI in London, consisting of:

- A thorough understanding of the local problem and what is driving it;
- Committed and visible leadership at the highest levels;
- Full multi-agency collaboration, data-sharing, and communication;
- A combination of enforcement, intervention, and prevention;
- An honest and targeted approach; and
- Meaningful community engagement.

The Commissioner should therefore develop the proposal for a Safer Streets GVI, and seek to follow the structure utilised in Cincinnati, with a Governing Board, Strategy and Implementation Team, and relevant Working Groups. This same structure should be repeated for each Safer Streets Zone, in order to engage local partners and be able to troubleshoot any local implementation issues.

Figure 61: Cincinnati’s initiative to reduce violence (CIRV)

Recommendation 42: The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis should immediately commence planning for a Safer Streets GVI, beginning with work to identify the initial cohort in consultation with Integrated Gang Units (IGUs), Gang and Organised Crime Command, and Met Intel.

Recognising the reality of working with 32 London Boroughs and partners

Greater London, excluding the City of London, is made up of 32 local authorities, each covering one of London’s Boroughs. These local authority areas have mapped onto the Basic Command Unit (BCU) of organisation that the Met Police has historically used within Territorial Policing. However, today, the Metropolitan Police is moving to merged boroughs – meaning a total of 12 BCUs, though they retain a named Superintendent for each of the boroughs within the BCU.

The organisation of local authorities in London means that the capital has up to 32 approaches in relation to such services as Children and Young People (CYP), Youth Offending Teams (YOT) or Youth Offending Services (YOS), and Community Safety.

London Councils represents London’s 32 borough councils and the City of London. It is a cross-party organisation that works on behalf of all of its member authorities regardless of political persuasion. London Councils have a crucial role in helping circulate good and effective practice across London’s local authorities, as demonstrated by the creation in 2017 of a London Gang Member Referral Guide based on processes employed in the London Borough of Hackney.193

The Integrated Gang Units (IGUs) provide an example of how local authorities can work with partners, including the police. It would be vital to ensure that where IGUs are working effectively, they should be incorporated alongside the Safer Streets GVI to help expedite the initial cohort identification and assessment phases.

Local authorities should publicly commit to the Safer Streets GVI and be held accountable for doing so. The Mayor, working with London Councils, and in concert with the Metropolitan Police, should require each local authority and partner agency in London to develop protocols for supporting necessary enforcement action against those high harm players who are identified as requiring targeted and sustained attention.

The Mayor and local authority Chief Executive and council leader should communicate the importance of the approach to their workforce. It is necessary that the enforcement element of the approach is understood within the context of the overarching message: that the violence must stop, that there is a genuine offer of help, and that if the violence does not stop, there will be consequences.

A Safer Streets GVI Enforcement Toolkit should be created by the Enforcement Working Group and regularly updated with a protocol to ensure that where high harm offenders have their enforcement plan activated, local authorities and other partners act swiftly in support of the clear message that “the violence must stop”.

**Recommendation 43:** The Mayor, DWP, HMRC, London Councils, and others to be represented alongside the Metropolitan Police on the Enforcement Working Group, aiding with the development of an enforcement toolkit covering the wide range of offences, regulations, and rules that can be used to target high harm players and help reinforce the message that “the violence must stop”.

To help drive accountability, and to crucially improve both the understanding of the issues and the identification of earlier interventions, in the event of a gang-related death of a young person or the death of any young person (under 30) as a result of a knife, gun, or other incident of serious violence, a Serious Case Review should be undertaken. The Serious Case Review should also include a debrief of the police and other enforcement activity that followed the incident.

Serious Case Reviews have provided valuable learnings for social workers and other professionals in other areas of child protection, abuse, and safeguarding. The methodology should be expanded to include young people who are killed as a result of gang – or other serious violent crime.

**Recommendation 44:** In the event of a gang-related death of a young person or the death of any young person as a result of a knife, gun, or other incident of serious violence, an approximation to a Serious Case Review should be undertaken and a full public response made by the local authority and other relevant agencies.

Mobilising and empowering the community to provide the “moral voice” and tackle issues

As established in Chapter 3, the “moral voice” of the community is a vital component within the Safer Streets GVI and has represented challenges in prior attempts at implementing GVI in London. We therefore propose the creation of a new Voices for Safer Streets Panel.

It would sit alongside existing structures – like the Safer Neighbourhood Boards and Safer Neighbourhood Ward Panels – that help to bring the police and community together. However, in recognition of the specialist focus of the Voices for Safer Streets Panel – namely the mobilisation and empowerment of the community’s “moral voice”, we believe it is vital that the entity be distinct from the existing structures.

**Figure 62: Incorporating the community within the Safer Streets GVI**
The Voices for Safer Streets Panel (VSSP) would look to mirror the make-up evidenced in the Watts Gang Taskforce (see page 59), which includes the mothers and grandmothers of gang leaders past and present, local streetwork and youth work leaders, and other credible local voices.

**Illustrative membership of a voices for Safer Streets Panel**

- Local parents and family members bereaved through gang or gang-related violence
- Local streetwork/youth work/community centre leaders
- Local religious and faith leaders
- Local ex-gang members
- Meetings of the panel would naturally include and engage with:
  - Local senior police officer (Inspector or Superintendent)
  - Local Gang Exit and Support Services lead
  - Local Safer Neighbourhood Team officers

The VSSP would not be run by the police – and membership would primarily consist of a credible local membership who support the Safer Streets GVI goal of reducing violence and sign up to the core messages directed at those involved in or at risk of serious violence. Most importantly that “we care about you, we want you to be safe and to succeed, but the violence must stop” and that if it does not then there will be comprehensive legal attention given to groups or gangs that commit serious violence.

The message and principles VSSP members would be required to sign up to must be kept clear and simple. This will help maximise the potential reach of the membership, and help ensure that the community and membership are both clear on the message of the Safer Streets GVI.

*The community won’t have read and won’t even know about the Serious Violence Strategy by the Home Office or the knife crime strategy from the Mayor. But they are living in and part of the community that is affected – we need to ensure communities sit around the table as they have a key role to play.*

Revd Les Isaac, Founder, Street Pastors

The VSSP would include the police, providing them with a clear mechanism by which information about incidents can be communicated to the community, and an opportunity for the community membership to feed in their concerns around growing tensions or issues. It would also include the local lead for gang exit and support services, underscoring the point that support and help is available for those who need it.

The Voices for Safer Streets Panel would meet on a regular basis – likely a weekly or fortnightly basis. In the aftermath of or in anticipation of serious violence – such as stabbings, shootings, or other related serious violence – there would be an expectation of an extraordinary meeting and an expectation that the Panel would, in support of the Safer Streets GVI, deliver violence reduction messaging, facilitate referrals to mediation services, and the offer of help to young people in the locality to exit gangs or violent lifestyles.
Local politicians – including local councillors, MPs, Assembly Members, and the Mayor of London – would be expected to support the Voices for Safer Streets Panel and recognise the vital role it provides in helping to mobilise the "moral voice" of the community against violence and in favour of gang exit.

Learning from the approach to Counter-Terrorism

The Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) recognises that the threat of terrorism is “large and multi-faceted” and calls for a “joined-up approach – uniting government, the wider public sector, and individuals around a common goal of preventing terrorism". 194

The CONTEST framework – comprising Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare (4P) work strands – has entered the consciousness of law enforcement and partners in their work to tackle the terrorist threat. The same 4P framework ought to be more readily and reliably referenced in relation to gangs and group violence.

The Home Office Serious Violence Strategy cites “4P” only once, but includes multiple references to “prevent”, “protect”, “pursue”, and “prepare”. The decade since the 7/7 bombings saw a clear focus upon counter-terrorism and the operationalisation of the 4P framework within and beyond policing. If we are serious about tackling the challenge of gang and group violence, then the next decade must see a focus on and operationalisation of a similar 4P framework in this domain.

Moving beyond specific violent crimes towards a violence strategy

The next decade must also see a move from strategies and plans that seek to address specific forms of violence. Recent examples of this include the Mayor of London’s Knife Crime Strategy and, in Canada, the City of Toronto’s Gun Violence Reduction Plan.

It is understandable for policymakers and politicians to focus on specific forms of violence – especially where prompted by either spikes in specific crime types or where there are specific issues. However, over the next decade, London must develop a strategy that goes further and looks beyond gangs, knife crime, gun crime, or vitriolage, and instead seeks to tackle violence in the broadest sense.

Case study: The London Borough of Haringey’s 10 year plan

The London Borough of Haringey has actively sought to develop a ten-year strategy to tackle gangs and reduce violence. In 2016, they also set out some ideas for what success looks like:

- Neighbourhoods no longer living in fear of gang violence; with the number of gang members dwindling as members are supported to change or face enforcement.
- The exploitation associated with gangs is understood and no longer tolerated – agencies and communities intervene early and take enforcement action to protect girls and vulnerable people.
- A vibrant array of positive diversionary activities provides an attractive alternative to gang membership as a lifestyle/culture.
- All young people at risk at gangs due to SEN, MH, family breakdown etc are identified early and supported to thrive.
- Regeneration provides all young people with real pathways to employment and prosperity – so that Gang membership is stripped of its appeal as the route to wealth and status.
- All neighbourhoods have high aspirations for young people – and all adults “step up” to support young people to realise those aspirations.
- Communities and public sector agencies work closely together – all communities have confidence in the Police and the Council.

It is important that this broader and longer-term strategy is developed. Failing to do so will continue to drive short-term solutions to long-term problems.

Leadership that values and supports parents over the crucial first 1,001 days

The Government’s formation of an Early Years Taskforce is a positive development, recognising the huge importance of the first 1,001 days of a child’s life. Ensuring effective government policy in support of parents and families during this period is crucial to securing the best possible outcomes for young people and society, helping reduce and minimise adverse childhood experiences (ACEs), and in turn helping support efforts to reduce violence and tackle gangs.

The 1001 Critical Days Manifesto was the UK’s first cross-party children’s manifesto and provides a vision for the provision of services in the UK for the early years period, which puts forward the moral, scientific, and economic case for the importance of the conception to age two period.

This period of life is crucial to increase children’s life chances, and they have pledged their commitment to ensure all babies have the best possible start in life. They all agree that

196 The 1001 Critical Days Manifesto, October 2016 [Accessed on 1 August 2018 via www.1001criticaldays.co.uk/sites/default/files/1001%20days_oct16_1st.pdf]
society is missing an opportunity if we don’t prevent problems before they arise and that it is vital that a focus on the early years is placed at the heart of the policy making process.

The Manifesto highlights the importance of acting early to enhance outcomes for children. Too many children and young people do not have the start in life they need, leading to high costs for society, and too many affected lives. Every child deserves an equal opportunity to lead a healthy and fulfilling life, and the 1001 Critical Days Manifesto supports this.

Future and updated violence reduction strategies from governments should make explicit reference to the 1,001 critical days and recognise that securing the best possible start in life for all children and young people will have a significant impact on violence and gang membership in later life.

Particular attention should be paid to the role of fathers. It is vital that young people susceptible to gang involvement are given a positive role model that they can share a deep relationship with. In Dying to Belong, we highlighted the link between the absence of an alpha male figure and gang membership. A large appeal of gang membership is the sense of community and leadership. Fathers thus have a vital role in providing a male role model for their children.

**Recommendation 45:** Recommendations made by the Government’s Early Years Taskforce chaired by Rt Hon Andrea Leadsom MP should be adopted and implemented, recognising that the first 1,001 days are crucial to securing the best possible outcomes for young people and society. The Taskforce should specifically reference how support for parenting and families during the early years – and beyond – can most effectively support violence reduction and gang prevention.

**The time for action is now**

If our proposals for immediate action and longer-term change are not accepted and implemented, then we can expect to see more young lives lost or seriously impacted by gangs and related serious violence.

If London implemented a Safer Streets GVI and achieved comparable reductions to those seen in Glasgow, Boston, and Cincinnati, it could save the lives of thousands of young Londoners over the next decade, preventing serious injury and the physical and psychological traumas associated with exposure to gangs and serious violence.

The focus today must be on moving forward and seeing the proven blueprint applied within London. As our report, Dying to Belong, set out almost a decade ago, tackling violence is everyone’s business. It can be stopped.
chapter seven
Recommendations

Ten years on and there is still an awful lot of talk, talk, talk. It is time to do.
Rev Les Isaac OBE, Founder, Street Pastors

If the issues of serious violence are not tackled in the near term, then there will be a significant human and societal cost, as well as a political cost at the ballot box for those who the public expect to lead on and tackle these issues.

The political cost of failure could be significant. We know that serious violence can be prevented. We know what works and have set out a proven blueprint. It simply requires political will and leadership to ensure that it is put into action.

In the first instance, this should be the duty of the Mayor of London to lead, through the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, and for the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police to operationally deliver. With London having twice previously attempted to introduce a GVI, and amid rising knife and gun crime, the stakes have rarely been higher.

Throughout this report, we have called upon several bodies to take ownership and do their bit to tackle the gang epidemic. Coordination is vital in this response. Therefore, we have summarised all of the recommendations of this report in this section. It’s time for action, we can no longer accept the record high number of gangs on our streets. It can be stopped.

Recommendations: For all agencies

Recommendation 1
A new Safer Streets Group Violence Intervention, taking the proven blueprint that has been successfully implemented in Glasgow, Boston, and Cincinnati, to tackle the problem of gang and gang-related violence.

Recommendation 11
The Safer Streets GVI should incorporate professional streetwork services for Safer Street Zones that are aligned to the core principles of the GVI, and that follow the good practice identified in other cities that sees such workers being certificated and having positive relations both with the community and the police, to help breakdown rather than reinforce barriers.
Recommendation 33
Adopt the term “need to reach” to replace the term “hard to reach” in all future government policy papers.

Recommendation 40
Police and Crime Commissioners, Mayors and Chief Constables beyond London should consider the extent to which gangs and group violence are driving local patterns of knife crime, gun crime, and serious violence. Where identified, we encourage consideration of a Group Violence Intervention.

Recommendation 43
The Mayor, DWP, HMRC, London Councils, and others to be represented alongside the Metropolitan Police on the Enforcement Working Group, aiding with the development of an enforcement toolkit covering the wide range of offences, regulations, and rules that can be used to target high harm players and help reinforce the message that “the violence must stop”.

Recommendations for the Mayor of London

Recommendation 3
The Mayor of London and the Home Secretary should prioritise the award of funding from the Young Londoners Fund and the Early Intervention Fund in support of those local authorities that have accepted the Safer Street Zone designation and agreed to participate in the GVI approach.

Recommendation 5
The Mayor of London should create and appoint a Safer Streets Commissioner with responsibility for leading the Safer London GVI centrally and holding partners accountable for the effective implementation of the intervention.

Recommendation 7
The Mayor should convene an Implementation Taskforce with representation from the Metropolitan Police, National Crime Agency, HMPPS, the National Probation Service, the London Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC), housing enforcement, local authorities, HMRC and DWP to develop approaches in support of encouraging and/or compelling call-ins and the development of protocols and approaches to the consequences strand.

Recommendation 8
Create Voices for Safer Streets Panels (VSSPs) to provide a mechanism for engaging and mobilising the community’s moral voice and to sit alongside existing Safer Neighbourhood Boards, helping diversify membership, and strengthen relationships.

Recommendation 20
The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime should conduct a pilot project for independent mediation of complaints against police with a focus on those areas with the lowest trust and confidence in policing. The pilot should be evaluated both in relation to the speed of resolution, the satisfaction of officer and complainant, and improved awareness and understanding on the part of both citizen and police officer. The Independent Office for Police Conduct should support such a pilot and afford latitude to operationalise such an approach.
Recommendation 25
The Mayor of London and frontline public services and partners across London should promote accessible helpline services for parents struggling with early signs of aggressive or anti-social behaviour.

Recommendation 26
The Mayor of London should set an expectation that London’s 32 boroughs each provide access to services in their locality to help parents during the first 1,001 days, but also in relation to where parents have concerns about aggressive or anti-social behaviour or concerns about involvement in gangs or criminality.

Recommendations for The Metropolitan Police

Recommendation 2
The Metropolitan Police should conduct a detailed assessment of London’s 32 boroughs and 632 neighbourhood wards to identify those areas presenting the highest risk and harm, making them worthy of designation as Safer Street Zones.

Recommendation 9
As part of the Safer Streets GVI the Metropolitan Police and London’s Victims Commissioner should extend an invitation to bereaved family members and survivors of serious violence offering them an opportunity to learn about the GVI and to join a local Voices for Safer Streets Panel. Comparable offers should be extended to London’s paramedics and trauma surgeons, and religious leaders who have experience of serious violence through conducting funerals and supporting families in the aftermath of bereavement.

Recommendation 10
The Metropolitan Police’s Gangs and Organised Crime Command should be charged with developing a robust set of measures for the “Consequences” strand of the Safer Streets GVI, considering how to most effectively make use of proactive policing capabilities, as well as partner enforcement activity to maximum effect.

Recommendation 12
The Safer Streets GVI should incorporate a process by which the delivery of Osman warnings by the Metropolitan Police occurs alongside and with the support of a professional streetwork service, ensuring that both the moral voice of the community and the genuine offer of help and support is communicated at this important point of interaction.

Recommendation 13
Initial and in-service training should better prepare and equip officers with the skills and experience to take heated high-stress encounters and convert them into a conversational style. Officers should be assessed on their ability to not just complete realistic stop and search scenarios lawfully and safely, but to demonstrate an ability and willingness to conduct appropriate after-care.

Recommendation 18
Metropolitan Police to review court results relating to individuals identified in the Safer Streets Matrix, to identify any missed opportunities and potential shortcomings. The
Criminal Justice Command should also introduce a clear channel through which police officers may refer questionable charging, prosecutorial, or sentencing decisions for review and/or feedback. Any flagged cases should be discussed in a joint meeting with the Chief Crown Prosecutors for London.

**Recommendation 21**
The Metropolitan Police should overhaul their local communications strategy, ensuring that named borough commanders and Dedicated Ward Officers are better known within their communities. Both these roles should come with a minimum tenure to build trust and relationships.

**Recommendation 23**
London’s Safer Street Zones should be prioritised for the uplift in neighbourhood policing, taking total strength from 2 Police Constables and 1 PCSO, to a total of 6 Police Constables and 1 PCSO. Local policing teams should be expected to be actively developing intelligence and undertaking surveillance to tackle high harm local offenders.

**Recommendation 32**
The Metropolitan Police should conduct research to develop a behavioural detection training package for police officers in relation to identifying potential female gang members and/or behaviours associated with a female carrying or holding weapons or other items. This training package should help empower both male and female police officers to use their powers more effectively in relation to young women and gangs.

**Recommendation 39**
Police forces, their partners, and those groups using flawed racial disparity statistics for stop and search in training packages and presentations for young people should desist. They risk fuelling a false narrative that undermines the confidence of young people and breeds fear and suspicion of police.

**Recommendation 42**
The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis should immediately commence planning for a Safer Streets GVI, beginning with work to identify the initial cohort in consultation with Integrated Gang Units (IGUs), Gang and Organised Crime Command, and Met Intel.

**Recommendations for Local Authorities**

**Recommendation 16**
Youth Offending Services and Teams (YOS/YOTs) working with young people at risk of criminal exploitation or gang membership should, over the course of the supervision period, connect that young person into existing youth services, provision, or centres that can provide a positive environment and trusted positive relationships for the long-term, beyond the length of the order.

**Recommendation 44**
In the event of a gang-related death of a young person or the death of any young person as a result of a knife, gun, or other incident of serious violence, an approximation to a Serious Case Review should be undertaken and a full public response made by the local authority and other relevant agencies.
Recommendations for the Government

Recommendation 4
The Government should implement a new service to facilitate gang exit. This service should provide a phone number and email address through which individuals can ask for help and referrals can be made.

Recommendation 14
The Government and Home Office should include provisions for a Serious Violence Reduction Order (SVRO) within the Offensive Weapons Bill that is currently progressing through Parliament.

Recommendation 15
The Government must recognise the importance of resourcing policing to tackle drug trafficking and the Metropolitan Police must ensure police leaders understand the value of proactive policing and the Met must develop a drug crime strategy.

Recommendation 17
The Government should initiate an urgent review of victim and witness intimidation and look to bring forward measures to better protect victims and witnesses from such intimidation. These measures could and should extend to consider the use of GPS tagging of suspected offenders and the provision of a paired handheld tag for victims and witnesses, alerting them in the event of proximity, and triggering safety plans. Courts must recognise the public interest in ensuring justice is done and be rigorous in remanding in custody individuals who engage in such activity.

Recommendation 24
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) should conduct an urgent thematic review into the availability of crime analysts within the police service. The Review should be accompanied by joint-working between forces and HMIC to understand the current gap in analytical capability.

Recommendation 27
The establishment of Family Hubs in the heart of disadvantaged communities, with the provision of non-stigmatising relationship and parenting education and support provided by effective third sector organisations, with an enhanced role for Health Visitors in the delivery of both targeted and universal support for families.

Recommendation 28
Government should redirect funding from the National Citizen Service to create capacity in priority areas to support uniformed youth organisations and other local youth provision that sign up to the principles of a Safer Streets GVI.

Recommendation 32
Government should progress the proposed Section 80A amendment to the Education Act 2002 that places schools under a legal requirement to ensure that pupils learn about “safety in forming and maintaining relationships”, “the characteristics of healthy relationships”, and “how relationships may affect physical and mental health and well-being”, and “the nature of marriage and its importance for family life and the bringing up of children”.
Recommendation 35
In addition to joint intelligence-led enforcement activity between British Transport Police (BTP) and local police forces, the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) should work with BTP to develop regularly updated training packages for railway staff to facilitate the identification of rail-enabled county line activity.

Recommendation 41
The Government must recognise it has a fundamental duty to ensure law and order. In the absence of any more comprehensive settlement, it should consider a matched funding scheme that provides £1 of additional funds for every additional £1 raised through increases in the police precept.

Recommendation 45
Recommendations made by the Government’s Early Years Taskforce chaired by Rt Hon Andrea Leadsom MP should be adopted and implemented, recognising that the first 1,001 days are crucial to securing the best possible outcomes for young people and society. The Taskforce should specifically reference how support for parenting and families during the early years – and beyond – can most effectively support violence reduction and gang prevention.

Recommendations for the Ministry of Justice

Recommendation 6
The Justice Secretary should specify participation in Group Violence Intervention Call-Ins as an approved and available licence condition, as permitted under Section 250(8) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This would enable the proportionate and necessary application by prison governors and probation of a condition to participate in Call-Ins to offenders being released on licence.

Recommendation 19
The Ministry of Justice should launch a review of Pre-Sentence Reports (PSR) and explore how they might be more effectively produced to better convey an accurate understanding of the root causes of offending, along with greater detail on the pattern of offending. Consideration should also be given to how technology might be used to help test the veracity of claims made by the defendant and to allow other agencies to feed into the PSRs. Quarterly Crime and Criminal Justice Briefings should be offered to the local judiciary, with inputs from police, probation, and the Mayor (or Police and Crime Commissioner). Locally, police forces and communities – through Voices for Safer Streets Panels – should undertake to make greater and more effective use of Community Impact Statements.

Recommendation 34
The Ministry of Justice should develop a comprehensive devolution strategy for Police and Crime Commissioners that includes electronic monitoring and allows for local areas to commission electronic monitoring services that are suitable to their local needs and requirements, such as incorporating within a GVI approach.
Recommendations for the Home Office

Recommendation 3
The Mayor of London and the Home Secretary should prioritise the award of funding from the Young Londoners Fund and the Early Intervention Fund in support of those local authorities that have accepted the Safer Street Zone designation and agreed to participate in the GVI approach.

Recommendation 14
The Government and Home Office should include provisions for a Serious Violence Reduction Order (SVRO) within the Offensive Weapons Bill that is currently progressing through Parliament. A SVRO is a suspicionless stop and search order allowing police to search any ex-offender still on sentence. The Order would only last for the duration of the sentence given by the court.

Recommendation 22
The Home Office Transformation Fund should look favourably on bids submitted by police forces and partners with a view to the development of practical proactive community policing training and tools. As with other Transformation Fund activities, progress and results should be shared freely with other forces.

Recommendation 36
The Home Office should work with the hire car industry to ensure the creation of a data-sharing tool allowing law enforcement to establish who should legally be in possession of and is insured to drive hired vehicles. This could be achieved through a monetary prize to encourage efficiency and innovation.

Recommendation 37
The Home Office’s National Law Enforcement Data (NLED) Programme must facilitate information sharing and the timely provision of data. The programme must support the creation of appropriate safeguarding markers, action plans, and points of contact.

Recommendation 38
The Home Office must consult on the development of a new methodology for assessing and understanding potential racial disparity in the use of tactics like stop and search. This is vital to ensure that the public, politicians and police leaders are armed with methodologically sound facts in relation to this important crime-fighting and life-saving tool.

Recommendations for the Department of Education

Recommendation 29
Schools should be responsible and accountable for the pupils they exclude, and funds should be devolved to them to support vulnerable pupils early. This would involve three main reforms:

- schools, not local authorities, are given responsibility for finding suitable education for the pupils they exclude;
- schools remain accountable for the educational outcomes of the pupils they exclude, which will count towards their performance statistics; and
- all local authority funding for AP is devolved to schools to give them additional resources to support pupils with complex needs.

The Department should consult on whether the accountability we outline above should be weighted to reflect the proportion of time excluded pupils spend in different mainstream schools.

**Recommendation 30**
All secondary schools and colleges in London should either have a Volunteer Police Cadet programme or be affiliated to one nearby. The roll-out and strengthening of the VPC should be prioritised to expedite roll-out across the Safer Streets Zones.